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From the Editor

O

ur Winter issue opens with a special commentary by Hal Brands
entitled, “Rethinking America’s Grand Strategy: Insights from
the Cold War.” One of the problems with drawing lessons from
history is how easy it is to extract the wrong ones. Hal Brands avoids this
problem by accounting for differences between the context of the Cold
War and that of today. The better strategic course for the United States,
he argues, is not that of retrenchment.
Our first forum, The Efficacy of Landpower, offers two contributions
concerning not only what US landpower brings to the table strategically, but also where it comes up short. In “Landpower and American
Credibility,” Michael Allen Hunzeker and Alexander Lanoszka maintain US ground forces provide the authority and reassurance that
make American grand strategy and foreign policy work. Joseph Roger
Clark’s “To Win Wars, Correct the Army’s Political Blind Spot,” offers
a sobering reminder that the performance of US ground forces wants
for improvement in areas outside the winning of battles. The remedy, in
Clark’s view, is to spend more time teaching Army officers how to “get
the politics right.”
The second forum, Professionalism and the Volunteer Military, offers two
articles reflecting on the way ahead for the US military. Don Snider’s
“Will Army 2025 be a Military Profession?” argues the US Army’s
senior leaders will have to exercise active moral leadership to ensure the
Army is a profession in 2025. Louis Yuengert’s “America’s All Volunteer
Force: A Success?” reviews the track-record of the All Volunteer Force,
and contends the model remains viable, contrary to arguments favoring
a return to the draft.
Finally, Putin’s Way of War, features a contribution by Russia expert
Andrew Monaghan of Chatham House. Monaghan’s “The ‘War’ in
Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’,” argues it is well past time to study how
Moscow thinks it might use military force in contemporary conflict.
A great deal of effort has gone into understanding the so-called hybrid
aspects of Russia’s way of war. But too little research is underway
concerning how Moscow’s notions of the utility of military force will
influence its decisions moving forward.
We are also pleased to offer a special feature in our Of Note section,
an excerpt of an interview with General (Ret.) David Petraeus on strategic leadership. ~AJE

Special Commentary

Rethinking America’s Grand Strategy: Insights
from the Cold War
Hal Brands
© 2016 Hal Brands

Abstract: This essay examines the history of the Cold War to illuminate insights that can help assess debates about American grand
strategy today. As will be shown, calls for dramatic retrenchment
and “offshore balancing” rest on weak historical foundations. Yet
Cold War history also reminds us that a dose of restraint–and occasional selective retrenchment–can be useful in ensuring the longterm sustainability of an ambitious grand strategy.

U

S grand strategy stands at a crossroads.1 Since World War II, the
United States has pursued an ambitious and highly engaged grand
strategy meant to mold the global order. The precise contours
of that grand strategy have changed from year to year, and from presidential administration to presidential administration; however its core,
overarching principles have remained essentially consistent. America has
sought to preserve and expand an open and prosperous world economy.
It has sought to foster a peaceful international environment in which
democracy can flourish. It has sought to prevent any hostile power from
dominating any of the key overseas regions—Europe, East Asia, the
Middle East—crucial to US security and economic wellbeing. And in
support of these goals, the United States has undertaken an extraordinary degree of international activism, anchored by American alliance and
security commitments to overseas partners, and the forward presence
and troop deployments necessary to substantiate those commitments.2
This grand strategy has, on the whole, been profoundly productive
for both the United States and the wider world, for it has underpinned
an international system that has been—by any meaningful historical
comparison—remarkably peaceful, prosperous, and democratic.3 Yet
over the past several years, America’s long-standing grand strategy has
increasingly come under fire.
1      This article is adapted from an essay originally published with the Foreign Policy Research
Institute. See “American Grand Strategy: Lessons from the Cold War,” Foreign Policy Research Institute,
August 2015, http://www.fpri.org/articles/2015/08/american-grand-strategy-lessons-cold-war.
2      For a good description of America’s long-standing grand strategy, see Stephen G. Brooks,
G. John Ikenberry, and William Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against
Retrenchment,” International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012/2013): 7-51, esp. 11; also Melvyn Leffler,
A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1992).
3      Robert Kagan, The World America Made (New York: Vintage, 2012); Michael Mandelbaum,
The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century (New York:
Public Affairs, 2006); Peter Feaver, “American Grand Strategy at the Crossroads: Leading from the
Front, Leading from Behind, or Not Leading at All,” in Richard Fontaine and Kristin Lord, eds.,
America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration (Washington, DC: Center for a New American
Security, 2012), 59-73.

Hal Brands is an
associate professor of
public policy and history
at Duke University.
His most recent book
is Making the Unipolar
Moment: US Foreign Policy
and the Rise of the PostCold War Order (Cornell,
2016).
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Amid the long hangover from the Iraq War and a painful financial
crisis whose effects are still being felt, leading academic observers have
taken up the banner of retrenchment. Prominent voices in the strategicstudies community argue the United States can no longer afford such an
ambitious grand strategy; that US alliances and security commitments
bring far greater costs than benefits; and that American overseas presence and activism create more problems than they solve. The solution,
they contend, is a sharp rollback of US military presence and alliance
commitments, and a far more austere foreign policy writ large. Scholars
such as Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer, and Barry Posen have been at
the forefront of such calls for “restraint” or “offshore balancing” within
the academy; mainstream commentators like Peter Beinart and Ian
Bremmer have offered similar assessments.4 These calls for retrenchment have recently been amplified by fears of American decline vis-à-vis
rising or resurgent rivals such as Russia and China, and by the emergence of a host of strategic challenges around the world. Basic questions
of what America should seek to achieve in international affairs, and
whether it should break fundamentally with the postwar pattern of US
global presence and activism, are more now robustly debated than at any
time since the end of the Cold War.5
The debate between these two rival schools of thought centers on
a series of key strategic questions. Can the US economy sustain the
burdens of a global defense posture? Are US alliances net benefits or
detriments to American security? Is the US overseas presence stabilizing or destabilizing in its effects? Is democracy-promotion a boon or
a burden for US strategic interests? How would an American military
retrenchment affect geopolitical outcomes and alignments in key
regions? Is the United States in inexorable geopolitical decline? How one
answers these questions frequently determines which path one believes
America should take in the future.
Yet grand strategy is not simply about the future; it is also about the
past. New scholarship reminds us that key policy decisions are indelibly influenced by perceptions of what happened before, and what we
ought to learn from these events.6 This is entirely appropriate, of course,
because history can shed considerable light on questions of American
foreign policy today. It can remind us of lessons that previous generations
of American officials learned at considerable expense; it can provide a
sort of laboratory for testing propositions about American statecraft.
History can, in general, lend the perspective of the past to contemporary
4      As examples, see Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: US Grand Strategy from 1940 to the
Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 159-192; Barry Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a
Less Activist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (January/February 2013): 116-129; Stephen
Walt, “The End of the US Era,” National Interest, no. 116 (November/December 2011): 6-16; John
Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” National Interest, no. 111 (January/February 2011): 16-34; Ian
Bremmer, Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World (New York: Penguin, 2015); Peter
Beinart, “Obama’s Foreign Policy Doctrine Finally Emerges with ‘Offshore Balancing,” The Daily
Beast, November 28, 2011. For survey and critique of these perspectives, see Hal Brands, “Fools
Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing,” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 2 (Summer
2015): 7-28; Peter Feaver, “Not Even One Cheer for Offshore Balancing?” Foreign Policy, April 30,
2013.
5      See the September/October 2015 issue of The National Interest, which contains a wide array of
responses to the question, “What is America’s purpose?”
6      Hal Brands and Jeremi Suri, eds., The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2015); also Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses
of History for Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986).
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grand strategic debates. Grand strategy may be an inherently prospective undertaking, but it generally works better when informed by a
retrospective view, as well.7
This essay assesses how history can inform the current debate on
American grand strategy by revisiting a fundamental period in US diplomatic history: the Cold War. Historical understanding of the Cold War
has always left a deep imprint on perceptions of the era that followed, as
shown by the fact this period is still often referred to as the “post-Cold
War era.” Indeed, although it ended a quarter-century ago, the Cold
War still looms large within the living memory of many policy-makers
and academics, and so its perceived insights unavoidably shape debates
on American policy today.8 Moreover, because the Cold War ended a
quarter-century ago, we now have access to a vast body of historical
literature that helps us better comprehend the course and lessons of
the superpower struggle. The purpose of this essay, then, is to explore
those lessons that seem most pertinent to America’s current strategic
crossroads—most germane to evaluating whether retrenchment or geopolitical renewal represents the best path forward.
This is, to some degree, an unavoidably subjective exercise. Informed
analysts could easily pick different lessons to draw from the Cold War,
and they could just as easily interpret the underlying history—or the
policy implications drawn therefrom—in different ways.9 But this
reality does not make the effort to identify and utilize historical lessons
fruitless, for it is precisely this process of debate and argument that helps
us sharpen our knowledge of the past, and of the insights it offers.
On the whole, the eight lessons discussed here suggest the call
for dramatic retrenchment rests on fairly weak historical foundations,
and in many ways they powerfully underscore the logic of America’s
long-standing approach to global affairs. But Cold War history also
demonstrates a dose of restraint—and occasional selective retrenchment—can be useful in ensuring the long-term health and sustainability
of an ambitious grand strategy. Finally, and above all, these lessons show
the well-informed use of history can enrich the grand strategic debate
today—just as the use of history enriched American grand strategy
during the Cold War.

Lesson 1 - The Economic Case for Retrenchment Rests on Weak Foundations

Grand strategy ultimately begins and ends with macroeconomics,
and perhaps the single most important insight from the Cold War is
that geopolitical success is a function of economic vitality. It was, after
all, the West’s superior economic performance that eventually exerted
such a powerful magnetic draw on countries in both the Third and
the Second Worlds, and allowed Washington and its allies to sustain
a protracted global competition that bankrupted Moscow in the end.
7      See Peter Feaver, ed., Strategic Retrenchment and Renewal in the American Experience (Carlisle
Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014); Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose
in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014),
esp. 203-204.
8      As one example, see Harvey Sapolsky, Eugene Gholz, and Allen Kaufman, “Security Lessons
from the Cold War,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (July-August 1999): 77-89.
9      Ibid; also Richard Haass, “Learning from the Cold War,” Project Syndicate, November 27,
1999.
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In this sense, the Cold War’s key takeaway is that preserving a vibrant
free-market economy, as a wellspring of hard and soft power alike, is the
most crucial grand strategic task America faces.
Much shakier, however, is the policy implication that advocates
of retrenchment often draw from this indisputable fact: America must
now slash its foreign commitments because those commitments are so
onerous as to imperil long-term US economic and fiscal health.10 This
argument is flawed on numerous grounds. For one thing, it elides the
fact that US deficits are driven far more by exploding entitlement costs
than by defense outlays. The former category consumed 48 percent—
and rising—of federal spending as of 2014, whereas the latter consumed
only 18 percent and falling.11 Just as important, this argument ignores
an inconvenient historical truth — during the Cold War, America sustained a far higher defense burden while maintaining robust growth for
most of the postwar period. The United States often spent well over
10 percent of its GDP on defense during the 1950s, for instance, and
upwards of 6 percent during the 1980s, as opposed to just 3 to 4 percent
in recent years. Indeed, the figure retrenchers often cite as a paragon
of military restraint—Dwight Eisenhower—presided over a period in
which defense spending never consumed less than 9.3 percent of GDP.12
In other words, the relevant Cold War lesson is economic performance is indeed the fount of national power, but the US economy has
historically been capable of supporting a far higher defense burden
without fundamentally compromising that performance. Whether this
remains true in the future, of course, will depend on the country’s ability
to make hard political choices associated with rationalizing US tax and
entitlement policies.13 But if we take the Cold War as a guide, it reminds
us that current defense spending actually constitutes a rather modest
strain on the economy by historical standards—and the United States
could comfortably spend much more on defense were it willing to make
those hard choices in intelligent ways.

Lesson 2 - American Engagement Is the Bedrock of International Stability

So what does this defense spending and global engagement actually
buy in terms of securing the international order? Does US engagement
foster stability and peace, as American officials and proponents of
robust global presence have long argued? Or does it primarily invite
blowback in the form of violent resistance and other undesirable behavior, as critics allege? The history of the Cold War lends some support to
both arguments, especially in regions like Latin America.14 At a broader
10      See Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Exit: Beyond the Pax Americana,” Cambridge Review of
International Affairs 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 153; Posen, “Pull Back,” 118, 121-123.
11      Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars
Go?” March 11, 2015, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=1258.
12      For Cold War figures, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of
American National Security Policy during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 393.
13      An illustrative discussion of hard choices and tradeoffs can be found in Stephan Seabrook,
“Federal Spending, National Priorities and Grand Strategy,” RAND Corporation Working Paper,
April 2012.
14      It is worth noting, however, that debates over the consequences of US policy in Latin
America is far from settled. See Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004); versus Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2010).
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international level, however, the balance of evidence lies overwhelmingly with the more positive perspective.
US global engagement during the Cold War was a response to the
absence of such engagement, which had helped cause the catastrophic
instability of the interwar era. And during the Cold War, it was precisely
the US decision to embrace the responsibility of organizing and protecting the non-communist world that allowed key regions like Europe and
East Asia to break free of their tragic pasts and achieve remarkable levels
of stability. US policy helped deter Soviet aggression and dissuade other
disruptive behavior; it helped mute historical frictions between countries
like Germany and Japan, on the one hand, and their former enemies, on
the other; it fostered the climate of security in which unprecedented
economic growth and multilateral cooperation could occur. US policy
was by no means the only factor in these achievements, but it was the
crucial common thread that connected them.15
What relevance does this history have for grand strategic debates
in a period so different from the Cold War? The relevance is simply to
remind us stability—and all of the blessings it makes possible—is not
an organic condition of international affairs. Rather, stability must be
provided by powerful actors who are willing to confront those forces—
national rivalry, aggression by the strong against the weak—that have
so often driven international relations toward conflict and instability in
the past. At a time when many of those forces are again rearing their
heads in places from East Asia to Eastern Europe, and when there is still
no compelling candidate to replace Washington as primary provider of
international stability, this lesson is especially salient.

Lesson 3 - Costs of US Alliances are Real, but Benefits are Enormous

The tenor of pro-retrenchment arguments today might easily make
one think US alliance commitments are the root of all evil—that they
do very little to advance American interests, while encouraging a mix of
“free-riding” and “reckless driving” by selfish allies.16 These concerns
would not seem novel to America’s Cold War statesmen. From the late
1940s onward, US officials continually worried American allies were not
doing enough to sustain the common defense, and that some particularly troublesome partners, such as Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-Shek, might
drag Washington into unwanted conflicts with powerful enemies. In
this sense, the history of the Cold War confirms the burdens and potential dangers associated with US alliance commitments are real enough.
What that history also confirms, however, is the unique and indispensable value those arrangements bring. Throughout the Cold War, US
alliances offered the high degree of military interoperability that flowed
from continual joint training, and the ability to call on US allies to support
Washington’s own military interventions in conflicts like the Korean
War. They “locked in” positive and comparatively stable relationships

15      Certain of these issues are discussed in John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War
History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
16      See Barry Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2014), 33-50.
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with key geopolitical players like West Germany and Japan.17 They gave
Washington forums for projecting its voice in key regions and relationships, and the moral legitimacy that stemmed from its role as “leader of
the free world.” They provided America with bargaining advantages in
trade and financial negotiations with allies, and the leverage needed to
dissuade countries from West Germany to South Korea from developing nuclear weapons and thereby destabilizing entire regions.18 In some
cases, they even gave the United States the ability to affect the composition of allies’ governments.19 Finally, and despite fears of entrapment,
US alliances frequently gave Washington the influence needed to exert a
restraining effect on the behavior of worrisome partners.20
Alliances, in other words, have never been a matter of charity in US
statecraft. Instead, they have conferred an array of powerful benefits for
American interests. The history of the Cold War reminds us of this fact.
In doing so, it also reminds us the burden of proof in the current debate
should be not on those who advocate maintaining such arrangements.
Rather, the burden of proof should be on those who would weaken or
terminate them, and thus risk forfeiting the grand strategic benefits they
have historically conferred.

Lesson 4 - Democracy-Promotion Is Not a Distraction from Geopolitics

Apostles of dramatic retrenchment frequently hail from the church
of realism, and so they argue the long-standing US emphasis on spreading democracy is in fact a distraction—sometimes a fatal one—from
the core mission of advancing concrete American interests.21 They are
right, of course, to note the Iraq War was in some respects a case of
democracy-promotion gone catastrophically awry, and the history of the
Cold War indeed confirms overeager or ill-timed efforts to promote
liberal values abroad, as in Iran or Nicaragua during the late 1970s, can
backfire spectacularly.22 At the same time, the Cold War also affirms
pushing democracy overseas is actually essential to achieving US geopolitical goals, and increasing the nation’s global power and influence.
Broadly speaking, Cold War history reminds us of the simple fact
America’s closest and most reliable allies have long been democracies, and the spread of liberal values therefore increases the range of
countries with which Washington can build such deep and lasting ties.
More specifically, Cold War history reminds us the advance of democracy can provide critical advantages in a prolonged geopolitical contest
with an authoritarian rival. As the Carter and Reagan administrations
17      This point is emphasized in Leffler, Preponderance of Power. It might also be noted that the
relatively free nature of American alliances gave the United States an enormous advantage over the
Soviet Union, whose alliances were largely coercive in nature.
18      On the nuclear issue, see Francis Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: US Grand Strategy and the
Nuclear Revolution,” International Security 40, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 29-31; Bruno Tertrais, “Security
Guarantees and Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, Note 14/11,
2011.
19      See Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 370-379.
20      This point is discussed in Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing
the Security Risks of US Defense Pacts,” International Security 39, no. 4 (Spring 2015): 7-48.
21      Stephen Walt, “Democracy, Freedom, and Apple Pie Aren’t a Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy,
July 1, 2014.
22      It is worth bearing in mind, however, that although democracy promotion was one rationale
for the war in Iraq, it was far from the primary motivation.

Special Commentary

Brands

13

emphasized from the late 1970s onward, democratic institutions can
provide the domestic legitimacy that makes US geopolitical partners
more stable and reliable in such a competition. As these administrations
also understood, the spread of liberal values can foster a global ideological climate in which a democratic great power is far more comfortable
and influential than an authoritarian competitor. The promotion of
liberal political institutions and global human rights under Carter and
Reagan, for instance, had the benefit of drawing a stark and unflattering
contrast with the ugliest aspects of Moscow’s totalitarian rule. And as
much as anything else, it was the global turn toward democracy from
the mid-1970s onward—a phenomenon that was crucially assisted by US
policy—that signaled a renewed American ascendancy and the ebbing
of Soviet global influence in the last years of the Cold War.23
The proper lesson to take from this history is not that democracy
should be pursued in all quarters and conditions, of course, for the Cold
War also underscores the value of partnerships, even uncomfortable and
temporary ones, with authoritarian regimes from Saudi Arabia to China.
What it indicates, rather, is a grand strategy that emphasizes selective and
strategic democracy-promotion is likely to bring geopolitical rewards—
and a grand strategy that significantly de-emphasizes such activities will
lose a great deal in the bargain.

Lesson 5 - The Military Balance Shapes Risk-Taking and Decision-Making

How would a sharp reduction in US military power—as envisioned
by offshore balancers and other advocates of retrenchment—impact
decision-making and geopolitical alignment in the world’s key theaters?
This should be a central question in considering US grand strategy
today, and based on the Cold War experience, the probable answer is
not comforting. For while history illustrates military balance—conventional and nuclear—is certainly not everything in geopolitics, it shows
that significant shifts in the military balance can have important effects
on how states behave.
Consider the following examples. Marc Trachtenberg has documented how the major shifts in the military balance from the late 1940s
through the mid-1950s profoundly affected the level of risk both US and
Soviet policymakers were willing to run in places as diverse as Korea
and Berlin.24 Two decades later, the massive growth of Soviet military
power was a key factor in pushing West Germany to embrace ostpolitik—
a policy, one commenter noted, of “partial appeasement” meant to
purchase some safety in the face of a changing strategic balance.25 This
Soviet buildup, moreover, seems to have played a role in encouraging
more assertive Soviet behavior in Third-World conflicts during the late
1970s. Finally, in the 1980s, evidence suggests the major US buildup of
previous years had a key part in convincing Soviet decision-makers such
as Mikhail Gorbachev to reduce the danger via a policy of increasing
23      This argument is developed in Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: US Foreign Policy and
the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016); also Tony Smith, America’s
Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994).
24      Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991),
100-153.
25      Quoted in Marc Trachtenberg, The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of
International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 167.
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accommodation with Washington. As Gorbachev later wrote, the need
to secure the removal of US Pershing-II missiles from Europe—“a pistol
held to our head”—was crucial to his decision to reverse long-standing
Soviet policy and conclude the INF Treaty on terms long desired by the
Reagan administration.26 As military balances shifted, in other words,
perceptions of opportunity or danger—and the corresponding propensities for risk-taking or accommodation—often shifted as well.
There are obvious differences between the Cold War and the world
of today. But these examples are worth keeping in mind when considering the likely consequences of major US retrenchment. They suggest,
for instance, that such retrenchment significantly altered the existing
balance in key regions like East Asia or Eastern Europe, it might invite
behavioral changes—by allies or adversaries—that could run counter
to the favorable climate Washington’s dominance has long afforded in
those regions.27 In short, when military balances start eroding dramatically, one should expect some nasty results.

Lesson 6 - Dramatic Retrenchment Is Unwise, but Restraint and Selective
Retrenchment Have Their Virtues

On the whole, Cold War history thus suggests calls for dramatic
retrenchment should be met with great skepticism. Yet there is a crucial
caveat here, for this history also tells us a degree of grand strategic
restraint is essential, and that selective retrenchment or recalibration at
the margins can actually be a very good thing.
First, Cold War history reveals activism must be balanced with prudence in order to keep an ambitious global strategy viable. There were,
certainly, times during the Cold War when Washington overreached in
its efforts to contain communism, the commitment of 500,000 troops to
poor, geopolitically insignificant Vietnam being the foremost example.
That overreach, especially in the case of Vietnam, boomeranged so
badly it undercut domestic support for US global agenda more broadly.
Just as the blowback from the Iraq War has more recently given voice
to calls for thoroughgoing American retrenchment, the insight from
Vietnam is, therefore, that activism must be carefully calibrated if it is
to be enduring.
Second, Cold War history underscores retrenchment at the margins,
rather than at the core, of American strategy can be very useful. As
Melvyn Leffler has argued, periods of military belt-tightening during
the Cold War forced US policymakers to sharpen priorities better and
think strategically about how to accomplish core objectives.28 Those
periods also incentivized US policymakers to invest in innovative
concepts and capabilities meant to exploit US comparative advantages
and sustain commitments at lower costs. The “offset strategy” of the
1970s, for instance, was born amid a climate of budgetary austerity,
and the high-tech capabilities it emphasized proved crucial not just to
neutralizing Soviet numerical advantages on the central front, but also
26      Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Random House, 1995), 444.
27      Along these lines, see Zachary Selden, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum
of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony,” Security Studies 22, no. 3 (May 2013):
330-363.
28      Melvyn Leffler, “Defense on a Diet: How Budget Crises Have Improved US Strategy,” Foreign
Affairs 92, no. 6 (November-December 2013): 65-76.
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to giving America unmatched conventional dominance after the Cold
War.29 More broadly, America’s selective post-Vietnam retrenchment
allowed it to retreat from exposed positions that could only be held at
an unacceptable price, to reset its strategic bearings, and ultimately to
forge a more politically sustainable and geopolitically effective approach
to competing with the Soviet bloc.30
To be sure, selective retrenchment is itself hard to calibrate—as the
US experience after Vietnam also demonstrates—and it can bring myriad
dangers if taken too far. Yet, if the overall goal remains to preserve and
strengthen a grand strategy of global engagement, then restraint and
occasional tactical retrenchment can serve an essential purpose.

Lesson 7 - Don’t Underestimate American Resilience

Of course, prospects for continued US global activism hinge on
another key question in the grand strategy debate—whether America
is experiencing inexorable geopolitical decline. Proponents of retrenchment generally answer this question in the affirmative, and the past
decade has indeed seen an erosion of America’s relative margin of international superiority. Yet the Cold War’s relevant lesson here is US power
has often proven more resilient than predicted.
Just as there is widespread discussion of US decline today, America
experienced repeated waves of “declinism” during the Cold War.31 After
the Soviet A-bomb test in 1949, or the launching of Sputnik in 1957,
or the oil shocks and the humiliating end to the Vietnam War in the
1970s, it was widely assumed US power was steadily draining away.32 In
each case, however, these predictions were wrong. Prophecies of decline
attributed too much importance to near-term setbacks whose impact
ultimately proved transitory (like Vietnam), and too little to the much
deeper, systemic weaknesses of adversaries like the Soviet Union. They
underestimated the resilience of the US economy and political system,
and the enduring global appeal of America’s liberal ideology. Just as
important, these predictions missed the fact that the very fear of decline
repeatedly impelled policymakers to take actions—from addressing
budget deficits, to restoring American military advantage over Moscow
during the 1980s—that facilitated US resurgence. America would therefore come out of the Cold War not in decline, but stronger, in relative
terms, than ever before.
To be clear, this history should not inspire undue optimism about
America’s current trajectory. Challenges to US primacy today—from
sluggish economic growth at home, to the rise of China and the emergence
of significant strategic challenges in virtually every key theater overseas—are more formidable than at any time in a quarter-century.33 But
29      On the offset strategy, see Robert Tomes, US Defence Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi
Freedom: Military Innovation and the New American Way of War, 1973-2003 (New York: Routledge, 2006),
58-95.
30      The general theme of adaptation within engagement is emphasized in Brooks, Ikenberry, and
Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America.”
31      The label coined by Samuel Huntington, “The US - Decline or Renewal?” Foreign Affairs 67,
no. 2 (Winter 1988/1989): 76-96.
32      See Josef Joffe, The Myth of America’s Decline: Politics, Economics, and a Half Century of False
Prophecies (New York; Norton, 2013).
33      A good discussion of these challenges is Walter Russell Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics,”
Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (May/June 2014): 69-79.
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this history certainly should not inspire fatalism, either. For familiarity
with the history of the Cold War can help alert us to the fact our current
and potential competitors—Russia, Iran, China—face domestic and
international problems that often make ours look modest by comparison. It can remind us we have a choice in the matter of decline: we can
pursue domestic and foreign policies that will either bolster or erode
our relative power. Above all, this history can caution us against making
potentially irrevocable grand strategic changes based on a hasty reading
of global trends, what Robert Kagan has called “committing preemptive
superpower suicide out of a misplaced fear of declining power.”34 In
sum, Cold War history will not solve the problems Washington faces
today. But it does show the United States has rebounded from situations
that looked far worse.

Lesson 8 - America Is Capable of Using History Well

So can America and its foreign policy officials actually employ these
historical insights effectively? Many historians would say “probably not.”
Scholarly accounts of the Cold War frequently emphasize the misuses
of history by US policymakers, focusing on episodes like the uncritical application of the Munich analogy in the run-up to intervention in
Vietnam.35 True, US officials did not always use historical analogies and
insights as effectively as they might have during the Cold War. But this
should not obscure the fact that, on the whole, America’s Cold War
grand strategy represented a near-textbook case of history used well.
The history in question, as noted above, was that of the international system and American isolation in the period prior to World War
II. The policymakers of the 1940s, and after, learned several invaluable
lessons from this period. They learned that economic depression led to
extremism and war, and that the combination of great power and totalitarian rule was highly dangerous. They learned US security required
maintaining a favorable balance of power overseas, and the best way
of avoiding another global war was through strength, multilateralism,
and engagement rather than non-entanglement and withdrawal. These
lessons may have been distorted or applied inappropriately at times, but
in general they informed a postwar grand strategy that was spectacularly
successful, and shaped the broadly favorable international environment
the United States inhabits today.
This learning process stands as a valuable corrective to the common
historian’s conceit that when policymakers use history, they almost
invariably use it poorly. It also gives cause for optimism about debates
on American grand strategy today. As this essay has argued, the history
of the Cold War is redolent with important insights that can help us
assess grand strategic options and alternatives. If the policymakers of
today and tomorrow draw on those insights as successfully as their predecessors, they will be all-the-better equipped to chart the nation’s path
forward. Because while only a fool would make policy solely on the basis
of history, it would be equally foolish to ignore what lessons history has
to offer.
34      Kagan, The World America Made, 7.
35      See Ernest May, “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).
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Abstract: The US Army is under pressure. If trends persist, it will
soon shrink to its smallest size in nearly 70 years. While there are
sound arguments for the current drawdown, reasonable policies can
still yield unintended consequences. In particular, we argue American landpower helps make America’s conventional and nuclear security guarantees credible. Since these guarantees stabilize alliances,
deter aggression, and curb nuclear proliferation, landpower’s relative
decline could have serious implications for the broader security situation of the United States.

T

he US Army is under pressure. Shifting strategic priorities, especially the rebalance to East Asia, necessarily emphasize naval and
air power.1 Budget constraints make it tempting to substitute
manpower with technology.2 Domestically, Americans have little appetite
for putting “boots on the ground” after years of war in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Beyond geography, economics and politics, an even more potent
threat looms: many strategists believe precision weapons are revolutionizing warfare in ways that diminish landpower’s usefulness.3 Although
armies have often been the most important source of military power,
because they alone have the ability to defend, conquer, and occupy territory, precision weapons threaten to turn that capability into a liability.4 As
the argument goes, on future battlefields, slow-moving armor, artillery,
and infantry units will have nowhere to hide as precision-guided munitions (PGMs) rain down upon them.
American defense planners have responded to these trends by shifting resources away from the Army.5 There are certainly sound arguments
1      See Aaron L. Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia
(London: Routledge, 2014); Andrew Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 19, 2010); Andrew Krepinevich, Maritime Competition
in a Mature Precision-Strike Regime (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2014); T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” Strategic
Forum, no. 278 (June 2012): 1-14; and Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and
Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 3 (2013):
385-421.
2      Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY: Preparing for War in the Robotic Age (Washington,
DC: Center for New American Security, January 2014).
3      On how PGMs would alter warfare, see Thomas Mahnken, “Weapons: The Growth and
Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime,” Daedalus 140, no. 3 (2011): 45-57. For an alternative view,
see Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004).
4      John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2001):
83-137.
5      By fiscal year 2018 the active-duty Army will complete its planned end-strength reduction from
565,000 to 450,000 soldiers. “Army Announces Force Structure, Stationing Decision,” Department of
Defense News, July 9, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/612623. The Army
National Guard’s end-strength is set to decrease by 15,000 by 2017. “Army Guard to see reductions,
changes in personnel and force structure,” National Guard Bureau, November 6, 2015, http://www.
nationalguard.mil/News/ArticleView/tabid/5563/Article/627489/army-guard-to-see-reductionschanges-in-personnel-and-force-structure.aspx.
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behind the current drawdown, including the Asia-Pacific Rebalance
and a strong aversion to large-scale counterinsurgency. Nevertheless,
even reasonable policy decisions can sometimes yield unintended consequences. Specifically, we argue as geopolitical priorities, technological
advances, and budgetary constraints undercut American landpower,
allies and adversaries may increasingly question America’s conventional
and nuclear security guarantees. Since these guarantees stabilize alliances, curb nuclear proliferation, resolve security dilemmas, and deter
aggression, landpower’s relative decline could have serious implications
for the broader security situation of the United States.
We proceed as follows. We first explain why landpower makes
American threats and promises more believable. It does so in two ways.
The first is well understood: ground troops signal the United States has
“skin in the game.” However, strategists have largely overlooked our
second observation: American troops reassure allies because allies think
American troops can punish, compel, and ultimately defeat an undeterred adversary.6 Put simply, forward deployed soldiers and marines
are more than just trip-wires and hostages. Allies do not have faith in
American commitments because American troops might die; they have
faith because American troops can kill and win. If deterrence and assurance were simply about having “skin in the game,” America could signal
its commitment on the cheap by deploying unarmed conscripts.7
We also identify three policy recommendations that flow from our
analysis. First, the United States should halt further cuts to Army force
structure. Our analysis suggests the United States must retain a sizable
forward-based presence in Europe and East Asia. Although budget cuts
make it tempting to replace forward-based troops with rotational training and prepositioned equipment, attempts to reassure allies “on the
cheap” are unlikely to work in a world where precision and anti-access/
area-denial (A2AD) threats make it hard to introduce ground forces
once the shooting has begun. Moreover, events in Iraq and Syria demonstrate the United States must retain its ability to wage counterinsurgency
operations despite its desire to avoid them.8 Second, the Joint Force must
prove to American allies it has a doctrine that allows it to seize and hold
ground in an A2AD threat environment. It is not yet obvious that the
United States can reliably introduce and resupply ground forces against a
first-rate opponent with robust A2AD capabilities. Third, the Army must
similarly develop a viable war-fighting doctrine and associated tactics,
techniques and procedures (TTPs) to operate in a PGM-dominated
environment. Incremental adaptation might suffice to keep American
landpower relevant, but wholesale innovation may prove necessary.

The Challenges of Making Security Guarantees

Security guarantees, including multilateral alliances like the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and bilateral defense treaties (e.g., Japan),
6      US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex
World (Fort Eustis, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2014): 16.
7      Though the United States did intentionally let families live with forward deployed troops during the Cold War to enhance the tripwire effect of those forces, the government did not deploy families without troops. It invested heavily to ensure those troops were well trained and well equipped.
8      Francis G. Hoffman, “What the QDR Ought to Say about Landpower,” Parameters 43, no 4
(Winter 2013-14): 7-14.
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enhance American security.9 They allow the United States to generate more power by leveraging the capabilities of like-minded partners
than it could on its own. They deter conflict by threatening to bring
combined power to bear on a potential adversary if it threatens an
ally. For deterrence to work, an adversary must believe undertaking a
certain action will result in a penalty that exceeds any possible gain.10
Moreover, security guarantees moderate tensions by assuring allies they
do not need to pursue nuclear weapons or engage in risky behaviors to
improve their security. Finally, they resolve security dilemmas between
American allies and their local adversaries.11 Security dilemmas occur
when one state tries to make itself more secure, inadvertently making
other states feel less secure in the process.12 For example, suppose Japan
were to develop nuclear weapons to deter China. If China misreads
Japanese intentions, it might grow alarmed and respond by adopting a
more aggressive posture. The result could be a destabilizing arms race.
Security guarantees prevent such dynamics from unfolding.
American security guarantees only work when allies and adversaries
believe them. Unfortunately, the nature of international politics is such
that states have difficulty trusting one another, especially when security
and survival are at stake.13 Although the United States can promise to
intervene on an ally’s behalf in a crisis, the ally knows no international
court, police force, or coalition has enough power to force the United
States to fulfill its pledges. Especially because it is so powerful, the
United States always has the option to renege if it changes its mind.14
For example, the US president might decide not to defend an ally if an
imminent war appears more costly than the United States anticipated
when it entered into the alliance. As Taiwan discovered in the 1970s, the
United States can unilaterally terminate formal treaties when its costbenefit calculus changes.
The degree to which other states see the United States as a credible
ally or adversary depends on how they answer two questions. First, do
they think the United States is willing to do what it says it will do, especially in a crisis situation? Second, is the United States able to do what it
says it will do? The less an ally or an adversary trusts American willingness or ability, the less it will believe American security guarantees.
These questions are important because the United States becomes
less secure when its allies and adversaries start to question its credibility.
All things equal, the more an ally worries the United States will renege
in a crisis, the more likely it is that the ally will prepare as though it will
have to go it alone in a conflict.15 Arms build-ups, offensive posturing,
9      Barack Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC:
The White House, February 2015), 6.
10      Richard Ned Lebow, “Deterrence and Reassurance: Lessons from the Cold War,” Global
Dialogue 4, no. 2 (2000): 119-120. Emphasis in original.
11      Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East,” in
International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastundono (New
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003), 25-26.
12      Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January
1978): 186.
13      Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
14      Reneging is never costless, but it can be less costly than fulfilling a promise that leads to war.
15      Loose commitments provoke abandonment fears. See Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
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and nuclear weapons acquisition are all possible behaviors. The same
logic holds for potential adversaries. They also know the United States
can shirk from or renege on its guarantees. The more a potential adversary doubts American credibility, the less it will trust American efforts
to restrain allies and American threats to intervene or retaliate. In both
cases, the lack of credibility can encourage aggressive behavior.16
Making credible conventional security guarantees is difficult, but
making believable nuclear security guarantees is even trickier. The
United States has long promised to use nuclear weapons to defend its
most important allies. This strategy of extended nuclear deterrence
serves two purposes. It deters nuclear-armed adversaries (as well as
those with massive, local conventional advantages) from blackmailing
our allies.17 It also helps to limit nuclear proliferation by convincing
allies that acquiring their own nuclear arsenals is unnecessary.18
Yet promises to use nuclear weapons must entail ambiguity.19
Conventional alliance treaties can be explicit about the conditions
under which the United States will militarily support an ally. With
nuclear security guarantees, the United States cannot draw such clear
trigger lines. It must keep adversaries uncertain of its threshold for using
nuclear weapons. Otherwise, adversaries can launch attacks against the
ally knowing the United States will prefer to stay neutral so as not to
risk nuclear war. Unfortunately, the ambiguity that keeps adversaries
off-guard does the same to allies. And the more an ally fears the United
States might not use nuclear weapons on its behalf, the more likely the
ally will try to acquire its own nuclear arsenal.

How Landpower Helps Generate Credibility

Landpower—particularly forward-deployed landpower—helps
American security guarantees appear more credible. It shapes how
other states perceive America’s willingness and ability to implement its
promises and threats.
To clarify, the benefits of landpower we describe below exist when
the overriding political objective is to defend an ally from external
aggression. These benefits might not exist if the goal is to support a
domestically unpopular regime face its internal enemies. In such cases,
landpower could become a liability if its presence can provoke resentment
from the local population and become a target for counterinsurgency.

American Willingness

Strategists and international security scholars have long understood
that putting ground troops on an ally’s territory is one of the most
16      On how past actions shape credibility and thus crisis negotiations, see Alex Weisiger and
Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,”
International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 473-495.
17      Paul Huth, “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” American Political Science Review
82, no. 2 (1988): 423-443.
18      Dan Reiter, “Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation,” Foreign Policy Analysis 14,
no. 1 (2014): 61-80. See also Philipp C. Bleek and Eric B. Lorber, “Security Guarantees and Allied
Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 3 (2014): 429-454
19      Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1960): Chapter 8. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Absolute Alliances: Extended Deterrence in International Politics,
PhD Dissertation (Columbia: Columbia University, 2014), Chapter 1.
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effective ways the United States can make itself look like a willing partner.20 Forward-based troops deployed in areas of vital interest do three
things. First, they are a tangible indicator of American willingness to
fight. Allies and adversaries can observe troop deployments and track
troop levels. Ground troops are also expensive to garrison overseas.
That the United States bears many of these costs offers further evidence
it is serious about its commitments.
Second, forward-based ground troops demonstrate the United
States has “skin in the game.” They soothe fears the United States will
abandon its ally in a crisis by intertwining American lives with allied
interests. When ground troops are on allied soil, even a small conflict
where key American interests are at stake could kill Americans. Allies
and adversaries know the loss of American life will trigger calls for
retribution, making it hard for American leaders to retreat. Accordingly,
strategists argue ground troops are one of the most important ways
the United States can make its promise to use nuclear weapons more
credible.21
Third, basing troops overseas also makes it more difficult to stay
neutral in a crisis because ground troops are not easy to withdraw. Ships
and aircraft can sail and fly away on short notice, but it takes considerable time and money to re-deploy thousands of ground troops. More
importantly, extracting ground troops during a crisis entails serious
reputational costs. Thomas Schelling captured this logic when discussing American troops in West Berlin:
..[t]he reason we got committed to Berlin, and stayed committed, is that
if we let the Soviets scare us out of Berlin we would lose face with the
Soviet (and communist Chinese) leaders. It would be bad enough to have
Europeans, Latin Americans, and Asians think that we are immoral or cowardly. It would be far worse to lose our reputation with the Soviets.22

Recent scholarship supports these arguments, demonstrating that
troop deployments discourage the allies who host them from acquiring nuclear weapons.23 Indeed, some states have responded to troop
withdrawals by trying to acquire nuclear weapons.24 Historians have
shown South Korea began its nuclear program shortly after President
Richard Nixon withdrew the 7th US Infantry Division from the Korean

20      For a similar argument on landpower’s benefits for deterrence, see John R. Deni, “Strategic
Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” Parameters 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2013): 77-86.
21      Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966 [2008]),
55.
22      Ibid.
23      Major and unforeseen troop withdrawals make affected allies more likely to consider at least
nuclear weapons acquisition. See Alexander Lanoszka, Protection States Trust?: Major Power Patronage,
Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics, PhD Dissertation (Princeton: Princeton University, 2014).
Reiter, “Security Commitments.” On alliances and nuclear proliferation, see Avery Goldstein,
Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear
Proliferation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); Bleek and Lorber, “Security Guarantees”;
and Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation,”
International Security, 39, no. 2 (2014): 7-51.
24      Lanoszka, “Protection States Trust?”
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peninsula.25 Even West Germany, amid indications the United States was
going to reduce its military presence in Western Europe, entered into a
trilateral initiative with France and Italy to develop nuclear weapons.26
In both cases, troop redeployments signaled the United States was no
longer heeding the security interests of those allies who still confronted
more powerful adversaries.

American Ability

Allies and adversaries must also believe the United States can win
on the battlefield if deterrence is to work.27 Landpower is a crucial tool
for demonstrating America’s ability to prevail. Specifically, when the
United States puts well-trained and well-equipped ground troops on an
ally’s territory, it substantially improves that ally’s ability to defeat an
invasion or seize an adversary’s territory. Much of this ability derives
from five capabilities unique to landpower.
First, ground forces are more survivable than air and sea forces.
When employed correctly, ground troops can disperse, entrench, and
camouflage.28 Consequently, they are notoriously hard to find and eradicate, even when an invader has precision weapons—a lesson the United
States repeatedly learned in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Second, ground forces have relatively more staying power than air
and sea forces. Aircraft and ships must routinely stop fighting and return
to a safe harbor or airfield for fuel and maintenance.29 Though ground
units also require logistical support, they can operate at the limits of
human endurance and can resupply while engaged in combat.
Third, landpower has a powerful psychological effect on invaders
and defenders. Invaders know ground forces are inherently difficult to
find and destroy. When defending ground troops are well trained and
well equipped, attacking troops know they will suffer heavier casualties. Similarly, the presence of well-trained and well-equipped ground
troops can stiffen the resolve of a defender’s political leaders. As long

25      Lyong Choi, “The First Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, 1975-1976,” Cold War
History 14, no. 1 (2014): 71-90. See also Sung Gol Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear
Option,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and
Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011) and Seung-Young Kim, “Security,
Nationalism, and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: The South Korean Case, 1970-82,”
Diplomacy and Statecraft 12, no. 4 (2001): 53-80.
26      Leopoldo Nuti, “The F-I-G Story Revisited,” Storia delle Relazioni Internationali 13, no. 1
(1998): 69-100. Historian Hubert Zimmermann writes that Adenauer saw American troops as “the
fundamental symbol of the American commitment to Europe.” Idem, Money and Security: Troops,
Monetary Policy, and West Germany’s Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971 (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 90. The United States repeatedly threatened troop withdrawals from West Germany during the 1960s, thereby complicating efforts to get West Germany
to make international commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. For one view of these diplomatic travails, see Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States
Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions,” International Security 39, no. 4 (2015): 91-129.
27      Steven Metz, “Has the United States Lost the Ability to Fight a Major War,” Parameters 45,
no. 2 (Summer 2015): 7-12.
28      Biddle, Military Power, 28-51.
29      On the fuel and armament limitations of modern American warships, see Charles C. Swicker,
“Theater Ballistic Missile Defense From the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component Commander,”
The Newport Papers, no. 14 (August 1998): 30-35. For a similar analysis of drones and fighter aircraft,
see Martin Edmonds, “Air power and Taiwan’s security,” in Martin Edmonds and Michael Tsai, eds.,
Taiwan’s Security and Air Power: Taiwan’s Defense Against the Air Threat from Mainland China (London,
UK: Routledge, 2004): 15.
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as a defender still has forces on the ground, it has the means to resist
occupation and the total loss of sovereignty.
Fourth, only landpower can hold and control territory. Although aircraft, ships, missiles, and satellites can destroy targets on the ground and
deny access to an area, they cannot subsequently exercise control. Only
ground troops can do so and, more importantly, subsequently pacify
hostile populations.30 At a minimum, landpower is a crucial complement to air and sea power. The presence of coalition ground defenses
means invaders must deploy ground troops of its own. These invading
ground troops will then be vulnerable to interdiction and destruction
by coalition air and sea forces, especially as they are transported into
theater. Collectively, forward-based American ground troops make it
more costly to invade an American ally, deterring invasion ex ante and
lowering its chances of success ex post.
Finally, given its ability to seize and control territory, landpower
allows the United States to threaten an adversary and its overseas holdings with invasion. By holding an adversary’s territory at risk, landpower
is therefore an important tool for preventing adversaries from gaining
a competitive advantage. In peacetime, the threat of invasion compels
adversaries to invest in defensive measures, consuming resources that
could otherwise be spent on offensive capabilities.31 In wartime, the
threat of an American retaliatory campaign means adversaries must hold
troops and equipment in reserve.

Recommendations for US Defense Policy

Three policy considerations flow from our analysis.

1) Maintain the Ability to Attack On Land

Credible security guarantees depend on allies and adversaries
believing that American ground forces can fight and win on the ground
in a theater dominated by precision and A2AD weapons. To clarify
why precision and A2AD weapons threaten landpower, consider how
long-range precision weapons could neutralize or disrupt forward-based
troops in the earliest stages of a conflict. Command and control nodes,
motor pools, troop barracks, supply dumps, and large combat formations are especially vulnerable to such strikes. By pre-emptively hitting
these centers of gravity, an adversary can disorganize, disorient and
demoralize a coalition ground force before reinforcements arrive. Even
if forward-based ground troops withstand an initial precision strike,
A2AD weapons will make it harder to reinforce and resupply them.
Anti-access weapons can prevent aircraft carriers, troop transports,
and maritime prepositioned forces from getting close enough to launch
airstrikes, seize beachheads, or offload gear. Meanwhile, area-denial
weapons make it harder to establish reasonably safe aerial and seaports
of disembarkation and allow adversaries to harass and attrite resupply
convoys.32
30      We acknowledge the difficulties in pacifying a hostile population. Our point is simply that
human ground troops are far more effective at the difficult task of providing security and building
trust than aircraft, ships and remote-controlled vehicles.
31      An adversary can use defensive weapons for offensive purposes. Nevertheless, the doctrinal
and training requirements for attacking and defending are different.
32      See footnote 1 for sources that describe the A2AD challenge facing the United States.
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Several intriguing proposals address the challenges raised by precision and A2AD weapons. John Gordon IV and John Matsumura suggest
that ground troops can maintain local security and missile defense for
air bases and naval resupply points. They can also support maneuver
operations by using attack helicopters and drones to protect ships; and
long-range rockets to suppress enemy air defenses.33 Andrew Krepinevich
envisions an even more important role for landpower in East Asia. He
wants to build a chain of linked coastal defenses throughout the socalled First Island Chain, making A2AD China’s problem. Ground
troops would operate early warning detection networks; lay coastal
mines; and fire long-range torpedoes, short-range missile interceptors,
and anti-ship cruise missiles. In the event of an invasion, American
ground troops could serve as the backbone for allied defenders.34
These ideas suggest fascinating options for keeping landpower viable
on future battlefields. Nevertheless, they primarily articulate a defensive
role for landpower. American forces must still be capable of undertaking
offensive operations around the world. Having the ability to attack on
land does four things. First, it allows the United States to deter through
the threat of punishment. Second, it prevents adversaries from gaining
a competitive advantage by focusing resources on offensive measures.
Third, it provides a hedge against salami slicing and other fait accompli
strategies that adversaries might otherwise be tempted to use. Fourth,
as Krepinevich points out, defensive operations in an A2AD environment may still require the United States to seize peripheral territory to
preempt an adversary and to draw it out of its bastion.

2) Allies are Hard to Reassure “On the Cheap”

Budget constraints and shifting strategic priorities have caused the
United States to reduce drastically its ground forces at home and abroad.
The US Army’s share of the defense budget is now at its lowest level in
15 years. If current trends persist, the Army’s budget share will shrink
to pre-Vietnam War levels. 35 Its active duty end-strength will drop to
450,000 soldiers by fiscal year 2018, representing the smallest active duty
Army in nearly seven decades.36
To maintain its overseas commitments in the face of these significant reductions, the Army has necessarily started to rely on rotational
forces and prepositioned gear.37 Unfortunately, such practices may be
less likely to reassure allies or deter adversaries. Both know it is easier,
politically and logistically, to halt a rotational program than it is to
withdraw permanently based forces. In other words, rotational forces
are a less costly signal than overseas bases. To the degree allies and
adversaries believe it is now easier for US leaders to renege in a crisis,
American credibility will decline. Prepositioned-gear programs are even
less likely to assure or deter. While allies and adversaries know having
33      John Gordon and John Matsumura, The Army’s Role in Overcoming Anti-Access and Area Denial
Challenges (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 21-32.
34      Andrew Krepinevich, “How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense,” Foreign
Affairs 92, no. 2 (March/April 2015): 78-86.
35      Michael O’Hanlon, The Future of Land Warfare (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2015), 23.
36      See footnote 5 for sources on these planned reductions.
37      Kimberly Field, James Learmont and Jason Charland, “Regionally Aligned Forces: Business
Not as Usual,” Parameters 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2013): 55-63; Julian Barnes, “US Army Chief Plans Steps
to Mitigate Reduction of American Forces in Europe,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2015.
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gear in theater will make it easier to deploy American ground forces in
a crisis, they also know prepositioned-gear does not make it more likely
that the United States will intervene as promised. In some respects,
prepositioned-gear may even be tantamount to cheap talk in the minds
of allies and adversaries. Such perceptions are especially likely if the
United States prepositions antiquated or poorly maintained equipment.
A2AD threats make it even harder for the United States to assure or
deter with prepositioned-gear. Given the degree to which the United
States has allowed its forcible entry capability to atrophy, there is no
guarantee US ground troops will be able to arrive in theater, link up
with their prepositioned equipment and deploy into combat formations
without absorbing unacceptable casualties.
The United States should therefore reevaluate its decision to cut
deeply into Army force structure. Although we are not in a position to
specify the Army’s ideal size, any end-strength that forces Army leaders
to substitute rotational and regionally aligned forces for permanently
based units should be considered too small. Given such considerations,
an end-strength of approximately 500,000 active-duty soldiers seems
more appropriate given the Army’s strategic requirements.38 It should
likewise consider maintaining more forward-based troops in Europe
than might seem strictly justified by the so-called “pivot to Asia.” We
admit to the difficulty of pursuing this course of action while the 2011
Budget Control Act (BCA) remains in effect. Increased reliance on Total
Force may be one way to minimize the inevitable opportunity cost of
maintaining a larger ground force.

3) Prepare for a Major Shift in Ground Doctrine

Maintaining the ability to attack on land in the face of precision
and A2AD weapons will require profound changes to existing doctrine.
Operational concepts, including the Joint Operational Access Concept
and the Joint Concept for Entry Operations, are critical steps in the right
direction because they identify a framework for innovation.39 However,
history suggests when it comes to doctrinal change, the devil is in the
details. History offers an example in the nineteenth-century firepower
revolution, which also made it easier to defend than attack. Europe’s
armies nearly annihilated themselves trying to figure out how to attack
during the First World War. The difference between success and failure
on the Western Front turned at least as much on tactics, techniques,
and procedures as it did on broad operational concepts.40 Accordingly,
(although it is important to spend on mobility/counter-mobility assets)
research and development in the areas of forcible entry from air, space,
and sea, distributed land operations, and tactical experimentation must
remain a priority.

38      John Evans, Getting it Right: Determining the Optimal Active Component End Strength of the AllVolunteer Army to Meet the Demands of the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Brookings, June 2015).
39      US Department of Defense, Joint Operational Access Concept (Washington, DC: US Department
of Defense, January 17, 2012); US Department of Defense, Joint Concept for Entry Operations
(Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, April 7, 2014).
40      Michael Hunzeker, Perfecting War: The Organizational Sources of Doctrinal Innovation, PhD
Dissertation (Princeton: Princeton University, 2013), Chapters 4-7.
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Conclusion

The rebalance to Asia, the drawdown in Afghanistan, war weariness
at home, and the BCA have led American defense planners to prioritize
sea and air power over landpower. Such shifts are sensible, but they
should not obscure the important relationship between landpower and
American credibility. Landpower—especially in the form of forward
deployed ground troops—helps make American security guarantees
believable. Ground troops have this effect because they symbolize
willingness (by acting as a tripwire) and possess ability (by being effective in combat). Precision weapons and A2AD assets target landpower
capabilities because the former lets adversaries destroy forward-based
troops from afar while the latter makes it difficult to reinforce them.
These capabilities are as much a threat to landpower in Europe as they
are in East Asia and the Middle East. As allies and adversaries around
the world begin to doubt the combat effectiveness of American ground
troops, they are more likely to find American credibility suspect. For
these reasons, the effectiveness of American landpower must be assured.
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Abstract: Within increasingly complex operational environments,
the Army’s apolitical approach to war represents a political blind
spot. This condition undermines the Army’s ability to match military means to political objectives and to set the conditions for victory. To correct this blind spot, the Army must leverage reflective
conversations about the political aspects of conflict. To develop this
ability in its soldiers, the Army should increase its use of mentoring.

A

s part of the post-Iraq-post-Afghanistan reset, much has been
written about how the US Army fights and whether its current
doctrine is capable of producing victory. In response to these
discussions, and the wars themselves, much has also been written about
the need for the Army to become a learning organization, one capable
of innovating in the face of increasingly complex operational environments. Most of these debates are insightful, yet miss the mark. They fail
to identify the central cause that underlies the unsatisfying outcomes in
Afghanistan and Iraq and that risks future failures—the Army’s political
blind spot.
The problem is not how the Army fights nor how it learns to fight.
The problem is how the Army understands the fight. Often, it does not.
Too often, the Army fails to consider and develop a tailored understanding of the political context, that is, specific political conditions, the
range of desired ends sought by actual or potential belligerents or other
strategic foreign audiences, associated with a given conflict. This failure
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the Army to effectively apply its
doctrine in pursuit of victory. This blind spot springs from an apolitical
approach to warfare. It leaves the Army unable to appreciate the political
conditions in which conflicts occur.
This situation cannot be remedied through the Army’s formal educational systems. Organizational and budgetary constraints make such
remedies impossible. Formal educational programs must focus first on
the delivery of formative skill sets and knowledge, rather than transformative understandings of theory, critical thinking, and the causal logic
necessary to assess political conditions.
To correct the Army’s political blind spot, informal methods must
be leveraged. Army-wide reflective conversations about the political
aspects of past and potential conflicts are needed. Such conversations
should be undertaken in the spirit of the Army’s process for crafting
strategic leadership. They should be an open dialogue of alternative
points of view, seeking to explore the recursive effects of political
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conditions and military action.1 These discussions should be carried
out via professional publications, The Army Press, and social media—
and facilitated through personal mentoring. The increased use of such
reflective conversations will increase the Army’s ability to appreciate the
political context within which wars occur—and enhance its ability to set
the conditions for victory in the twenty-first century.

Political Roots of Recent, and Potentially Future, Failure

Over the last two years, counter-insurgency debates have given way
to discussions of why the Army failed — or in Lieutenant General Daniel
Bolger’s view, lost—in Afghanistan and Iraq.2 In “Learning from the
Past, Looking to the Future,” Colonel Matthew Morton highlights the
importance of this dialogue: “[c]onclusions about the recent era of conflict will affect US officers as they ascend to higher ranks…” He notes
how future senior officers understand their experiences in Afghanistan
and Iraq will affect the advice they give civilian leaders.3 It will also
affect how they fight future conflicts, and even their understanding of
modern war. Major Jason Warren notes that the Army’s exceptional
tactical prowess has paradoxically led to strategic impotence. Warren
cites the rise of a “centurion mindset” as the principal reason the Army
has repeatedly failed to achieve national objectives. To develop strategic
leaders, Warren calls for a broadening of educational opportunities and
duty assignments.4 The arguments put forth by Morton and Warren are
critically insightful, but incomplete and in some ways impractical.
Morton is correct in his assertion that knowledge of past events
informs contemporary understandings of what is possible. More specifically, he is correct that during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq there
was a failure to appreciate the limits of US power, a lesson easily drawn
from history.5 Morton notes that the Army’s history offers a multitude
of lessons to enrich our understanding of current or expected future
events and hone the advice officers provide civilian leaders.6 I agree.
Yet, the challenge is knowing from which past events one ought to draw
such lessons, and which lessons ought to be learnt. Determining which
historic examples best inform current or future cases requires one to
have the ability to compare the political conditions in question. An
understanding of the similarity or dissimilarity of political conditions
provides a criteria for determining which lessons of history ought to be
learnt.
Similarly, Warren’s contention the “lack of military success during
a time of American technological and training advantages indicates
shortcomings of US Army Culture” is correct. His contention that
the centurion mindset produced an Army that wins firefights but
loses wars, is also correct. Yet, his solution, to increase and broaden
1     US Department of the Army, Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, Agile, Field Manual 6-22
(Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, 2006), chapter 12.
2     Daniel Bolger, Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (New
York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014).
3     Matthew Morton, “Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future,” Parameters 45, no. 1 (Spring
2015): 55-67.
4     Jason W. Warren, “The Centurion Mindset and the Army’s Strategic Leader Paradigm,”
Parameters 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2015): 27-38.
5     Morton, “Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future,” 58-61.
6     Ibid., 66.
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educational opportunities for officers, is insufficient (though necessary).7
Furthermore, funding to send every mid-grade officer to graduate
school is unlikely, given current budget constraints.8 Even if funding
was available, graduate education itself would fail to bring about the
desired outcome—an Army that excels tactically and wins strategically.
Improved critical thinking skills are not enough.
What is needed is improvement in the Army’s political skill sets.9
The Army’s operational and strategic failures resulted from the fact that
its leadership lost sight of the central tenet of war: the aims are political,
and the means are carried out within a specific political context.
Wars are political. Victory is ultimately defined in political terms.
Clausewitz did not invent these tenets. He observed the world around
him, then provided arguments about what was necessary to fight and
win.10 Two hundred years later, the political nature of war has not
changed. The political conditions under which it occurs, however, are
rapidly evolving. To set the conditions for victory in the twenty-first
century, the Army must get better at observing the political conditions
of a conflict, and question how well its doctrine fits those conditions,
and when necessary innovate how it fights.

A Changed World, Changing Conflicts

Successful armies are products of their environments. The logic and
core assumptions of their doctrines are fitted to specific circumstances.
The US Army is no different. During the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, the Army could expect to fight within a constrained set of
political conditions. War was the exclusive realm of nation-states. US
national security objectives were primarily defined as homeland defense
and the protection of free commerce with other nation-states. The political objectives of a conflict could be secured by defeating the military
forces with which a foreign power threatened US national security. War
had a sequential nature. Military success proceeded political victory.
Military doctrine based on Jomini’s assumption that the destruction of
the enemy’s military forces precedes, and opens space for, a political
settlement was well-fitted to the political conditions of most conflicts.11
The world has changed.
In the twenty-first century, war is primarily—but not exclusively—
the realm of nation-states. Access to global resource and financial
markets, decreased transportation costs and travel times, the ubiquity
of the internet and World Wide Web, the diffusion of technology, and
social media, endow non-state actors with the potential to generate
capabilities once reserved to national governments. Non-state actors
now have the ability to participate in, if not wage, war. Non-state actors

7     Warren, “The Centurion Mindset and the Army’s Strategic Leader Paradigm,” 35-38.
8     Ibid., 36-37.
9     By political skills, I mean the epistemological capabilities that fall within the domain of political
science.
10     Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976).
11     Antoine Henri Jomini, Art of War, ed. James Donald Hittle (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books,
1965).
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can shape the political conditions by shaping the narrative of the conflict
and activating or deactivating strategic audiences.12
Globalization, diffused technology, and social media similarly
increase the ability of conventionally weaker nation-states to shape
the political conditions of a given conflict. These factors enhance the
ability of weaker states to shape the narrative and influence strategic
audiences, potentially expanding the number of combatants or fronts.
Globalization, technology, and social media allow weaker nation-states
to short-circuit, circumvent, or reduce the military and political advantages of great powers—including the United States.13
Within these increasingly complex conditions, conflicts become
more dynamic. The range of potential adversaries increases. As the
number of combatants evolves, the range of capabilities and political
objectives the Army may confront becomes more fluid. A multitude of
state and non-state combatant and non-combatant actors may enter and
exit the conflict, changing the number and nature of strategic audiences.
This situation undermines the sequential nature of war observed during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the twenty-first century,
Jomini’s assumption may be less valid.14 The defeat of enemy forces may
not be tightly bound to victory.
Modern warfare requires the Army assess political conditions and
evaluate how well existing military doctrine fits. If Army doctrine is
ill-fitted to the political conditions, setting the military conditions for
victory requires innovation in military doctrine and/or strategy.

The Paradox of Adaptation—Political Blindness

No army is better at finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy than
the US Army. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this capability overwhelmingly produced the desired political objective(s). The
Army’s tactical prowess is a product of its adaptive ability.
Adaptation is catalyzed by a desire to increase efficiency or capabilities. It is also catalyzed by changes in operational terrain or technology.
It requires new techniques or procedures to accomplish an accepted
task. Adaptive learning builds on the foundations of conventional
wisdom. New techniques or procedures (even if radically different) are
based on accepted assumptions about the logic and utility of a given
task.15 Adaptation changes behavior, but not beliefs about the utility of
the behavior in regard to the objective(s).16 For example: over the last
hundred years, cavalry has adapted to the industrial revolution and other
changes in technology—yet, the logic and utility of continuous reconnaissance to develop the situation and identify, create, and preserve
options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative remains unchanged.17
12     Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 15-109.
13     Robert A. Johnson, “Predicting Future War,” Parameters 44, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 65-76.
14     Jomini.
15     Andrew Hill, “Military Innovation and Military Culture,” Parameters 45, no. 1 (Spring 2015):
85-98.
16     Chris Argyris, “Double-Loop Learning and Implementable Validity,” in Organizations as
Knowledge Systems: Knowledge, Learning and Dynamic Capabilities, eds. Haridimos Tsoukas and Nikolaos
Mylonopoulos (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
17     US Department of the Army, Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron, Field Manual 3-20.96
(Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, 2010), Chapter 3.
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The Army’s excellence in adaptation is a product of its formal educational systems. They stress adaptive learning. From Basic Training
to the Command and General Staff College, the Army’s educational
systems produce soldiers who are increasingly efficient and effective at
accomplishing accepted tasks—maneuver to contact, accurate delivery of direct and indirect fire, identifying and locating enemy forces,
etc. Soldiers become experts at adapting new tools, technologies, and
weapons to such tasks. They also become experts at adapting the accomplishment of these tasks to different physical environments.
Herein lies the root of the Army’s strategic problem. As adaptation
reinforces existing assumptions and validates the perceived utility of
established behaviors, it undermines innovation.18 Innovative learning
questions not just how something is done, but why it is done. Innovative
learning does this by examining the utility of existing behaviors in reference to the stated objective(s) and specific conditions.19
Because the Army’s educational systems and adaptive skills developed during a period in which military success preceded political victory,
Jomini’s central assumption came to be unquestioned. The destruction
of enemy forces became the Army’s raison d’être.
As the Army became accustomed to overlooking the political conditions of a conflict, it stopped evaluating such. Eventually the Army’s
ability to appreciate and respond to the political conditions within which
a war occurs atrophied. The Army developed a political blind spot. As a
result, military operations often came to be viewed myopically, untethered to the nation’s political objectives.
Correcting this requires soldiers capable of considering the political conditions of a given conflict. They must also become aware of the
potential disconnect between established military doctrine and the
political conditions and political objectives of said conflict.
Yet, this must be done without sacrificing tactical prowess. It is still
possible to lose a war on the battlefield. It makes no sense to become
better strategically, at the expense of tactical ability. The Army’s formal
educational systems ought to continue to focus on adaptive ability.
Innovative ability and an appreciation of political context ought to
be honed via Army-wide reflective conversations and mentoring that
explore how the political conditions of a given conflict and US national
security objectives challenge the utility of existing doctrine. The Army’s
experiences in Vietnam and Iraq illustrate the importance of such.

Reflective Conversation: Vietnam, Iraq, and Innovation

When faced with the inability to secure the political objective(s)
of a war, the military forces of great powers have three choices: quit,
try harder, or try something else. Predominately, the second option is
chosen. Perversely, it normally raises the costs of failure—without altering the outcome.

18     Chris Argyris, Reasons and Rationalizations: The Limits to Organizational Knowledge (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004).
19     Ibid.
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The reason for this is simple. For great power militaries, failure is
rarely the result of the poor execution of well-fitted doctrine. Failure is
more often a product of doctrine that is ill-fitted to the conflict’s political conditions. Trying harder will not fix this problem.
This was the Army’s experience in the wars in Vietnam and Iraq.
During the Vietnam War, efforts at an Army-wide reflective conversation were blocked by the Army’s hierarchy. During the 2003-2011 Iraq
War, efforts at an Army-wide reflective conversation were facilitated by
the Army’s organizational structure.
In June 1965, Army Chief of Staff General Harold Johnson commissioned a study of the war in Vietnam. General Johnson had questions
about the nature of the conflict and the appropriateness of the growing
US military mission. Concerned the Army did not understand the challenges it would face, General Johnson hoped an examination of the
political conditions might yield new courses of action to “accomplish
US aims and objectives.”20
General Creighton Abrams, the Vice Chief of Staff, was tasked with
overseeing the study. Abrams and the study’s ten field-grade authors
became convinced existing doctrine was ill-fitted to the political conditions of the war—and was therefore unlikely to produce victory. Their
findings were published in March 1966 as “A Program for the Pacification
and Long-term Development of South Vietnam” (PROVN).21
PROVN questioned how well core doctrinal assumptions fit the
political conditions of the war in Vietnam. It maintained the political
conditions of the war were such that: “‘Victory’ can only be achieved
through bringing the individual Vietnamese, typically a rural peasant,
to support willingly the Government of South Vietnam (GVN). The
critical actions are those that occur at the village, district and provincial
levels. This is where the war must be fought; this is where that war and
the object which lies beyond it must be won.”22 The officers working
under Abram’s leadership had access to battlefield information, professional experience with existing doctrine, access to academic resources
and histories regarding insurgencies, and sought out expert opinions
in the United States and Asia about the political conditions of the war.
They had a wealth of information with which to launch an organizationwide conversation about the war. Yet, they did not have access to the
Army (as an organization).
PROVN did not result in an Army-wide reflective conversation.
There was no internal dialogue about the political conditions of the
war or the appropriateness of existing doctrine. Such was blocked by
the organization’s hierarchy. General Johnson was concerned about
PROVN’s potentially divisive effects on the Army. General William
Westmoreland, the Commander of Military Assistance CommandVietnam, and General Earle Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, disagreed with the authors’ findings. As a result, PROVN’s
classification rating was elevated and distribution restricted. PROVN
20     The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition, Volume II (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 501.
21     US Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations,
A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam, Volume 1 (Washington, DC:
US Department of the Army, 1966).
22     Ibid., 1.
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was effectively locked away, and with it any organization-wide attempt
to evaluate how well the Army’s military means fit the nation’s political
ends.23
In November 2005, the Commander of the Army’s Combined
Arms Center (then) Lieutenant General David Petraeus announced the
Army would completely rewrite its manual on counterinsurgency. His
public announcement, occurring at a Washington conference hosted
by the Carr Center for Human Rights, came as a shock. The Army’s
existing counterinsurgency manual had been issued just thirteen months
earlier.24 What Petraeus’ announcement did, however, was decrease the
likelihood the Army’s contemporary hierarchy would be able to stifle
such an evaluation in regard to Iraq. The military-means-political-ends
question was now in the public sphere.
After the 2003 invasion, Petraeus worried existing doctrine was
ill-fitted to the political conditions of the war in Iraq. He questioned
its ability to produce victory. By 2005, at the end of his second tour,
Petraeus was convinced the Army’s core doctrinal assumptions were
ill-fitted to the political conditions of the war.25 Newly assigned to
the Combined Arms Center, Petraeus launched an Army-wide reflective conversation—the counter-insurgency debates. The professional
journals under his control became the forum for discussion and debate
about the political conditions of the conflict, Army doctrine, and the
best path forward. To fuel the conversation, Petraeus pulled in information from Iraq, expanded the Army’s Lessons Learned program, and
used the Command and General Staff College and the seventeen other
Army schools and training programs under his command as vehicles for
modeling and studying the war.26
The organization’s reflective conversation about counter-insurgency
operations drew attention to the Army’s performance gap and the need
for innovation.27 This increased awareness and the search for solutions,
made the organization ripe for leaning. These conversations increased
the Army’s absorptive capacity—its capacity to absorb and act upon
23     Robert Gallucci, Neither Peace nor Honor: the Politics of American Military Policy in Vietnam
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 37-39; Philip Davidson, Vietnam at War: The
History 1946-1975 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 410; Lewis Sorley, “To Change a
War: General Harold K. Johnson and the PROVN Study,” Parameters 28, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 93109; John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 160; Jeffrey Record, The American Way of War: Cultural
Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2006), 11; and Andrew Birtle,
“PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal,” The Journal of Military History 72, no.
4 (October 2008): 1244. It is worth noting that PROVN was even withheld from the White House
and National Security Council. John Tierney, Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006), 242-243.
24    Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq
(New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 77; and Conrad Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: The US Army’s Response to
Defeat in Southeast Asia (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2010), 59-60.
25    David Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations for Soldiering in Iraq,” Military
Review 86, no. 1 (January-February 2006): 45-55; and Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military
Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 165, 228-232. Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends,
67-70.
26    Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends, 76; David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, The Fourth Star: Four Generals
and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army (New York: Crown Publishing, 2009), 216217; Thomas Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq (New
York: Penguin Books, 2009), 17-18; and David Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the
US Military for Modern Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 75.
27     Richard Downie, Learning from Conflict: The US Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 2.
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new knowledge.28 Critically, they forged a community of like minded
individuals with a different understanding of the fight and the best
means for achieving victory. As this community grew, it reshaped the
organization’s understanding of the war in Iraq.29
In a relatively short period of time, the Army reevaluated the political conditions of the war in Iraq and revised doctrine to fit them better.
By January 2008, the means through which the Army sought victory in
Iraq changed. The speed of innovation was facilitated by the Army-wide
reflective conversations that preceded it. Yet, organizational change did
not occur fast enough to secure US political objectives, that is, to secure
victory. The process started too late, beginning after the Army entered
the conflict.
Army-wide reflective conversations about the political conditions
of past, current, and potential conflicts are critical. As a form of inquiry
and learning, such conversations are part of evaluating the organization’s
performance in setting the military conditions for victory. The counterinsurgency debates of the last decade illustrate this process. Yet, what
is needed is a process for reflective conversation that is more expansive
and more routine—and less defensive on the part of the participants and
the Army as an institution.
At the core of such Army-wide reflective conversation must be the
written works of soldiers, works produced through the soldier’s self-study
of given past, present, or potential conflicts. In a January 2016 article for
The Army Press, Captain Philip Neri argued for the encouragement of
such self-study activities as part of the professional military education
of individual soldiers.30 Neri’s suggestion should be implemented and
leveraged to foster organization-wide conversations. This aim could be
accomplished by encouraging the publication of self-study works via the
Army’s professional publications, The Army Press, and social media.
Senior leaders should incentivize participation in self-study activities
and publication by favorably highlighting such on evaluation reports
and promotion decisions.
Back-and-forth, open, conversations visible to the entire organization could challenge the Army to consider the political conditions of
modern conflicts. Could, however, does not equate to would.
For Army-wide conversations to generate a better appreciation of
the political conditions of modern war, two additional traits must be
present. First, they must have a reflective nature. They must go beyond
histories of what happened or post hoc defenses of poor outcomes.
Instead, these conversations must compare expected outcomes with
actual outcomes and question the role political conditions played in
diverting the two.31 Second, within the context of these conversations,
28     Haridimous Tsoukas and Nikolaos Mylonopoulos, Organizations as Knowledge Systems: Knowledge,
Learning and Dynamic Capabilities (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
29     Frederic Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force: Tactics of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
30     Phillip Neri, “Rethinking How to Develop Leaders for Complex Environments, Part 2,”
The Army Press, January 2016, http://armypress.dodlive.mil/2016/01/07/rethinking-how-todevelop-leaders-for-complex-environments-pt-2/.
31     Isabelle Walsh, Judith Holton, Lotte Bailyn, Walter Fernandez, Natalia Levina, and Barney
Glaser, “What Grounded Theory Is...A Critically Reflective Conversation Among Scholars,”
Organizational Research Methods 18, no. 4 (October 2015): 581-599
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dissent from the conventional wisdom of existing doctrine must be
appreciated. Such dissent ought to be challenged, it is as dangerous to
assume the validity of the novel insight as it is to assume the validity of
the status quo. Yet, to encourage true explorations and dialogue, those
who raise and offer contradictory views must be encouraged, engaged,
but not punished. This process offers the best method for fostering
organization-wide reflective conversations about the types of political
conditions in which the Army may have to fight.
Currently, the organization’s professional publications, The Army
Press, and social media are devoid of such. Articles appear about the
importance of strategic thinking and about strategic conditions, but
little discussion is given to how political context is likely to affect how
the Army will (or should) set the conditions for victory. Now, before
the next conflict, is the time for discussions that marry the abstract with
the practical. For example, the Army ought to consider how it would
affect the fight if civilian leaders decided the political objective of a
major war with a peer-competitor was simply to raise the cost of the
enemy’s victory, rather than forestall it. Similarly, the Army ought to
consider how a social media campaign to undermine the legitimacy of
an allied government might affect the political conditions of a conflict,
potentially altering the means employed by the Army, and perhaps even
the objectives sought by the United States. Now, before the next conflict,
is the time to consider how political conditions affect not just the aims
of war, but its means.
Such reflective conversations, however, do not happen on their own.
Few individuals within the Army are prepared to engage in such selfstudy. To hone the skills necessary for such abstract consideration and
reflective conversations, personal mentoring is needed. Mentoring will
facilitate the individual political skills necessary to foster organizational
capability.

Mentorship: Fox Conner and Innovation

Major General Fox Conner is an important, yet little known, Army
officer who served as General John Pershing’s Chief of Operations
during World War I. Conner had a penchant for taking on the role of
personal mentor to junior officers—including George Marshall and
Dwight Eisenhower.32 His mentorship of Marshall and Eisenhower
illustrates how to foster an appreciation of the political conditions within
which wars occur and endow leaders with the ability to set the military
conditions for victory.
Fox Conner met George Marshall in July 1918. Marshall was serving
as the operations officer for the 1st American Division. In Major Marshall,
Major General Conner recognized a keen ability for operational planning
and strategy. Conner devoted one day a week to working with Marshall.
The two worked together to plan the offensive at Saint-Mihiel. Conner’s
investment quickly paid dividends. By October, Conner had Marshall
detailed to the First Army operations staff.33
32     Edward Cox, Grey Eminence: Fox Conner and the Art of Mentorship (Stillwater, OK: New Forums
Press, 2011).
33     Ibid., 69-79.
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Conner would continue to provide mentorship and opportunities
for Marshall to hone his skills at planning and strategy. From his staff
position with the First Army, Marshall observed how intra-alliance politics and political objectives drove military operations. At the end of the
war, Marshall and Conner discussed how the political conditions of the
peace practically guaranteed another European war.34 Conner’s tutelage
endowed Marshall with the skills and experiences he would call upon as
Army Chief of Staff, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State to help
the US emerge from that Second World War victorious.
Fox Conner met Dwight Eisenhower in October 1920, at a dinner
hosted by George Patton. Conner liked the young major and accepted
Patton’s recommendation that Eisenhower be selected as Conner’s
executive officer at Camp Gaillard in Panama. Although Eisenhower
was unable to accept the posting until January 1922, a mentor-mentee
relationship quickly developed between the two.35
Conner was unsatisfied with Eisenhower’s knowledge and appreciation for military history. He pushed Ike to study both. During rides
through the jungle and weekend fishing trips, the two discussed past
battles and campaigns. Conner encouraged Eisenhower to go beyond
memorization of decisions made and actions taken. He challenged Ike to
consider why key decisions were made and how the actions that stemmed
from them affected the outcome. In time, Conner led Eisenhower from
purely historic accounts of war to more theoretical works — including Shakespeare, Nietzsche, and Clausewitz. Conner’s penultimate
lesson, drawn from his own experiences, was political. He encouraged
Eisenhower to learn all he could about waging allied warfare.36 Given
Ike’s future role as Supreme Allied Commander, Conner’s lessons
were prescient. Reflecting on the victory in World War II, Eisenhower
himself credited “two miracles” for bringing about Germany’s surrender
in 1945: “America’s transformation, in three years, from a situation of
appalling danger to unparalleled might in battle…” and “…the development, over the same period, of near perfection in allied conduct of war
operations.”37
Two recent articles, one by Colonel Jim Thomas and Lieutenant
Colonel Ted Thomas, the other by Colonels Thomas Galvin and Charles
Allen, highlight the important role mentorship plays in developing
leaders. The authors note that such voluntary relationships between
individuals of greater experience and lesser experience, based on mutual
trust and respect, facilitate cognitive development.38 Fox Conner,
George Marshall, and Dwight Eisenhower illustrate this process, and
how it can be leveraged to develop strategic leaders cognizant of the
political conditions of war.

34     Ibid.
35     Ibid., 81-94.
36     Ibid.
37     Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1948), 4.
38     Jim Thomas and Ted Thomas, “Mentoring, Coaching, and Counseling: Toward a Common
Understanding,” Military Review 95, no. 4 (July-August 2015): 50-57; and Thomas Galvin and Charles
Allen, “Professional Military Education: Mentoring Has Value When Your Soldiers Want for
Experience,” Army 65, no. 7 (July 2015): 37-39.
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Those with the talent and skills to do so, should look for opportunities to serve as mentors. As such, they should guide their mentees in the
study of the military actions and political conditions of past wars and
battles (US and foreign) and discuss the factors that defined victory and
the factors that enabled one side or the other to achieve it. They should
also challenge their mentees to consider counter-factuals in regard to
the military actions and political conditions and how differences in such
might have altered the outcome.
Still, the Army is too large to rely on personal mentorship to develop
an appreciation for the political conditions of war. Mentorship remains
a critical start point. It must lead to, not replace, reflective, Army-wide
conversations via the professional journals and social media necessary
to anticipate and observe the political conditions of a given conflict,
evaluate how well existing doctrine fits, and (when necessary) innovate
how the Army seeks to set the military conditions for victory.

Skill and Ability Precede Outcome

The Army’s experiences in Vietnam and Iraq demonstrate the critical importance of organization-wide reflective conversations about the
political conditions of a war. Understanding political conditions can
precondition the Army’s ability not only to fight effectively, but to secure
the political objectives of a war as well.
Fox Conner’s mentorship of George Marshall and Dwight
Eisenhower illustrates how an appreciation of the political conditions
of a given conflict is critical to the development of strategic leaders. The
ability to consider the political conditions of war is critical to the ability
to question accepted assumptions and to think about the potential scenarios the Army might face.
In the twenty-first century, the Army will fight within a wider, more
dynamic set of political conditions than was the historic norm of the
second half of the twentieth century. Fighting well tactically will not be
enough. Achieving victory will require an appreciation of the political
conditions and an ability to innovate to meet them. In short, political
awareness will be at the core of mission command. The ability to think
critically, creatively, and seize the initiative will be predicated on a solid
understanding of the fight. That cannot be achieved without an appreciation of the political conditions of modern conflicts.

Professionalism and the
Volunteer Military

Will Army 2025 be a Military Profession?
Don M. Snider
Abstract: Army 2025 is now being built and it needs to have all the
right expert knowledge developed into its practitioners and units
for immediate use when called upon. That is an immense task given
the crunching defense reductions now ongoing. Analyzing the current state of the Profession using Army data on the bureaucratizing influences of the drawdown, on leadership and trust within the
ranks, and on the development of moral character of future Army
professionals, the author arrives at a less than sanguine conclusion.
While the Army will find the necessary efficiencies during reductions, military effectiveness is the true hallmark of the success of our stewardship.
ADP1 - The Army (2012)1

I

n this article I will argue there are no guarantees that Army 2025, now
being developed by its current Stewards, will be an effective participant in the military profession. In fact, there is a very good possibility
it will not be, to the extreme detriment of the Republic’s security. The
provenance of this challenge resides within the Army’s history and its
unique institutional characters. And, as we shall see, the potential solution
lies with the quality of the Stewards the Army develops, the leadership
they provide through this decade of defense reductions, and the results
they do, or do not, obtain.
The Department of the Army is, in fact, an institution of dual character. It is at the same time both a governmental bureaucracy and a
military profession. Thus there is a powerful, internal tension raging
between the competing cultures of bureaucracy and profession. Only
one can dominate institution-wide and at the levels of subordinate organizations and units.2 Presently, and after fifteen years of war, there are
indicators the culture of profession dominates that of bureaucracy, but
only weakly so.3
Stated another way, like all organizations the Army has a set of
default behaviors that accurately reflect a core functional makeup. Since
its establishment in 1775, that default behavior has been, and remains,
1      US Department of the Army, The Army, Army Doctrinal Publication 1 (Washington, DC: US
Department of the Army, September 2012), paragraph 4-19.
2      This dual-character framework and the conduct of its inherent, internal struggle is one of
the main findings of the two research/book projects that renewed the study of the US Army as a
military profession. See, Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds., The Future of the Army Profession,
2d Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005).
3      This is a judgment call on my part based on the data reported in the 2015 Annual Survey of
the Army Profession (CASAP FY15) and the 2013 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army
Leadership (CASAL – Main Findings, April 2014). In particular, I focused on data in both reports that
supported the existence of a professional vs. bureaucratic culture within Army AC units. Subsequent
documentation in this article will draw specifics more from the CASAL given the longitudinal nature
of its data.
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one of a hierarchical government bureaucracy. Only by the immense
efforts of post-Civil War leadership, both uniformed (Major General
William T. Sherman) and civilian (Elihu Root), was the behavior of the
Army first conformed from bureaucracy to that of a military profession,
and then only within the officer corps. The remainder of the Army was
professionalized later, though that status was lost in Vietnam only to be
renewed in the re-professionalization that occurred in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. To this day the challenge remains—every morning by presence and policy, Army leaders at every level, and particularly the senior
Stewards, must shift the Army’s behavior away from its bureaucratic
tendencies and to the behavior of a military profession. It simply does
not occur naturally; it is a function almost solely of leadership. To be
more specific, read carefully the contrasts laid out in the table below:
Profession Versus Bureaucracy Comparison4
Comparison
Profession
Knowledge
Expert, requires lifelong learning, education,
and practice to develop
expertise
Application Knowledge applied as
expert practice through
discretion and judgment
of individual professional; commitment based
Measure of
Mission effectiveness
Success
Culture
Values and ethic based;
granted autonomy with
high degree of authority, responsibility and
accountability founded
on trust; a self-policing
meritocracy
Investments Priority investment in
leader development;
human capital/talent
management; investment
strategy
Growth
Develop critical thinking
skills to spur innovation,
flexibility, adaptability;
broadened perspectives
Motivation
Intrinsic - Sacrificial service, sense of honor and
duty, work is a calling

Bureaucracy
Non-expert skills based,
learned on the job and/
or through short duration
training
Work accomplished by
following SOPs, administrative rules and procedures; compliance based
Efficiency of resource
expenditure
Procedural compliance
based; closely supervised
with limited discretionary authority, highly
structured, task-driven
environment founded on
low-trust
Priority investment in
hardware, routines; driven
by cost
Develop tactical and
technical competence to
perform tasks
Extrinsic - Ambition to
get ahead, competition;
work is a job

4      This table was first published in a chapter by T.O. Jacobs and Michael G. Sanders in The
Future of the Army Profession (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2005). I have subsequently adapted and updated
it several times, most recently with insights from Professor John Meyer of the Navy War College.
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It should be clear from these comparisons of the Army’s dual
character that a real tension exists within the Army and its subordinate
commands and agencies. Thus leadership, both civilian and uniformed,
through presence and policy is what ultimately determines the cultural
and behavioral outcome of Army commands and agencies.
This is not a trivial issue, as too many today believe, because if the
Army morphs into its default behavior of an obedient military bureaucracy it will be unable to do what professions alone can do.5 As shown
in the table, professions only exist because of two unique behaviors their
clients need to exist: they create expert knowledge and develop individuals to apply it effectively and ethically under the control of a self-policed
Ethic.
As new Army doctrine states, that sought after behavior is only
manifested when Army stewards create and maintain within Army
culture and its professionals the five essential characteristics of the
Army profession (versus Enterprise bureaucracy): Military Expertise;
Honorable Service; Esprit de Corps; and Stewardship which together
produce the internal and external Trust needed for the Army to be, and
to remain, a military profession.6
Restated in military parlance, unless the Army behaves as a military
profession it will be unable to produce: (1) the evolving expertise of
land combat to Win in a Complex World; and, (2) an Ethic to motivate the
development, honorable service, and sacrifice of individual professionals and to control ethically the immense lethality of their expert work.7
Either outcome, I believe, is a disaster for the security of our Republic.
I will make three inter-related arguments in support of the thesis
that there is no guaranteed outcome for Army 2025. But first let me
state very briefly two facts needed for context by those who may not be
acquainted with the sociology of professions.8 First, the Army is not a
profession just because it states somewhere it is one; calling yourself a
professional does not make you one! In fact the Army does not even get
to determine if it is a profession. As with all professions, their clients
determine when they are behaving as effective and ethical professions
and their approval is seen in an established trust relationship and in the
resulting autonomy of practice granted to the profession and its individual members.
Second, modern professions compete within their jurisdictions of
work with many other organizations and in that competition some of
them do not succeed; they die as professions. They either cease to exist
because their work is no longer needed or expert (railroad porters and
schedulers), or they morph into a different organizational behavior for
5      This point is best understood by comparing, over the past decade or so, the battlefield performance of the professional US Army to that of the bureaucratic European land armies serving in
the same coalitions in the Middle East.
6      US Department of the Army, The Army Profession, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 1
(Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, June 2015), 1-3 - 1-5.
7      US Department of the Army, The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World: 20202040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: US Army Training and Doctrine Command,
October 2014); and Don M. Snider, “Renewing the Motivational Power of the Army’s Professional
Ethic,” Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn 2014): 7-11.
8      The foundational text is, Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of
Expert Labor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
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a period until they can try to re-earn the trust of their clients (accountancy, after the Enron scandals). Thus, contrary to what Huntington
implied in his classic, The Soldier and the State, it is simply not the case,
“once a profession, always a profession.” I will return to this point in
the conclusion.
With those facts stated, on to the first argument.

An Institutional Culture of Trust

While it is well established in research and in Army Doctrine that
trust, both internal and external, is the “currency” of professions, it
is not clear the Army’s Stewards will be able to maintain the current
institutional culture of trust so essential to the Army functioning as a
military profession. There are at least two reasons for this:
The first and main reason is found external to the Army. It is the
intense bureaucratization being abetted within all military departments
by the ongoing defense reductions.9 While only slightly winning the
constant battle over institutional culture, the Army is now enduring extensive and de-motivational reductions in personnel and other
resources (e.g., involuntary terminations of service for both officers
and senior enlisted soldiers, lowered readiness in many units which
demotivates leader initiative, a sustained high op-tempo which means
at all levels “doing more with less,” etc.). For the Army leadership, as
they execute such necessary—but clearly bureaucratic—responses, the
culture of trust so tenuously held together is pressured to fray even
further. This is but a recurring example of the well-accepted fact from
decades past that defense reductions tend strongly to bureaucratize the
military departments.10
A second reason the battle over a professional institutional culture
may well be lost in the near future is the fact that the operational Army
has now moved back to garrison in CONUS from its wartime deployments in the Middle East. And, it is fair to say, it is having some major
problems fitting in. Particularly in the junior ranks, both officer and
enlisted, there is a huge learning curve to be surmounted as individuals
and units learn anew, to cite just two critical items, how to do training
management/execution in garrison; and, how to develop Army leaders
under stateside priorities, policies, and procedures. This transition is
turning out to be a very significant leadership challenge at all levels, one
that will exist for several more years with the outcome likely remaining
in question.
Fortunately, the Army regularly surveys at all levels throughout
the institution both the state of the Army as a profession, and Army
leaders’ perceptions of leadership and leader development effectiveness.
The former is found in the CASAP Report, the most current being
9      The post-Cold War reductions within the Department of Defense provided an “extreme”
case of organizational downsizing, and scholars documented then across all types of organizations such bureaucratizing effects as “increasing formalization, rules, standardization, and rigidity;…
loss of common organizational culture; loss of innovativeness; increased resistance to change; risk
aversion and conservatism in decision-making…” See, Kim S. Cameron, “Strategic Organizational
Downsizing: An Extreme Case,” Research in Organizational Behavior Vol. 20 (JAI Press, 1998):185-229.
10      Periods of Defense reductions also offer opportunities for the Stewards of the profession
to renegotiate jurisdictions of practice to ease an excessive optempo created by the smaller force. It
remains to be seen whether that will eventuate for Army 2025.
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September 1015; and, the latter in the CASAL Report, the latest being
April 2014.11 Of interest to this discussion are findings that cast light on
the state of the Army’s institutional and unit climates amid the defense
reductions in which Army leaders now lead. One finding from the
CASAL is particularly relevant to our discussion:
Mixed climate indicators – Commitment high (Captain intent to stay highest
percent since tracked in 2000), confident in mission ability, but decrease in
career satisfaction, upturn in unit discipline problems, increase in workload
stress.”12

For the last item, the report notes, “Stress from high workload is a
serious problem for nearly one-fifth of Army leaders.” This is a significant increase from 2009 when twice as many active component Army
leaders rated it “not a problem.”13
To understand better this challenge of the bureaucratizing, indeed
de-professionalizing, influence of the defense reductions coinciding with
the post-war “return to garrison,” consider the case of the implementation to date of the Army’s new doctrine of mission command. Within
internal audiences senior Army leaders repeatedly state, “We can’t do
mission command unless the Army is a profession.”14 They say this, correctly, because of the critical role trust plays in the execution of mission
command and the fact that, uniquely, professions create and maintain
high levels of trust both internally and externally—it is, as noted earlier,
the “currency” of all professions. But is that requisite level of trust being
generated now among those implementing mission command?
To remind, mission command is “…the exercise of authority and
direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined
initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” Several doctrinal
principles are embedded in this definition, three of which are germane
here: “Build cohesive teams through mutual trust,” “Exercise disciplined
initiative,” and “Accept prudent risk.”
The current challenge, which is now described internally within the
Army as the “hypocrisy” of mission command, rests on the different
perspectives held by the Army’s younger generations of leaders about
the current implementation of the concept. Junior leaders, both commissioned and non-commissioned, most of whom enjoyed great freedom of
action while deployed and have seldom before served in garrison, focus
on the principles of exercising initiative and accepting prudent risk.
They want to operate in garrison as they did while deployed—mission
orders, freedom to exercise initiative, and with minimum oversight by
seniors who underwrite the risks inherent in their initiatives.
11      Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE), Annual Survey of the Army Profession
(CASAP FY15), Technical Report 2015-01 (West Point, NY: Center for the Army Profession
and Ethic (CAPE), September 2015), http://cape.army.mil/repository/reports/Technical%20
Report%20CASAP%20FY15.pdf; and Center for Army Leadership, Annual Survey of Army Leadership
(CASAL), Main Findings, Technical Report 2014-01, April 2014, http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cal/2013CASALMainFindingsTechnicalReport2014-01.pdf.
12      Ibid., 28-29.
13      Ibid., 35-36.
14      For example, General David Perkins, CG TRADOC, speaking at the Army’s Senior Leader
Seminar (SLS-15-02) in August 2015, author in attendance.
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But, currently, their perception is it is not the case. In the CASAL
report company grade officers and especially junior NCOs rate satisfaction with “amount of freedom/latitude in the conduct of duties” as
even below the CASAL’s acceptable (but inexplicably low!) favorability
threshold of 67 percent. Similarly unsatisfactory rating were received for
empowerment to make decisions, and learning from honest mistakes.15
Their battalion and brigade commanders, on the other hand, see in
garrison situations significant personal and professional downsides in
underwriting initiatives by junior leaders. Simply stated, executing live
fire exercise in CONUS is a far more restricted and controlled activity
than it was when conducted while deployed. To paraphrase one recent,
and successful, battalion commander, “If you think I am going to risk
a ‘top block’ OER on the initiatives of one of my platoon leaders who
doesn’t know what the hell he’s doing in garrison, you are crazy.” While
regrettably careerist as expressed, the CASAL data indicates this position may well be too common among the 20-30 percent of Army leaders
not rated effective in demonstrating the principles of mission command.
That data concludes:
Between 70-78% of leaders are rated effective in demonstrating the principles of the mission command philosophy (lowest rating of six tasks was
“building effective teams” at 70%).16

In earlier defense reductions such a climate was known as “micromanagement,” a recognized obstacle to leader development and the
creation of positive unit climates.17 The result is not only the erosion of
critical leader-led trust relationships within operational units, but also
the erosion more broadly of the institutional culture necessary for the
Army to remain a military profession.
So, aside from the specific issue of mission command, how is the
Army doing at building and maintaining a culture of trust amid this
bureaucratizing environment? Let us turn again to specific CASAL
data, two of which are directly focused on this question:
Seventy-three percent of leaders rate their immediate superior effective or
very effective at building trust while 14% rate them ineffective. A majority
of leaders (72-83% [by component]) are also viewed favorably in demonstrating trust-related behaviors including looking out for others’ welfare,
following through on commitments, showing trust in other’s abilities and
correcting conditions in units that hinder trust.
Two thirds of leaders report having high or very high trust in their immediate superior, peers, and subordinates (overall no more than 12% of leaders
reporting having low or very low trust in those cohorts). Just over half of
leaders (55%) report having high trust in their superiors two level ups (14%
report low or very low trust).18

I read these data as, roughly one-quarter of all the followers surveyed
indicate that their leaders are less than “effective or very effective” at
building trust and 14 percent of those are, in perception, fully ineffective.
15      Center for Army Leadership, Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL), Main Findings, 38.
16      Ibid., 39-40.
17      See, for example, George Reed, Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the US Military (Lincoln,
Nebraska: Potomac Books, 2015).
18      Center for Army Leadership, Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL), Main Findings, 46.
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Further, one third of Army leaders do not have “high or very high” trust
in their immediate leaders, and considerably less in those two levels up.
When these portions of Army leaders (1/4 -1/3) are deficient at the critical tasks of “building trust” and “being trusted,” it is difficult for me to
be sanguine about the future state in internal trust within the Army.19

Army Leaders are Not Sufficiently Practicing Transformational
Leadership

The second element of my thesis is that current leadership practices
within the Army are unlikely to provide the inspiration and motivation,
and thus the trust and commitment, needed for both the institutional
Army (at the policy level) and its professionals (at the level of individual
practice) to prevail against the bureaucratizing pressures outlined in the
first argument.
While there are currently dozens of leadership theories extant in the
relevant literatures, for our purposes here they can be discussed best in
the context of how they are practiced by Army leaders. Broadly speaking
there are two related practices, both of which are implicitly endorsed
by the Army in its leadership doctrines. Current doctrines emphasize
“situational leadership,” that is, Army leaders are to be able to adjust
their actions to influence and otherwise lead based on the specifics of
the situation.20 This is commonsense—in the chaotic work that is the
Army’s, situations confronted by leaders are seldom if ever replicated.
The first broad practice is “transactional” leadership. Known for
its use of contingent reinforcement, or the “if-then, carrot and stick”
approach, it emphasizes the use of the formal authority of the leader to
influence, indeed if required to compel, subordinates to obedience, to
correct actions and behaviors.21 Rewards and punishments, threats and
sanctions are prominent in such interactions. The motivation and commitment produced by such a compliance-oriented relationship, then, is
what we know as the obligation of the duty concept, “I must do my
duty.” Thus commanders offer rewards for high performance and within
UCMJ there are articles which prescribe punishments for “dereliction”
of one’s duty. Understandably, such a leadership practice, if relied on too
heavily, will create a top-down, legalistic, compliance-oriented climate,
one more akin to a bureaucratic organization than a professional one.
Going well beyond such compliance oriented interactions is the
practice of “transformational” leadership. This approach looks deeper
into the human dimension of the leader-follower interaction to address
“the follower’s sense of self-worth in order to engage the follower in
true commitment and involvement in the effort at hand. This is what
transformational leadership adds to the transactional exchange.”22
More specifically, such leadership practices focus on the underlying
commitment of the leader and follower to shared goals and ideals as
19      This data on trust is only very slightly improved from the 2013 CASAL, which rated as
“moderately favorable” the perceived level of trust within Army organizations and units.
20      US Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Doctrine Publication 6-22 (Washington, DC:
US Department of the Army, August 2012), 4.
21      Bernard M. Bass, Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impacts
(Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum Associates, 1998), 6-7.
22      Ibid., 4.
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the basis for influencing behavior. Generally such leadership has four
components: (1) Leader as role model, someone whose attributes and
competencies are so compelling as to be aspired to and emulated; (2)
Inspirational motivation by the leader’s demonstrated commitment to
shared goals, well communicated expectations, and creation of a team
spirit; (3) Intellectual stimulation by the leader’s encouragement of innovation and creativity by the team; and, (4) Individualized consideration
of subordinates by the leader’s special attention as mentor or coach to
each one’s needs for achievement and growth.23
The relevant questions, then, are: (1) which, or what mix, of these
approaches is most likely to produce climates of trust and honorable
service needed for the Army to maintain its effectiveness and status as a
military profession; and, (2) which is the Army now using most?
When the first question is addressed in the context of the role of a
military Ethic in regulating the performance and behavior of individual
professionals, the answer is comparatively clear. Research on the Israeli
military has shown the three facets of a soldier’s commitment—to
organizational goals, to career expectations, and to internalized ethical
principles—are aligned better, and maintained that way, under the
transformational techniques.24
Research on the development and capabilities of “authentic”
leaders also sheds light on which practice is more effective. There, the
leader’s development of a cooperative interdependent relationship with
subordinates based initially on his/her competence, character, and demonstrated dependableness are the sources of trust. In turn, this trust
opens subordinates to further influence by their leaders, creating highimpact leadership seen both in unit effectiveness in combat and in the
moral development of subordinates. “Transformational leaders induce
their followers to internalize their values, belief and visions.”25
Further, studies of transactional versus transformational leadership component effectiveness in both stable and unstable environments
show both practices to be effective in stable environments. But in an
uncertain and unstable environment, such as deployments or combat
where “complexity, volatility and ambiguity are increased, transformational practices rated approximately 85 percent more effective than
transactional.”26 This is not a marginal difference!
Thus, what is most needed for Army 2025 is authentic leaders using
more frequently the practices of transformational leadership. So how is
the Army doing?
Returning once again to the 2014 CASAL report, the findings
of relevance here are those that give insights into the leadership techniques now being used by Army leaders. The CASAL assesses leader
23      Ibid., 5-6.
24      Reuben Gal, “Commitment and Obedience in the Military: And Israeli Case Study,” Armed
Forces and Society 11 (1985): 553-564.
25      Patrick J. Sweeney and Sean T. Hannah, “High Impact Military Leadership: the Positive
Effects of Authentic Moral Leadership on Followers,” in Forging the Warrior’s Character, Don M.
Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 91-116; quotation, 95.
26      Bernard M Bass and Ronald E. Riggio, Transformational Leadership, 2d Edition (New Jersey:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006), 53; see also Peggy C. Combs, US Army Cultural Obstacles to
Transformational Leadership, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, March
2007).

Professionalism and the Volunteer Military

Snider

47

effectiveness in each of the nine methods of influence described in Army
doctrine, methods ranging from inspirational appeals and getting buy-in
at the transformational end of the influence continuum, to pressure and
legitimating actions by authority at the transactional end. As one would
expect, Army leaders are perceived as exercising different degrees of
effectiveness with these techniques. Overall the report notes:
Larger percentages of leaders use the preferred methods of influence to gain
commitment from others as opposed to compliance-gaining methods, which
is a positive finding…Two thirds of AC leaders (69%) rate their immediate
superior effective in inspirational appeals as a method of influence, while
15% rate them ineffective. While these results meet the two-thirds threshold
of favorability, improvement of leader effectiveness in this skill [would be]
beneficial as it is positively associated with other favorable outcomes.27

Specifically, the five lowest rated techniques were participation,
pressure, personal appeals, inspirational appeals, and exchange.28 It is
good that three of these are transactional techniques and that, in particular, exchange rated the lowest. But I find it problematic that inspiration
appeals and getting buy-in (participation) are even in this group and that
inspirational appeals are next to the lowest.
So, what we currently have is 15 percent of all AC Army leaders perceived as ineffective in a vital tenet of transformational leadership and
roughly a third are rated less than “effective or very effective” with the
same technique. Further, in another critical tenet of transformational
leadership, getting buy-in, Army leaders are only rated as 77 percent
effective. How can an Army with that portion of its leaders (roughly
one-fourth) perceived as less than effective in critical transformational
leadership techniques expect to create a culture of trust essential to
professional behavior?
These data reinforce my contention Army leaders are leading too
much with transactional modes and too little with transformational
ones.29 Transformational leadership can still be practiced during a drawdown and in a constrained environment. But, as presented in the earlier
discussion on trust, some leaders will succumb to bureaucratic tendencies and gravitate towards transactional leadership in order to “survive”
and “climb” the careerist ladder. But the best organizations will be those
that have transformational leaders. Both will look good on paper in the
short term, but units and organizations with inspiring, developmental
leaders will continue to be successful beyond that leader’s tenure, i.e,
will provide a far greater contribution to the professional state of Army
2025.30
Unfortunately, unless the use of transformational leadership
increases markedly in the future one cannot be sanguine about Army
2025 being a military profession.

27      Center for Army Leadership, Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL), Main Findings, 20.
28      Ibid., 19.
29      Obviously leaders at all levels and at most all times use a blend of techniques; my conclusion
is qualitative rather than quantitative.
30      The concluding comments here benefit from discussions with Colonel Thomas Clady, USA.
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An Ineffective Approach to Character Development

The third element of my argument is the Army does not have
an effective approach to the development of the moral character of
its professionals. Yet, such character is essential to the Army’s daily
effectiveness as a profession, and in particular as just discussed, to the
authenticity requisite to transformational leaders.
Professions are not only expected to be functionally effective, but
they are also expected to do their work rightly, according to their own
Ethic which their client has approved. This is their basis of trust with
their client, their life-blood as a profession. Not unexpectedly this is
particularly true of a profession such as the military because its lethality
places it in the “killing and dying” business.31
Couple this with the fact that the “practice” of the Army professional, regardless of age, rank, or location, is the “repetitive exercise
of discretionary judgments.”32 These decisions and resulting actions,
done many times a day by each Army professional, are highly moral in
character in that they directly influence the well-being of other persons.
Given this situation, the imperative for high personal character in each
Army professional is clearly established.
However, recent research describes the Army’s approach to character development as “laissez faire.”33 This is attributed to a number of
reasons not the least of which is an institutional culture too infused with
social trends that contradict the principles of the Army Ethic, imperatives such as the moral principle that each Soldier, to be trustworthy,
must be capable and reliable in executing all requirements of their occupational specialty.
But the main point of the critiques is that Army doctrine essentially
absolves the institution of responsibility and places almost complete
responsibility on the individual professionals to development themselves
morally. The key excerpt from current doctrine is:
Soldiers and Army Civilians are shaped by their backgrounds, beliefs, education, and experience. An Army leader’s job would be simpler if merely
checking the team member’s personal values against the Army Values and
developing a simple plan to align them sufficed. Reality is much different.
Becoming a person or leader of character is a process involving day-today experiences, education, self-development, developmental counselling,
coaching, and mentoring. While individuals are responsible for their own
character development, leaders are responsible for encouraging, supporting
and assessing the efforts of their people.34

The last sentence is key. Such a “hands off” approach is further
exemplified by the fact that no extant doctrine contains a robust model
explaining human or character development and how such a thing
comes about and is reinforced by the fulfilling of the mutual responsibilities of the Army, its leaders, and the individual. So, without such
31      James Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 1995), 25.
32      US Department of the Army, The Army Profession, Ibid., para 1-8 on page 1-2.
33     Brian M. Mickelson, “Character Development of U.S. Army Leaders: The Laissez-Faire
Approach,” Military Review 93, no. 5 (September-October, 2013): 30-39.
34      US Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 6-22
(Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, August 2012): paragraph 3-26, page 3-6.
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common understanding and language of character development, how
can the Army hope to effectively develop the strength of character of its
professionals? According to one Army study, this recognized void now:
…permits leader and professional development of Soldiers and Army
Civilians to proceed without explicit, coordinated focus on character in
concert with competence and commitment; accepts unsynchronized, arbitrary descriptors for desired qualities of character in Soldiers and Army
Civilians; continues undisciplined ways and means of assessing the success
of Army efforts to develop character within education, training, and experience; and defers to legalistic, rules-based, and consequentialist reasoning in
adjudging the propriety of leaders’ decisions and actions.35

To further document this argument we need not rely on the all too
often cited media reports of egregious cases of moral failure by individual Army leaders. Instead, the results of such a weak approach to
character development and reinforcement are more reliably seen in a
recent study completed by two Army War College professors aptly titled,
Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession.36 In it they sought to
determine, as the Army is downsizing and returning to garrison, what
the impact of increasing requirements for evaluative reporting up the
chain of command is on the ability of Army leaders, and particularly
officers, to refrain from moral compromise, or “ethical fading” as it is
known in the literature:
While it has been fairly well established that the Army is quick to pass
down requirements to individuals and units regardless of their ability to
actually comply with the totality of the requirements, there has been very
little discussion about how the Army culture has accommodated the deluge
of demands on the force. This study found that many Army officers, after
repeated exposure to the overwhelming demands and the associated need
to put their honor on the line to verify compliance, have become ethically
numb. As a result, an officer’s signature and word have become tools to
maneuver through the Army bureaucracy rather than being symbols of
integrity and honesty. Sadly, much of the deception that occurs in the profession of arms is encouraged and sanctioned by the military institution as
subordinates are forced to prioritize which requirements will actually be
done to standard and which will only be reported as done to standard. As
a result, untruthfulness is surprisingly common in the U.S. military even
though members of the profession are loath to admit it.37

Thus, the authors document clearly that the Army, as an institution, is actually abetting the very behavior it finds unacceptable as the
antithesis of the behavior of a military profession. Operationally, the
strength of character of Army leaders, in this case primarily officers, has
been and continues to be too easily overmatched by the demands of the
Army’s bureaucratic behavior.
Yes, the current bureaucratizing behavior of the Army, unchecked
by its Stewards, is allowing the culture of bureaucracy to dominate that
of profession, a dire situation for the future of Army 2025. And, for
yet another data point we can look at the long, and as yet unsuccessful,
campaign the Army has waged against sexual assault and harassment
35      Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, The Army Concept for Character Development of
Army Professionals, Draft (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Mission Command Center of Excellence, US Army
Combined Arms Center, December 23, 2015), 5, copy in possession of author.
36      Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession
(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, February 2015).
37      Ibid., ii.
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within its own ranks. What better case is there that the Army’s client,
the American people have lost trust in its effectiveness as a military
profession? Trusted professions are granted autonomy by their client;
the people’s Congress is doing exactly the opposite as it repeatedly seeks
to pull away from Army commanders authorities to deal with this issue.
Leaders of character are not bystanders, especially when a buddyprofessional is threatened! Yet by observation it is clear that the Army is
not yet winning its battle against the moral disengagement, indeed moral
cowardice, of the too-many bystanders among its ranks, both uniformed
and civilian.
Demonstrably, then, how can the Army’s current process for character development of leaders be seen as other than inefficacious? The
observable behaviors are not moving in the right direction and, in my
judgment, the Army’s laissez faire approach to character development
simply is too weak to reverse them.38

Conclusion

We started with the question of whether Army 2025 will be a military profession. And I have offered three reasons why I believe a positive
answer is not at all assured.
Some will argue my assessment is too negative: there are very
positive things going on I did not consider. I am aware of many positive
things going on, even in the midst of the very trying defense reductions.
One is the development of new fields of Army expert knowledge, such
as cyber, and the development of soldiers and civilians to use that new,
and urgently needed, knowledge. Such behaviors are exactly what one
would expect from a military profession rather than from a military
bureaucracy.
There is a second positive trend centered on the Army’s recent
intellectual efforts to rethink its own future, culminating in the new
operation concept, Win in a Complex World.39 A part of that effort is the
Army’s new focus on the “human dimension” of warfare which very
favorably corresponds to the focus of this paper, the quintessentially
human nature of modern competitive professions.40 This initiative does
have potential to address directly and powerfully the professional character of Army 2025. But, given the facts that it has just been initiated and
the Army’s poor historical record of actually implementing any strategy
for, or actual reforms to, policies for human capital development, it is far
too early yet for anything but sincere hope.
Thus, on balance, I believe it a fair assessment to be less than sanguine
about the professional future of Army 2025. To me, the three arguments
offered here simply out-weigh such positive scenarios. The fact that the
Stewards’ ability to prevail against the bureaucratizing tendencies of the
38     To be fair, the Army is aware of this failing and has initiated an internal effort to rethink its
approach to character development. But the results are not due until late 2016 and implementation
will take additional years after that. Whether this effort will be implemented to show results within
Army 2025 remains to be seen.
39     US Department of the Army, The US Army Operating Concept, Ibid.
40     US Department of the Army, The Army Human Dimension Strategy 2015 (Washington,
DC: US Department of the Army, 2015), http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/20150524_Human_Dimension_Strategy_vr_Signature_WM_1.pdf.
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defense reductions remains problematic, the fact that Army leaders do
not sufficiently use practices of transformational leadership to generate
needed climates of trust; and, the fact that the Army lacks an effective
approach to strengthen and reinforce the moral character of its professionals, altogether indicate to me a very problematic future for the US
Army as a military profession.
All of this brings us back to the title of this article and to the moral
agency that the Army’s Stewards play in such a time as this. They alone
have the moral responsibility and accountability to keep the Army a
military profession, and thus an effective national instrument of landpower. And they will only do so by urgently and forthrightly addressing,
among many others, the issues outlined in this essay.
As General Odierno noted when he commenced his tenure as CSA
at the beginning of these crunching force reductions (epigram to this
essay), “the necessary reductions will be found.” But, as he also noted,
they will not define success for the Army’s Stewards. Rather, it will be
the residual effectiveness of Army 2025 that defines their success in
executing their moral agency. And that effectiveness will be assessed, as
we have done in this analysis, by whether Army 2025 is then a military
profession “ready for the first battle of the next war,” or just another
obedient military bureaucracy.41

41      This phrase is adopted from, Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America’s First Battles,
1776-1965 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986).
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America’s All Volunteer Force: A Success?
Louis G. Yuengert

Abstract: Perhaps the most significant by-product of America’s involvement in Vietnam was the decision to move from conscription
to an all-volunteer force. The Gates Commission recommended this
change, but identified several concerns regarding costs, quality, and
the nature of the force that persist forty years later. This article examines the success of the All-Volunteer Force and its appropriateness for a democratic society

W

hen America committed major combat forces to Vietnam in
1965, the United States had 2.66 million service members on
active duty.1 It was a mixture of professional volunteers, many
of whom had combat experience in WWII or Korea, and conscripted
citizens. At the time, President Lyndon Johnson made the political decision not to ask for authority to call up reserve forces; instead he relied on
the existing armed forces to implement US national policy, augmented by
draft calls, to fill the ranks as the commitment grew.2 This decision and the
violent reaction to the war prompted 1968 Republican nominee Richard
Nixon to promise he would end the draft.3 According to historian Lewis
Sorley, Johnson’s decision and growing anti-war sentiment in the United
States motivated Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams to restructure
the Army in a way that would force future presidents to mobilize reserves
whenever the nation committed to a protracted conflict.4
The past fifty years have brought a dramatic change in the size,
composition, orientation, and professional character of the US military. At 1.31 million, it is just under half the size of the 1965 force and
completely composed of volunteers—though some call it a recruited
rather than a volunteer force.5 US forces are strategically mobile and are
thus expected and trained to conduct operations anywhere in the world
across a wide spectrum, to include humanitarian assistance. Women now
1      Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1965-1966 (London: Institute for Strategic
Studies, March 1966), 23.
2      Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime,” Parameters 21,
no. 2 (Summer 1991): 35.
3      Donald Vandergriff, Manning the Future Legions of the United States: Finding and Developing
Tomorrow’s Centurions (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 62.
4      Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime,” 42. Sorley’s claim is
disputed by a lack of direct evidence of General Abrams’ intent.
5      Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request
(Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, February 2015), 21.
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comprise nearly 15 percent of this force, and serve in roles not imagined
in 1965.6 The US Defense Department also created a robust and experienced special operations capability. Finally, and most significantly, the
American military is trained and educated to a level unsurpassed by
any other country’s armed forces. This change took place in an era of
extreme volatility and complexity, one that included the remainder of
the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the first Gulf War, ethnic conflicts
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Iraq and Afghanistan
wars. There was an explosion in technological development; specifically, unprecedented advances in the speed of computer processors and
precision-guided weapons. The international political environment
shifted from the relatively stable bi-polar Cold War to what proved to
be a less stable uni-polar world that is developing into a multi-polar
dynamic with even greater uncertainty. Inevitably, the changes also took
place in the context of natural American political and economic cycles.
Many factors influenced the US Armed Forces’ development over these
50 years. This essay focuses on the end of the draft and the institution
of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973.
Two significant questions have accompanied the development of
this military force. Is the All-Volunteer Force a success? A review of
the forty years of experience since its inception suggests that it is. Is an
All-Volunteer Force appropriate for a democratic society? This broader
question defies easy answers, but it is important for all citizens of the
United States to consider.

The Decision to End Vietnam-Era Conscription.

The story of America’s increasing commitment to Vietnam during
the Johnson presidency, the effect of more than 58,000 Americans killed
in action, and the lack of popular support for the war are well known.
Less well known are the events that led to the institution in 1973 of an
all-volunteer military that forms the basis for the US armed forces of
today. The use of the term “all-volunteer” implies America’s armed forces
have normally been manned with conscripted citizens. Throughout the
country’s history, this has not been true. Americans traditionally resisted
the maintenance of a large standing army and relied on volunteers to fill
the ranks of the active military with a robust militia to be mobilized in
times of national emergency. The United States has relied on a draft only
three times: during the mid-later stages of the Civil War, World War I,
and for most of the period 1940-1972.7
In March of 1969, two months after his inauguration, President Nixon
announced the creation of a Commission on an All-Volunteer Force to
fulfill his campaign promise to end the draft.8 Members included former
Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr. as the chairman and such
notables as Roy Wilkins (Executive Director of the NAACP), Milton
Friedman, Alan Greenspan, Jerome Holland (President of Hampton
Institute), and Theodore Hesburgh (President of the University of
6      Eileen Patten and Kim Parker, “Women in the US Military: Growing Share, Distinctive
Profile,” Pew Research Center, December 22, 2011, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/12/22/
women-in-the-u-s-military-growing-share-distinctive-profile.
7      George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 5-8.
8      The Report of The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Washington: US
Government Printing Office, February 1970), vii.
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Notre Dame).9 In 1970, the Commission recommended an immediate
end to conscription and the institution of an all-volunteer military. After
relying on the draft to fill the ranks of its armed forces for the Cold War
for more than 30 years, our defense leaders decided to do something
for the first time in US history, maintain a significant military force
with volunteers instead of draftees. After a lengthy debate, Congress
allowed the statutory authority for the draft to expire.10 The decision was
controversial and despite its recommendation, the commission’s report
identified several concerns involving:
•• the possible mercenary motivation of volunteers
•• the creation of a separate warrior class within the society
•• a greater propensity of political leaders to employ the force
•• the possibility of a disproportionate percentage of volunteers being
from lower economic classes and African-Americans
•• the expense of a recruited military
•• possible quality issues, and
•• opportunity costs associated with expanding personnel expenses
within a fixed defense budget.11
Ironically, even though the all-volunteer force was declared a success
in the 1980s by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, many of these
concerns persist.12

The Success of the All-Volunteer Force

Has the All-Volunteer Force been a success? What defines success
for such a force? Eugene Bardach, a professor at the Goldman School
of Public Policy at the University of California, suggests several criteria
to evaluate policies or programs. They include efficiency (specifically
cost-effectiveness or benefit-cost analysis), political acceptability, and
robustness or improvability.13 He also insists that outcomes be evaluated,
not the policy or program itself. Of these, I will use performance (related
to the most significant outcomes), sustainability (related to robustness)
and cost. An assessment using these measures must compare the current
force to its primary alternative, the conscripted force.
Performance is the most difficult measure to assess. It is impossible to know how well a draftee force would have performed under the
circumstances of the four decades in question. That aside, the US military has been remarkably successful against other conventional military
forces in the last 30 years. This success includes operations in Panama
(1989), Iraq (1991), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003).14
While several factors and circumstances led to the collapse of the
9      Ibid., viii-ix.
10      Leonard Wong, From Black Boots to Desert Boots: The All-Volunteer Army Experiment Continues
(Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 2014).
11      The Report of The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 12-20.
12      Mark J. Eitelberg, “The All-Volunteer Force after Twenty Years,” in Professionals on the Front
Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington: Brassey’s, 1996), 66-67.
13      Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem
Solving (New York: Chatham House Publishers, 2000), 20-26.
14      United States Army Center for Military History, Operation Joint Guardian: The US Army in
Kosovo, CMH Pub 70-109-1 (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, September 2007), 3.
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Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, many partially attribute America’s
success in the Cold War to improved military capability.15 Leaving strategic forces (nuclear) aside, since the end of the Cold War, America’s
military forces have been unchallenged at sea or in the air, and rarely
challenged (conventionally) on land. This success has been the result
of the resources the United States spent in pursuit of a powerful military. These include the development and fielding of more sophisticated
combat equipment; e.g. the Abrams tank, the F-22 and the B-2 bomber,
advanced precision munitions, and the construction and operation of
advanced combat training centers like the National Training Center at
Ft. Irwin, California. Currently, US armed forces are ranked as the most
powerful military in the world based on a balance of trained manpower,
quality and quantity of combat equipment, and expenditures on defense
activities.16 Would the US have committed the same resources to training and equipping a draftee force? More significantly, would the nature
of US foreign policy have changed?
Measuring the sustainability of the All-Volunteer Force involves
assessing the ability to recruit and retain the people of the quality necessary to provide the capabilities the nation needs to implement its foreign
policy. The Gates Commission loosely defined “quality” as “mental,
physical and moral standards for enlistment…”17 Within the Armed
Forces, this has come to mean education levels (primarily high school
diploma or equivalent), minimum mental capacity as measured by score
on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, absence of a serious criminal
record, and physical ability (minimum fitness level and no disabilities).18
The Gates Commission’s fears about the quality of the armed forces
have generally not been realized.
For a time between the end of the Vietnam War and the early 1980s,
the US military (especially the Army) suffered from a “hangover” effect
in that service in the military was not valued.19 As a result, the military
accepted and did their best to retain lower quality members in order
to fill the ranks. This contributed to low morale, discipline problems,
and, when coupled with poor equipment and training based on lower
budgets, produced what Chief of Staff of the Army Edwin Meyer called
a “hollow Army.”20
The Army’s response to this condition was to change its approach
to war-fighting, training and readiness, convince Congress to boost
soldier pay and benefits, and drastically improve the quality of the equipment and training facilities (discussed earlier).21 Without these changes,
15      Vojtech Mastny, “NATO at Fifty: Did NATO Win the Cold War? Looking over the Wall,”
Foreign Affairs, March 28, 2015, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55003/vojtech-mastny/
nato-at-fifty-did-nato-win-the-cold-war-looking-over-the-wall.
16      Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 21-25
17      The Report of The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 16.
18      Lawrence Kapp, Recruiting and Retention in the Active Component Military: Are There Problems?
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 25, 2002), 2.
19      George C. Herring, Preparing Not to Refight the Last War: The Impact of the Vietnam War on the
US Military in After Vietnam: Legacies of a Lost War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2000), 83.
20      Testimony of General Edward C. Meyer before the Subcommittee on Investigations, House
Committee on Armed Forces, May 29, 1980, 18.
21      Anne W. Chapman, Carol J. Lilly, John L. Romjue, and Susan Canedy, A Historical Overview
of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1998 (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office,
TRADOC, 1998), xv-xvi; and Wong, From Black Boots to Desert Boots.
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successful operations in Panama and Iraq (1991) would not have been
possible. The resultant strategic success in the Cold War led to a period
of downsizing for the military, the harvesting of a “peace dividend,” and
a reflection on the relevance of the military in the absence of the global
Soviet threat.
In the decade prior to September 2001, the military was reduced
in size by almost 37 percent and largely brought home to the United
States from Europe.22 For the all-volunteer force, this meant a balanced
approach that included a reduction in accessions (enlistments and officer
commissions) and a combination of voluntary and involuntary incentives
for career soldiers to leave the force. The effect of this was an increase
in quality of the smaller force as the services were more selective in
who they enlisted and retained.23 A by-product of this drawdown was
the transfer of experienced soldiers and leaders into the Reserves and
National Guard, improving the quality of those forces as well.
However, the economic boom in the mid-to-late 90s, coupled with
an end to the drawdown that resulted in an increase in enlistment quotas,
created a period where the military struggled to recruit the number of
quality soldiers necessary to fill its ranks.24 The real test for the AllVolunteer Force came in the years after the 9-11 attacks. In the initial
years of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military services were able
to meet both their quality and quantity goals for recruiting. Nonetheless,
by 2005, they were hard pressed to recruit enough soldiers of the desired
quality.
According to a 2013 Congressional Research Service report, this
shortfall happened for a variety of reasons: the difficulty of recruiting
during wartime, an upturn in the economic conditions in the US, and,
in the Army and Marine Corps, an expansion of the recruiting mission
in an effort to grow the size of the force to meet operational requirements.25 When the mission in Iraq started to wind down, the expansion
of the force was completed and the severe economic downturn took
hold in 2008-09, the services began to meet recruiting goals once more.
In the four to five years since then, the planned reduction in the size of
the armed forces has made for an easier recruiting and retention environment, resulting in a high quality force.26
In general, other than two periods of time, the quality of the AllVolunteer Force has been very high. An increase of over 100 million
people to the US population with a corresponding dramatic decrease in
the size of the military, sizeable increases in pay, an insistence on high
school graduates and higher test scores, the introduction of women into
the ranks in much greater numbers (15-20 percent) and extensive use
of enlistment and retention bonuses have allowed the services to select

22      Bernard Rostker, Rightsizing the Force: Lessons for the Current Drawdown of American Military
Personnel, Working Paper (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2013), 13.
23      Lawrence Kapp, Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2011 and FY2012 Results for Active
and Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 10,
2013), 4.
24      Ibid., 15.
25      Ibid., 4.
26      Ibid., 5.
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their members more carefully from among the population.27 The ability
to sustain this quality force over time is a significant measure of its
success as compared to a conscripted military force.
The most compelling argument against the success of the allvolunteer military is that it is unaffordable. In 1967, Milton Friedman
addressed this issue by stating the hidden tax imposed on those young
men who were drafted would be replaced with an explicit tax on society,
thus exposing the real cost of defense. He also argued reduced costs
would result from longer enlistments and less required training.28 While
this projection represented increased government expenditures (by initially 3-4 billion dollars a year in his estimation), it effectively reduced
the overall costs which included the hidden tax on draftees.
The Gates Commission argued the increased taxes required to
maintain the military would spur a broader debate about defense spending and the use of the military.29 While Friedman and others included
direct compensation in their calculations and analysis, they either did
not anticipate or did not address indirect costs resulting from efforts to
maintain an effective force in the face of changing demographics. These
include increases in retirement costs for a recruited force more likely to
make the military a career, the housing, family program and health care
costs for a force more likely to be older and married, the direct cost of
recruiting infrastructure and advertising, and the costs associated with
increased usage of benefits like the Army College Fund and the GI Bill.
In the last decade alone, the costs per active duty member of the
Armed Forces increased 46 percent.30 If current spending trends continue, personnel costs could consume the entire DOD budget by 2039.31
At the macroeconomic level, however, US defense spending was almost
20 percent of all government spending in 2008 (at the height of spending
for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) compared to 45 percent in 1968 at
the height of the Vietnam War.
As a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), military spending decreased from 9.4 percent to 4.6 percent over the same time period.32
While this is an academic discussion given the current budget environment, the reality is the level of defense spending is a matter of priorities,
federal taxation and spending policy. The significantly increased personnel costs in maintaining an all-volunteer military are undeniable.
If Friedman is correct, however, this is just the actual cost of providing for the nation’s defense, paid for explicitly by its taxpayers and not as
an implicit tax on draftees. The relevant question is whether the United
States is willing to pay the bill. If not, then the choices include reductions
in military strength and capability, changes in military compensation or
benefits, or both.
27      US Census Bureau, “American Fact Finder,” http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_13_5YR_B01003&prodType=table; and Institute
for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 21-25.
28      Milton Friedman, “The Case for Abolishing the Draft—and Substituting for it an AllVolunteer Army,” New York Times Magazine, May 14, 1967, 117.
29      The Report of The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 152.
30      Dennis Laich, Skin in the Game: Poor Kids and Patriots (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2013), 10.
31      Ibid.
32      Karl W. Eikenberry, “Reassessing the All-Volunteer Force,” The Washington Quarterly 36, no.
1 (Winter 2013): 12.
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As a result of this discussion, a reasonable conclusion is the AllVolunteer Force has been a success. The US military has performed
admirably over the past four decades by most measures and America
has shown a willingness to sustain its military over that time period.
Whether the cost of this force is worth the benefit gained is, rightfully,
always being debated.

Is a Volunteer Force Appropriate for a Democratic Society?

The Gates Commission raised several issues regarding the effect of
the All-Volunteer Force on American society: possible mercenary motivations of recruits, development of a separate warrior class within the
society, possible disproportionate representation of African-Americans
in the force (resulting in a greater proportion of casualties), and a greater
propensity to employ military force by the political class. A subject not
addressed by the commission was the effect of this change on one
specific group, women. In the limited space of this essay, all of these
will be addressed except the African American issue. While the specific
concern about casualties has never been realized, the complexity of the
discussion and its place in American society’s dialog on race requires its
own essay. As scholar Beth Bailey noted: “In a democratic nation, there
is something lost when individual liberty is valued over all and the rights
and benefits of citizenship become less closely linked to its duties and
responsibilities.”33
Related to the question of mercenary motivation, and the creation of
a “warrior class,” is the issue of whether all citizens should be committed
to securing the liberties of a democratic society, not just committed to
paying someone else to secure them.
Beth Bailey’s quote above can be viewed as a warning about the
majority of American citizens avoiding this responsibility and duty to
protect liberty by allowing volunteers, generally from the economic
lower classes, to provide that protection while they are shielded from
a draft. During the deliberations of the Gates Commission, members
considered a statement made years earlier by noted economist, John
Kenneth Galbraith:
The draft survives principally as a device by which we use compulsion to get
young men to serve at less than the market rate of pay. We shift the cost of
military service from the well-to-do taxpayer who benefits by lower taxes to
the impecunious young draftee. This is a highly regressive arrangement that
we would not tolerate in any other area. Presumably, freedom of choice here
as elsewhere is worth paying for.34

In effect, deciding to recruit an all-volunteer force was also a decision to compete fairly in the workforce marketplace. As such, monetary
incentives have played a critical role in the recruiting strategy of the US
Armed Forces over the years.
The decision to proceed with an all-volunteer force prompted
Congress to immediately increase pay for enlistees by 61.2 percent as an
33      Beth Bailey, America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 260.
34      Walter Y. Oi, “Historical Perspectives on the All-Volunteer Force: The Rochester
Connection,” in Professionals on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington, DC:
Brassey’s, 1996), 46.
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enticement to join. This incentive, combined with rising unemployment
at the time, resulted in a seemingly positive start for the experiment.35
However, the replacement of the GI Bill in 1977 with a less generous
program, concerns among career enlisted soldiers about pay equity, and
subsequent pay increases capped below private sector wage increases
resulted in low quality soldiers and an exodus from the services of midgrade officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).36 As the decade
closed, the all-volunteer force experienced declining enlistments, an
element of soul-searching as the military sought relevance post-Vietnam,
lower quality soldiers, rising attrition and declining morale.37
The 1980s saw a renewed commitment to the all-volunteer force.
Double-digit, across-the-board pay raises in 1981 and 1982, an early
decade recession and highly successful recruiting campaigns (like the
Army’s “Be All You Can Be”) helped the services begin to meet desired
quality goals. Introduction of programs like the Army College Fund and
the return of the GI Bill in 1984 helped in the recruitment of high school
graduates looking for options to fund their college education.38
This influx of higher quality soldiers allowed the military to adjust
its retention standards so it could separate those with lower test scores,
the less educated, drug users, and malcontents. An emphasis on physical
fitness and weight control also improved the health and overall fitness
of the force. These improvements, coupled with increases in spending
on modern equipment and training, and tactical successes in Grenada,
Panama and Iraq improved the morale, standing and reputation of the
force.
In the 1990s as America substantially reduced the size of the military resulting in a need for fewer recruits, monetary incentives were
less important to meeting quality goals. After the 9-11 attacks, the US
Department of Defense made decisions that significantly increased the
total compensation of its service members to sustain the military during
the long years of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.39 These included substantial increases in enlistment and retention bonuses between 2005 and
2008 as the services struggled to meet recruiting quotas.40
Does this evidence indicate the creation of a mercenary force? Are
monetary incentives the main factor in successfully recruiting the high
quality young people needed to make this force effective? While many
of the incentives used to recruit and retain service members are monetary, the primary reason (88 percent) cited in a 2011 Pew Survey by
post-9/11 veterans for joining the military was “to serve their country.”
The second most common reason (75 percent) cited was “to receive

35      Wong, From Black Boots to Desert Boots.
36      Gary R. Nelson, “The Supply and Quality of First Term Enlistees Under the All-Volunteer
Force,” in The All-Volunteer Force after a Decade (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), 25.
37      Wong, From Black Boots to Desert Boots.
38      Ibid.; and Maxwell R. Thurman, “On Being All You Can Be: A Recruiting Perspective,” in
Professionals on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996),
56-61.
39      US Congressional Budget Office, “Costs of Military Pay and Benefits in the Defense
Budget,” November 2012, 16.
40      Laich, Skin in the Game, 65.
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education benefits.”41 This was consistent with an earlier report (1987)
published by the World Congress of Sociology about youth motivation
for military service that listed “chance to better myself” as the number
one reason for enlisting.42 These survey results indicate that monetary
benefits have a role in recruitment but that they are not the primary
reason for choosing to serve.
These data mitigate the concern about mercenary motivations
somewhat. An alternative narrative is the Armed Services are competing
in the marketplace with a combination of pay and benefits and messages
regarding opportunities for self-improvement, patriotic service to the
nation, and inclusion on a values-based, winning team.
On the question of a separate warrior class, there is genuine concern
regarding a divergence in values between the small portion of the US
population that serves in the military and the society the military serves.
In some ways, serving in the military has become “a family business,”
with children and grandchildren of career military members being more
prone to military service than other citizens.43
Additionally, our civilian political leaders are unlikely to have
military service on their resume. The percentage of veterans serving in
Congress has dropped from (77 percent) in 1977 to (20 percent) today.
This corresponds to an overall drop in the number of veterans in the
population from 13.7 percent to 7 percent.44
The implications for civilian control over the military are significant. Resistance by the military establishment to major policy changes
generally supported by the US population (repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” and combat exclusion policy, for example) can be attributed in
part to this divergence in values.45 While the military eventually bows
to the direction of its civilian masters due to strong cultural norms and
an understanding of constitutional civilian control, the resistance sows
distrust and tension between military and political leaders. A lack of
military or national security experience on the part of political leaders
can lead to a form of blackmail by military leaders and those who
support them, pressuring politicians to acquiesce to military opinion
through use of public and private media or the Congress. The more
experience political leaders have in these areas, the less susceptible they
are to this blackmail.
The third concern expressed by the Gates Commission pertained to
whether political leaders might be more prone to commit troops to military action if they were volunteers. From 1973 to 1989, the US national
41      Pew Research Center, “War and Sacrifice in the Post 9/11 Era,” October 5, 2011, Chapter 3,
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/10/05/war-and-sacrifice-in-the-post-911-era.
42      Paul A. Gade and Timothy W. Elig, Enlisting in the US Army: The Citizen Soldier in an All
Volunteer Force (Munich: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut Der Bundeswehr, 1987), 33-41.
43      V.A. Stander and L.L. Merrill, The Relationship of Parental Military background to the Demographic
Characteristics of 11,195 Navy Recruits, Naval Health Research Center Report No. 00-14 (San Diego,
CA: April 2000), 4.
44      Drew Desilver, “Most Members of Congress have Little Direct Military Experience,”
Pew Research Center, September 4, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/04/
members-of-congress-have-little-direct-military-experience.
45      Craig Whitlock, “Marine General Suggests Repeal of “Don’t Ask” Could Result in
Casualties,” Washington Post, December 15, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/14/AR2010121404985.html; and Kori Schake, “Women Soldiers Confront
not just Enemy, but a Range of Political Issues,” in Strategika, Hoover Institution, June 1, 2013,
http://www.hoover.org/research/women-soldiers-confront-not-just-enemy-range-political-issues.
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security establishment was focused on the Cold War struggle with the
Soviet Union. The threat of major military conflict with the Warsaw Pact
may have suppressed the urge to engage in the use of force in pursuit
of other national interests. In the period since the end of the Cold War
and breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the absence of this suppressant may
have contributed to two decades of what could be called US military
adventurism (Iraq-1991, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq2003, Libya).
Although there is no direct correlation between the number of military operations in this period and the advent of the all-volunteer force,
the increase after the end of the Cold War calls into question whether
this factor had a bearing on decisions to commit US armed forces. As an
illustration, the US deployed forces 19 times in the draft years between
1945 and 1973. Since the end of the draft, the Unites States engaged
forces overseas 144 times.46 If this pattern continues after the United
States withdraws combat troops from Afghanistan, it might be reasonable to conclude that American leaders see fewer political consequences
to employing all-volunteer military forces than they would while using
conscripted forces. This outcome would certainly be a significant negative consequence of having an all-volunteer military.
The discussion of these three issues raises serious concerns about the
strict use of volunteers to fill the ranks of our military. While mercenary
motivations seem to be less of a problem, the existence of a “warrior
class” in society and the possibility elected officials will be more prone
to use the volunteer force should spark meaningful debate about the
composition of the US military.

Women in the All-Volunteer Force

The experience of women in the All-Volunteer Force and the subsequent expansion of opportunities for them is worth specific mention.
The significant changes in policy and attitude toward women in the
Armed Forces began with implementation of the All-Volunteer Force.
Since 1972, the percentage of women serving in the military has increased
from 1.9 percent to 11 percent in 1990, to 14.6 percent in 2012.47 The
implications of this dramatic increase were not considered by the Gates
Commission because it assumed the percentage of women in the force
would continue to be capped at 2 percent and women would remain in
clerical, administrative and medical specialties.48
In 1972, however, the realization of an inability to recruit a highquality force due to a shrinking population of qualified men, prompted
then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to develop a task force “to
prepare contingency plans for increasing the use of women to offset possible shortages of male recruits…”49 By 1976, the number of women in
46      Eikenberry, Reassessing the All-Volunteer Force, 10.
47      US General Accounting Office, Composition of the Active Duty Forces by Race or National Origin
Identification and by Gender (Washington, DC: February 1991), 1-4; and US Department of Defense,
2012 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Communities and Family Policy,
2012), 19.
48      The Report of The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 82.
49      Central All-Volunteer Task Force, Utilization of Military Women (Washington, DC: Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, December 1972), i.
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the military had more than doubled and they could be assigned to all but
“combat-associated specialties.”50 During that period, some institutional
barriers were lifted that inhibited opportunities and restricted roles for
women. These included:
•• Allowing women to command mixed-gender units
•• Allowing women to enter aviation training and military academies
•• No longer requiring the discharge of pregnant women or those with
minor dependents
•• Equalizing the family entitlements for married men and women51
Looking back, these changes signaled the existence of significant
cultural and legislative barriers that women had to overcome. The most
significant impediment to their advancement was the combat exclusion
policy that barred women from positions with the likelihood of direct
physical contact with the enemy. This policy initially flowed from a 1948
legislation restricting women in all services except the Army (there were
specific Women’s Army Corps restrictions in place already) from assignment to aircraft or ships that were engaged in “combat missions.”52
By 1987, the statute had been amended and the service policies had
evolved to allow women to be assigned to all but selected specialties
where the likelihood of direct combat or capture by enemy forces was
high.53 For military women, this progress was encouraging but painfully
slow. The excluded specialties were those, culturally, afforded the most
respect and most important to career advancement.54 In some cases
where statutory restrictions did not exist, service policies still restricted
their range of assignments based on a probability of being involved in
direct combat.55
In all of the services, these restrictions resulted in fewer opportunities for women and acted as an obstacle for advancement and promotion
to senior rank. As doctrine and organizing principles changed over time
and the services realized there was inherent inconsistency in these policies (e.g. there were some women who were excluded from positions due
to likelihood of direct combat while others were in positions where they
were exposed to enemy fire), a steady erosion of the combat exclusion
took place. The deployment of over 40,000 women to support the first
Gulf War in 1991 heightened public awareness of the role of military
women.56 In 1992, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
repealed the limitations on the assignment of women to combat aircraft.57 Similarly, the 1994 NDAA repealed the ban on assignment of
women to combat ships and the Army opened attack aviation positions
50      Martin Binken and Mark J. Eitelberg, “Women and Minorities in the All-Volunteer Force,” in
The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), 85.
51      Ibid., 85-86.
52      US General Accounting Office, Combat Exclusion Laws for Women in the Military, Testimony of
Martin Ferber (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, November 19, 1987), 2.
53      Ibid., 4.
54      Ibid., 4-6.
55      Ibid., 8.
56      US Department of Veterans Affairs, America’s Women Veterans: Military Service History and VA
Benefit Utilization Statistics (Washington, DC: US Department of Veterans Affairs, National Center
for Veterans Analysis and Statistics, November 23, 2011), 3.
57      United States Congress, National Defense Authorization Act, amendment to sections 8549 and
6015 of Title 10 US Code, section 531, sub-para. (a) and (b), December 5, 1991.
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to women. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the twenty-first century
featured the continuous exposure of women to enemy fire and capture,
in spite of the policy excluding them from direct ground combat.
In March 2011, a Military Leadership Diversity Commission created
by the 2009 NDAA recommended the combat exclusion policy be
eliminated, women in career fields already open to them be available for
assignment to any unit, and the services and DoD take “deliberate steps
in a phased approach” to open career fields and units involved in “direct
ground combat” to qualified women.58 In January 2013, Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta made the announcement of the rescission of the
combat exclusion policy.59 This opened another chapter in the integration of women into the armed forces that is still on-going. After the
military services conducted the “deliberate steps in a phased approach”
recommended by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission with a
focus on the ability of women to meet the physical demands of the specialties involved, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter opened all military
positions to women in January 2016.
Arguably, the advent of the All-Volunteer Force changed the discussion of women’s roles in the military. In order to find enough volunteers
of the appropriate quality to fill the ranks, the Department of Defense
had to include more women in the recruiting pool. To recruit and retain
those women, it had to give them opportunities for success and advancement. This led to changes in policy and a much slower change in culture
that has paralleled the society’s changing view of the role of women in
the workplace.

Conclusion

One of the legacies of the Vietnam War is the all-volunteer military
force. It has proved resilient in the face of US involvement in conflict
across the world, budget reductions, economic prosperity and stagnation, demographic changes in the makeup of the force, and changes in
social policy and attitudes. A return to conscription and the resulting
effect on American society seem unimaginable.
I have tried to answer two fundamental questions about the choice
America made in 1973. Has the All-Volunteer Force been a success? And,
is an All-Volunteer Force appropriate in a democratic society? However,
several other fundamental questions persist. Is the all-volunteer military
representative of our society and its values? Does its existence allow
our citizens to avoid the hard discussions about the use of military
force in pursuit of national objectives? Is the burden of service borne
disproportionately by members of the lower economic classes? What
costs are American taxpayers willing to bear to sustain the excellence of
this force? All US citizens should contemplate the implications of these
questions as the country struggles to make decisions about the size and
nature of the armed forces.

58      David F. Burrelli, Women in Combat, Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, November 8, 2011), 7.
59      Claudette Roulo, “Defense Department Expands Women’s Combat Role,” US Department
of Defense press release, January 24, 2013.
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Abstract: The war in Ukraine has refocused Western attention on
Russia and its ability to project power, particularly in terms of “hybrid warfare” through the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine. At the
same time, Russian military thinking—and actions—are rapidly
evolving. This article reflects on the increasingly prominent role of
conventional force, including the use of high intensity firepower, in
Russian war fighting capabilities, and advocates the need for a shift
in our conceptualization of Russian actions from hybrid warfare to
state mobilization.

S

ince Russia’s annexation of Crimea in February and March 2014,
there has been much discussion of Russian aggression in its
neighborhood, Russian rearmament—even militarization—and a
newly robust and competitive foreign and security policy that threatens
both the international order and even the West itself. Much of this debate
has had the feel of a response to an unwelcome surprise: few had paid
attention to the Russian military since the end of the Cold War (with the
partial exception of its successful, but rather moderate performance in
the Russo-Georgia war in 2008), and few had predicted the intervention
of competent, disciplined and well-equipped Russian special forces in
Crimea in 2014.
In their haste to come to grips with what was going on in rather fast
moving circumstances, observers traced their way back through recent
history using the distorting light shed by hindsight. Some oft-cited
older speeches by Vladimir Putin were rediscovered and embellished
with other much less widely-known sources to suggest not only that
the Russian operation was long pre-planned, but that Moscow had
developed a new way of achieving its goals while avoiding direct armed
confrontation with the militarily superior West.
One of these less well-known sources was an article published under
the name of Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov in
the Russian newspaper Voenno-Promyshlenni Kurier in early 2013. Relying
heavily on this source, which some considered “prophetic” given the
events in February 2014, many Western commentators suggested the
Russian operation in Crimea (and subsequently in Eastern Ukraine) heralded the emergence of a new Russian form of “hybrid warfare,” reflected
in what has become known as the “Gerasimov doctrine,” the contours
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of which had been set out in that article.1 This supposedly new form
of war conferred numerous advantages on Moscow, observers argued,
since it heightened the sense of ambiguity in Russian actions, and provided Russian leadership with an asymmetric tool to undercut Western
advantages: since Moscow would be unable to win a conventional war
with the West, it seeks to challenge it in other ways. Furthermore, it fits
readily into Western debates about the increasing roles of special forces
and strategic communications in conflict.
Even as the situation in Ukraine evolved and Russia intervened in
the war in Syria, this discussion of “hybrid warfare” became the bedrock
of the wider public policy and media debate about Russian actions, particularly about potential further “hybrid” threats to NATO member
states, and about how NATO and the EU might respond to and deter
them. The terms remain a central aspect of the media and public policy
debate in NATO and its member states as they explore and try to grasp
Russian “ambiguous warfare.”
At the same time, while the term hybrid war offers some assistance
to understanding specific elements of Russian activity, it underplays
important aspects discussed by Gerasimov, and offers only a partial
view of evolving Russian activity, capabilities, and intentions. One result
is thinking about Russia has become increasingly abstract, not to say
artificial, as Western observers and officials have created an image of
Russian warfare that the Russians themselves do not recognize. Another
result is too many have overlooked the increasingly obvious role of conventional force in Russian military thinking.
This article suggests Western emphasis from 2014 to 2015 has been
on the hybrid aspect of warfare, and now that emphasis needs to shift
quickly to focus on warfare. In other words, while there are hybrid elements, attention should be re-balanced to include more concentration
on the Russian leadership’s development of its conventional warfighting
capacity, even on its preparation for the possibility of a major state-onstate war. Indeed, in order not to fall behind evolving Russian thinking
and capabilities, it is already time to supersede thinking about hybrid
warfare to reflect on Russian state mobilization.

Debating Russian Hybrid Warfare

The labels hybrid warfare and Gerasimov doctrine have spurred and
underpinned much discussion about the “Grey Zone” between war and
peace, and Russian asymmetric challenges such as economic manipulation, an extensive and powerful disinformation and propaganda
campaign, the fostering of civil disobedience and even insurrection and
the use of well-supplied paramilitaries. In sum, Russian hybrid warfare
as widely understood in the West represents a method of operating that
relies on proxies and surrogates to prevent attribution and intent, and
to maximize confusion and uncertainty. Conventional force is often
obliquely mentioned as a supplementary feature, but the main feature
1      See, for instance, “Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War,” Financial Times, August 28, 2014.
G. Lasconjarias and J. Larsen, eds., NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats (Rome: NATO Defense
College, 2015), brings many of these views represented in the debate together into one volume. For one of the first, also see M. Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Nonlinear Warfare,” July 6, 2014 https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the
-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war.
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of hybrid warfare is that it remains below the threshold of the clear use
of armed force. Hybrid warfare is thus tantamount to a range of hostile
actions of which military force is only a small part, or “measures short of
war” that seek to deceive, undermine, subvert, influence and destabilize
societies, to coerce or replace sovereign governments and to disrupt or
alter an existing regional order.
Such definitions almost invariably draw on parts of Gerasimov’s
article, in which he does indeed state that the “role of non-military
means has grown and in many cases exceeded the power of force of
weapons in their effectiveness.” He also points to the important roles
of special operations forces and “internal opposition to create a permanently operational front through the entire territory of the enemy state,”
and the blurring of the lines between war and peace. And of course
Gerasimov’s article is an important source for understanding Russian
thinking, particularly the efforts of the Russian leadership to adapt to
warfare in the 21st century, rather than harking back to an earlier period
and a return to the Cold War, and how the Russian military has sought
to learn how to neutralize the West’s “overwhelming conventional military superiority.”2
At the same time, the term hybrid warfare has been rigorously critiqued by some in the Russia-watching community, as well as those in
the wider strategic studies field. The main criticisms of hybrid warfare
are worth briefly summarizing in four points.3 First, the term hybrid
warfare is not new, indeed it has a long history, and in many ways is
best understood as warfare. In relation to Russia, the term is often used
without an awareness of historical context. The term, as one observer
has pointed out, has “drifted far afield from its inventor’s original objective, which was to raise awareness of threats that cannot be defeated
solely by the employment of airpower and special forces.” Thus the term
serves to cloud thinking.4
Second, the term hybrid warfare—as intended as a label for Russian
actions—does not relate to Russian conceptions of warfare. While many
purport to explain Russian conceptualizations of hybrid warfare, its
appeal to the Russian leadership and the conditions in which Moscow
might deploy such an approach, they do so without either Russian language sources or detailed, empathetic consideration of the view from
Moscow, and the Russian leadership’s actual approach and the considerable difficulties it faces.5 A Russian strategy is thus asserted and assumed,
apparently being made in a vacuum, and without all the problems that
strategists everywhere face.
Moreover, Russian commentators use the term gibridnaya voina, a
direct transliteration of hybrid warfare, when they assert that the notion

2      V. Gerasimov, “Tsennost Nauki v Predvidenniye,” Voenno-promyshlenni Kurier, February 27,
2013, http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632.
3      Three good critiques are K. Giles, What’s Russian for Hybrid Warfare? (Carlisle, PA: US Army
War College, forthcoming, 2016); C. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review (JanuaryFebruary 2016); S. Charap, “The Ghost of Hybrid Warfare,” Survival 57, no. 6 (December-January
2016).
4      A. Echevarria, “Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for US Military
Strategy,” Strategic Studies Institute, 2016.
5      Empathy, it should be remembered, is not synonymous with sympathy.
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of Russian hybrid warfare is a myth.6 Russian officials are emphatic that
“hybrid warfare” is not a Russian concept, but a Western one, indeed
that is something that the West is currently waging on Russia. This suggests that there is insufficient connection between what the West thinks
it sees in Russian actions and how the Russians themselves conceive
them, and consequently that the Western discussion of Russia is both
abstract and misleading. This is an important reason for the strong sense
of surprise in the West about Russian actions.
Third, related to this, the way Gerasimov’s article has been used
in attempting to understand Russian actions in Ukraine and potential
threats to NATO is problematic. The article, an attempt to frame a
conceptual response to the complex situation that emerged with the socalled Arab Spring, and grasp how warfare had evolved since the end
of the Cold War, and particularly in the twenty-first century, is often
pulled out of this context. Indeed, in large part the article reflected a
series of longer-term views that had already been taking shape under
Gerasimov’s predecessor, Nikolai Makarov, Russian Chief of General
Staff from 2008 to 2012. Of course, this had important implications for
how Russia understood and operated in Crimea and the war in Ukraine.
But the point is that Gerasimov’s article was a response to developments
elsewhere, and the perceived evolution of war fighting as led by others,
particularly Western militaries.
Moreover, only some conveniently relevant lines of the article are
used in the hybrid analysis: important themes in the article are often
overlooked, as are Gerasimov’s other statements, and strategic planning
documents such as the military doctrine and foreign policy concept.
Thus, while the article is important and revealing, much relevant material is missed in the Western discussion, giving an inaccurate indication
of how Russian military thinking and capacity is changing.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the label hybrid warfare
anchors analysis to what took place in February 2014 in Crimea, even
as conditions—and Russian actions—have been changing. Indeed, the
hybrid label serves to draw a veil over the conventional aspects of the war
in Eastern Ukraine. While non-military means of power were deployed,
they relied on more traditional conventional measures for their success.
This was amply demonstrated in the battles at Debaltsevo, Donbass
airport and Ilovaisk, during which much of the fighting involved high
intensity combat, including the extensive use of armor, artillery and
multiple launch rocket systems, as well as drones and electronic warfare.
During these battles, massed bombardments were deployed to considerable lethal effect—in short but intense bombardments battalion sized
units were rendered inoperable, suffering heavy casualties.
Additionally, by continuing to focus on the supposed hybrid aspects
of Russian operations, it overlooks the evolution of Russian military
thinking and the centrality of conventional force in it. Indeed, the ability
to develop and deploy such conventional capability has only become
more obvious, exemplified by Russia’s intervention in the war in Syria.
Beginning in late September 2015, the scale and impact of Russian force
deployed in this war has been significant: in December 2015, human
6      See, for instance, R. Pukhov, “Mif o ‘Gibridnoi voine’” [The Myth of ‘Hybrid Warfare’],
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 29, 2015, http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-05-29/1_war.html.
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rights groups in Syria accused Russia of killing more than 2,300 people,
including hundreds of civilians, in indiscriminate attacks that involved
the use of vacuum bombs, unguided or “dumb” bombs and cluster
munitions.7
While Russian officials rejected these accusations as “absurd” and
a “hoax,” the statements of senior Russian defense officials themselves
do illustrate the scale of the force deployed at tactical, operational and
strategic levels. Thousands of tactical and operational sorties have been
flown, striking hundreds of targets. At the same time, in support of the
forces deployed to Syria, Russia has launched strategic strikes. These
have included cruise missile strikes from long-range Tu-160, Tu-195MS
and Tu-22M3 bombers launched from Russia, and also cruise missile
attacks launched from surface vessels in the Caspian Sea and from
submarines in the Mediterranean. Indeed, the Russian authorities themselves emphasize the scale and the strategic nature of the force they
are seeking to deploy: supplementing “high intensity” operations with
“massive” strategic air raids, delivering “powerful strikes” across Syria’s
territory.8 In Putin’s terms, Russia has conducted a “comprehensive
application of force...allowing [Russia] qualitatively to change the situation in Syria,” and a “great deal has been done over the course of the
past year to expand the potential of our armed forces.. and Russia has
reached a new level of operational use of its troops, with a high readiness
among units.”9
This should be seen in the context of other aspects of the evolution
of Russian military capability. A prolonged and deep series of reforms
to the military has been underway since the Russo-Georgia war in 2008.
A major feature of this has been a substantial spending program of 20
trillion rubles (approximately $640 billion when it was signed off in
2010) dedicated to modernizing the armed forces by 2020, including
ensuring that 70 percent of the armed forces’ weapons are modern, and
the acquisition of 400 ICBMs and SLBMs, 20 attack submarines, 50
combat surface ships, 700 modern fighter aircraft, and more than 2,000
tanks and 2,000 self-propelled and tracked guns. Although there are
some problems in achieving these targets, Russian officials state that by
the end of 2015, 30 percent of weapons were new (more in some areas)
and this should reach 50 percent by the end of 2016. Thus, while hybrid
aspects are important, as one American observer has accurately stated,
“while the US military is cutting back on heavy conventional capabilities, Russia is looking at a similar future operational environment, and
doubling down on hers.”10
At the same time, the forces themselves have been learning how
strategically to deploy conventional capability. A Russian naval flotilla
was deployed to the waters off Northern Australia during the G20 in late
2014, for instance, indicative of the type of deployment that is likely to
become more frequent, and the Russian ground forces have undergone
7      Amnesty International, Civilian Objects Were Not Damaged: Russia’s Statements on Its Attacks in
Syria Unmasked (London: Amnesty International, December 2015), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/
sites/default/files/civilian_objects_were_not_damaged.pdf.
8      “Soveshaniye o deistviyakh Vooruzhonnikh Sil Rossii v Sirii” [Meeting on Russia’s Armed
Forces Actions in Syria], November 17, 2015, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50714.
9      “Rasshirennoe zasedaniye kollegi Ministerstva oboroni” [Expanded Meeting of the Defense
Ministry Board], December 11, 2015, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50913.
10      Bartles, 36-37.
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constant exercising at all levels over the last five years.11 As one astute
observer has suggested, these exercises have sought to address questions of both quality and quantity of equipment and servicemen, and
were in the main about fighting large-scale interstate war. Thus, by 2015,
“Russia had been preparing its armed forces for a regional confrontation with possible escalation into using nuclear weapons for at least four
years.” The Russian Armed Forces were “most likely capable of launching large-scale conventional high-intensity offensive joint inter-service
operations, or … to put it simply, to conduct big war-fighting operations with
big formations.” Furthermore, each of the exercises during this period
demonstrated ambitions to increase Russia’s military power, and were
conducted in coordination with other agencies, suggesting that the
focus was not just the fighting ability of the armed forces, but improving
the state’s capacity to wage war.12

Re-reading Gerasimov – War Fighting in the 21st Century

With this in mind, it is worth reflecting again on Gerasimov’s article
and the so-called “Gerasimov doctrine,” particularly in the context of
other statements by the Russian Chief of Staff and other senior officials.
Four points deserve attention.
First, if it is true that the article points to the increasing importance
of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals, it also
emphasizes the ramifications of these means—which reveals rather
different concerns. According to Gerasimov, the lessons of the Arab
Spring are that if the “rules of war” have changed, the consequences have
not – the results of the “colored revolutions” are that a “thriving state
can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of
fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention and sink into
a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe and civil war.” “In terms of
the scale of casualties and destruction… such new-type conflicts are
comparable with the consequences of any real war.” The Russian armed
forces therefore need to have a “clear understanding of the forms and
methods of the use and application of force.”13 This corresponds to
the statements by other senior Russian officials about how hybrid-type
conflicts can evolve and merge—and draw states into interstate wars
that then undermine them. Russian armed forces need to be able both
to fight that “fierce armed conflict” and also shut out potential “foreign
intervention.”
Second, in the article, Gerasimov went beyond discussing “color
revolution-type” conflicts, and also reflected on military power projection and strategic war fighting. Noting piracy, the September 2012 attack
on the US consulate in Benghazi, and the hostage taking in Algeria, he
stated the need for a system of armed defense of the interests of the state
beyond the borders of its territory.
He also reflected on American concepts of “Global Strike” and
“global missile defense” which “foresee the defeat of enemy objects and
11      Led by the flagship of the Russian Pacific fleet, the Varyag, a Slava-class cruiser, the group
was a small but self-sustainable ocean-going flotilla.
12      J. Norberg, Training to Fight. Russia’s Major Military Exercises 2011-2014 (Stockholm: FOI,
December 2015): 61-2. Emphasis added.
13      Gerasimov, op cit. Emphasis added.
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forces in a matter of hours from almost any point on the globe, while at
the same time ensuring the prevention of unacceptable harm from an
enemy counterstrike.” Similarly, he pointed to US deployment of highly
mobile, mixed-type groups of forces. This suggests that the Russian
leadership is deliberating on how to deal with a range of threats that
involve the strategic deployment of armed force, including major strikes
on Russia and its interests that clearly go well beyond a hybrid nature.
This relates closely to other statements by Gerasimov which point to
his concern about the increasing possibility of armed conflict breaking
out and threatening Russia. In early 2013—at the same time, roughly,
as his article—he also suggested that Russia may be drawn into military
conflicts as powers vie for resources, many of which are in Russia or
its immediate neighborhood. Thus by 2030, “the level of existing and
potential threats will significantly increase” as “powers struggle for fuel,
energy and labour resources, as well as new markets in which to sell their
goods.” Given such conditions, some “powers will actively use their
military potential,” he thought.14
Again, this corresponds to concerns stated by senior figures about
increasing international instability, competition and even war. President
Putin, for instance, has stated that the lessons of history suggest that
“changes in the world order, and what we’re seeing today are events on
this scale, have usually been accompanied if not by global war and conflict, then by chains of intensive low-level conflicts,” and “today we see
a sharp increase in the likelihood of a whole set of violent conflicts with
either the direct or indirect participation by the world’s major powers.”
Risks, he suggested, included not just internal instability in states, but
traditional multinational conflicts.15 Subsequently, he suggested that the
“potential for conflict in the world is growing, old contradictions are
growing ever more acute and new ones are being provoked.”16 These
points about the perceived need for force projection to defend interests,
and concerns about the potential for conflict and even strategic strikes
on Russia and its interests are what underpin both the major modernisation programme of the armed forces, the ongoing prioritization of the
maintenance and modernisation Russia’s strategic nuclear capacity and
the significant investments in the high north.
Third, a central theme underpinning Gerasimov’s article is readiness.
At the outset, he suggests that in the twenty-first century, we have seen a
tendency towards blurring the lines between the states of war and peace.
Wars are no longer declared. Yet as he himself states at the end of the
article, this is not new: he quotes the Soviet military theoretician Georgy
Isserson, who stated before the second world war broke out that “war in
general is not declared, it simply begins with already developed military
forces.” This is at the heart of the wider Russian approach to international affairs today: the concern about the speed with which conflict
and war erupts and evolves, and therefore the need to be prepared for
multiple eventualities in the name of defending the state and its interests
at a moment’s notice. He quoted Isserson in stating “mobilisation and
14      Cited in “Russia may be Drawn into Resources Wars in Future – Army Chief,” Russia Today,
February 14, 2013, https://www.rt.com/politics/military-conflict-gerasimov-threat-196.
15      “Zasedaniye Mezhdunarodnovo Diskussionnovo kluba ‘Valdai’,” October 24, 2014.
16      “Soveshaniye poslov i postoyannikh predstavitelei Rossii,” July 1, 2015, http://kremlin.ru/
events/president/news/46131.
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concentration is not part of the period after the onset of the state of
war, as in 1914, but rather unnoticed, proceeds long before that.” This
corresponds not only with other statements made by Gerasimov and
others since early 2013, but with the exercises about moving Russia onto
a war footing, in effect state mobilisation to prepare to withstand the
test of war.

Beyond Russian “Hybridity” Towards Russian Mobilization

The labels hybrid war and Gerasimov doctrine have served an
important purpose—it has energized debate about evolving Russian
power and the range of tools at Moscow’s disposal, particularly highlighting the role of information and strategic communication. And it
emphasizes the need for better coordination between NATO and the
European Union. But at the same time, these labels illuminate only a
specific part of what is a much larger evolving puzzle.
And there is a danger that the label is no longer encouraging thinking about Russia, but becoming an unchallengeable artifice: senior
Western officials have noted that there is little point in questioning the
concept of hybrid warfare because “that ship has sailed.” If this is true,
and hybrid warfare has become an orthodox label, then the Alliance will
face encroaching mental arthritis at the very moment that it needs to be
most adaptable to a changing environment—and in consequence will
suffer repeated unpleasant surprises. As another experienced Western
official noted, the focus on hybridity in 2014 and 2015 meant that too
few were looking at Russian strategic power, and thus were taken by
surprise by Russia’s deployment of complex and massive cruise missile
strikes on Syria. Thus, if the hybrid “ship has sailed” in the NATO
debate, it should beware of icebergs and torpedoes. To avoid such perils,
it is time to move on from thinking about hybrid warfare, and towards
understanding the implications of the much deeper and wider Russian
state mobilization.
Two conclusions flow from this. First, the Russian armed forces are
in a period of experimentation and learning. Russian military thinking is
rapidly evolving, absorbing lessons from its exercises, events in Ukraine,
the war in Syria and how the West is responding to the situation. Indeed,
an important undercurrent in Gerasimov’s article was the posing of
questions—“What is modern war? What should the army be prepared
for? How should it be armed? Which strategic operations are necessary and how many will we need in the future?” This reflects a lengthy
and ongoing debate within the Russian military about the nature of war
and how best to defend Russian interests in an increasingly competitive
international environment. Such debates appear to include questions
about the need for constant readiness forces and the requirements for
short or longer war fighting, the role of reserves in successfully enduring a longer war, and about Western military capacities. Thus neither
Russian capabilities and thinking about war are static, both are evolving
quite rapidly.
This is not to suggest that after years of underinvestment and
neglect the Russian armed forces have suddenly become invincible. They
continue to face numerous problems. But while some Western military
observers are painting a picture of a “2030 future” in which Russia has
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developed a “new generation” warfare, one in which Russian ground
forces would rely on massive salvoes of precision rocket and artillery
fire, targeted by UAVs and cyber and electronic warfare capabilities
designed to blind NATO, we do not have to look as far ahead as 2030
to see precisely that capacity taking shape.17 This emphasizes the point
that the Western understanding of the evolution of Russian military,
already playing catch-up in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea,
should not fall behind either (let alone both) of the twin Russian curves
of re-equipment and lesson learning.
Second, the gaps in how the West and Moscow are addressing the
similar future operating environment are notable. Perhaps the most
important element of this gap is in the approaches to “asymmetry.” In
NATO, this has been understood as Russia adopting other, non-conventional means to attempt to off-set Western conventional superiority. It
appears, however, that Russian thinking about asymmetry is different,
and can include a conventional military superiority in a specific place
and at a certain time. Western forces have gained much experience in
Iraq and Afghanistan of a specific kind of combat. But the examples of
what has happened in Eastern Ukraine, and subsequently in Syria—and
what exercises suggest that Russian armed forces are preparing for—are
instructive in terms of understanding conventional asymmetry.
To be sure, there is some recognition of this changing picture of
Russia. Senior US and other allied officials and generals have noted this
Russian conventional capacity and how it might have a negative impact
on NATO and allied forces, noting, for instance, Russian anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Furthermore, in early 2016, the United
States announced a quadrupling of its military spending in Europe over
a two-year period as part of what Defense Secretary Carter stated was
a “strong and balanced” approach to reassure Eastern European allies
and to deter Russian aggression. “We must demonstrate to potential foes
that if they start a war, we have the capacity to win,” he said.
But there are other implications for US defense policy that bear
reflection, since the US bears the heaviest burden of NATO’s Article
V guarantee when it comes to conventional warfighting capacity. Two
points stand out, military and conceptual. The military implications particularly relate to the necessary equipment for such an environment. Not
all NATO forces are equipped for engagements in which light armored
vehicles are vulnerable to massive, intense fire strikes and in which cyber
and electronic warfare plays a central role in affecting command and
control; indeed, NATO’s electronic warfare capacity has withered over
years, while Russia has developed its capacity, and NATO also appears
to be struggling with how to address cyber threats at both policy and
implementation levels. This needs sustained attention.
The conceptual point is perhaps more important. Russia has not
been a feature of US defense thinking for 25 years. While it hardly needs
saying that much has changed, it is worth noting that during this time,
in other conflicts, it has sometimes appeared that US and allied combat
superiority has been so marked that the active role of an opponent has
17      P. Norwood and B. Jensen, “Three Offsets for American Landpower
Dominance,” War on the Rocks, November 23, 2015, http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/
three-offsets-for-american-landpower-dominance.
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been overlooked, that the point that the opponent has a vote has been
forgotten. The point about recalibrating away from hybrid warfare—
while keeping in mind what has been learnt over the last couple of years
—to mobilization is that a better understanding of how and why Russia
goes to war is necessary, as is a more flexible understanding of how the
Russian leadership might view how that war might be fought and won.
It is not clear, for instance, how Western populations would respond
to conventional engagements in which there would be heavy casualties
on both sides, and the ability to endure such a conflict is open to question. In such circumstances, therefore, NATO as a whole, and even the
US itself cannot rely on the automatic assumption that it would win a
conventional war.

Of Note

On Strategic Leadership
An Interview with David H. Petraeus, General (USA
Retired)

Few military officers ever command international coalitions in
combat operations. Fewer still do it twice. General (retired) David
Petraeus commanded coalition forces in Iraq from February 2007 to
September 2008, and in Afghanistan from July 2010 to July 2011. He
served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency until 2012.
A team from the Belfer Center of the Harvard Kennedy School,
led by Emile Simpson, recently interviewed General Petraeus to obtain
his views on strategic leadership. What follows is a selection from those
interviews, reproduced here with permission.1

Question: Can you give us an overview of your four key tasks of
strategic leadership?

Petraeus: First of all, strategic leadership is that which is exercised at
a level of an organization where the individual is truly determining the
azimuth for the organization. When you look at a combat theater, the
overall commander of that combat theater—Multi-National Force-Iraq,
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan—is the strategic
leader who, within the confines of the policy that is approved by the
President of the United States and/or the NATO authorities, he’s the
one that is developing the direction the organization is going to go.
In essence there are four tasks. The first is to get the big ideas right.
The second is to communicate them effectively throughout the breadth
and depth of the organization. The third is to oversee the implementation
of the big ideas. And the fourth is to determine how the big ideas need
to be refined, changed, augmented, and then repeating the process over
again and again and again.
Now, in my experience, getting the big ideas right isn’t something
that happens when you sit under the right tree and get hit on the head
by Newton’s apple—a big idea fully formed or big ideas fully flushed
out. My experience is big ideas result from collaboration, from study,
research, analysis, having a large tent in which lots of people are engaged.
Certainly the leader at the end of the day does have to make decisions,
does have to settle on the big ideas; but it’s a very iterative process, or
at least it has been for me over the years. And that’s the way it needs to
be approached.
Communicating the big ideas is a process that takes place using
every possible medium and opportunity. It starts with the very first day
speech, the change of command remarks after having taken command
of the unit. In the case of Iraq, it continued with the issuance of a letter
1     For the full interview, see: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/PetraeusStrategicLeadership.
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I’d written to all of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians
of the Multi-National Force in Iraq. It then went on through a meeting
with the commanders of the Multi-National Force who were all there
for the change of command. In subsequent days, I changed the mission
statement; over time we changed the entire campaign plan.
You continue to communicate on a daily basis, through everything
you do, including how you spend your time. The battlefield update and
analysis we went through each day was another opportunity to communicate throughout the organization because there are a lot of people who
are video teleconferencing into this particular event. It ran a full hour,
and my comments were all transcribed and sent out via the military
internet all the way down to brigade commander level.
This gets now into overseeing the implementation of the big ideas
task, which is one that involves a battle rhythm of how is it you’re going
to spend your time. Each day, what will you do? Beyond that, what are
the metrics you use to measure progress? We spent a great deal of time
trying to develop those, refine them, and make sure they were absolutely
rigorous in application. How many days a week do you fence to go out
and see for yourself, to go on a patrol, to meet with Iraqi leaders in their
areas, to meet with our leaders all the way down to the company and
platoon level, to get a sense of what they’re experiencing, what their
concerns are, whether they have been able to understand your big ideas,
your intent, and then how they’re operationalizing it at their level?
And then finally, of course, comes the process of identifying changes
needed for the big ideas. Some big ideas perhaps, as we say, we shoot and
leave by the side of the road, others we refine, and then perhaps we adopt
some additional big ideas as well. So it’s a continuous cycle that is always
ongoing. This is something that does have to be done systematically. It is
something that has to have a rhythm to it. You need to return to examine
the big ideas formally from time to time. You need to determine your
communications process. You have to communicate to those above you,
you have to communicate to your coalition partners, to your host nation
partners, Iraqi or Afghan, so it’s a 360 degree effort in that regard. Then,
of course, in the oversight of these, you’re constantly assessing. Where
do we need to make the changes, that fourth task? But that fourth task
has, again, systems, processes, procedures. There was a Center for Army
Lessons Learned team, a United States Marine Corps Lessons Learned
team, a Joint Lessons Learned team, the Asymmetric Warfare Group,
the counterinsurgency center, on and on and on. All of that formally
had to be brought together, presented to me, and then recommendations
made for how we would actually operationalize them, because a lesson
is not learned until it has actually resulted in a change back in the big
idea phase.

Question: How did you come to the “big ideas” when you were in
command in Iraq?

Petraeus: Well, first of all is what I did to get the big ideas right in my
own head. To help our Army and indeed the Marine Corps—because
we did this in partnership with General Mattis and the US Marine
Corps—what we sought to do to help those institutions develop the
right big ideas as well. So during that fifteen month period that I was
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back in the United States [commanding the Combined Arms Center at
Fort Leavenworth], having returned from a fifteen-and-a-half month
tour as a three star heading the train and equip mission in Iraq, we spent
a great deal of time working our way through ideas and concepts of
what the strategy should be. This included the counterinsurgency field
manual, and it included articles for Military Review magazine—indeed we
had a writing contest for counterinsurgency using Military Review which
was also under my purview at that time. We worked very, very hard
and with considerable rigor to try to get this set in our heads so when
I actually did deploy—you know, I’d been told that it was quite likely I
was going to go back to Iraq. There was only one position to which I
could return presumably, and that would be to be the commander of the
Multi-National Force in Iraq. The call came, frankly, a bit earlier than I
expected when the President decided to conduct the surge, and decided
to make a change in leadership.
But when I went back over there, and having already had nearly
two-and-a-half years on the ground, I had a pretty good idea—as did
our other leaders, who had been seized with this issue for a number of
years. Most of the commanders who came to Iraq during the surge had
at least one tour, one full-year tour on the ground by then. Many had
two. And so we were a reasonably experienced group, and, again, we’d
worked our way through this. We’d made the doctrinal changes, we’d
tweaked our organizations, we’d overhauled the training, the so-called
road to deployment, every activity along it. We’d completely changed our
leader development courses. And so we’d made a number of institutional
changes to ensure our leaders and our units were prepared for the tasks
required in Iraq and of course in Afghanistan as well.

Question: How did you communicate the “big ideas”?

Petraeus: Relentlessly and continuously. You have to seek every
opportunity, make use of it, exploit it. Every medium, every possible
way in which you can communicate the big ideas as effectively as possible throughout the breadth and depth of the organization, but also to
our partners, our Iraqi and coalition partners, and indeed to the greater
audiences out there, certainly to our chain of command, our bosses
in the US and coalition chain, and to the people of our nations, the
citizens of the United States and the other coalition countries. All of
these had to be audiences, each of them needed to be provided with
what it was we were trying to do. We needed to explain that; we had an
obligation to do that. I think we even had an obligation to let them get
to know a little bit about the individual who was commanding their sons
and daughters, who was taking this important effort forward together
with Ambassador Crocker and all the other members of the team. And
indeed we then owed them an objective, a frank, realistic assessment
of the situation on the ground, how we thought it was going, what we
planned to do in the future in a general sense, and what we thought we
could and could not achieve.
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Question: How did you oversee the implementation of the “big
ideas” in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Petraeus: Well, in a very structured way. You’ve got to understand that
this in not going to be an effort that’s going to culminate with taking the
hill, planting the flag, and going home to a victory parade. Rather, it’s
going to be a set of small successes and perhaps small setbacks along the
way, certainly. It will be the gradual achievement of progress that does
then start to accumulate over time. And you can map it, you can see it,
you can feel it. You’ll see it in the metrics.
We worked very hard to have a whole series of different metrics on
which we focused, whether it was daily attacks initiated by the enemy,
suicide car bombs, regular car bombs, improvised explosive device
explosions, sectarian violence, our casualties, Iraqi casualties, civilian
casualties, again across the board. Even into how many megawatts of
electricity are being produced, how many barrels of oil produced and
exported. Every element of Iraq, its society, its political progress, its
social progress, basic service provision, hospitals, schools, rule of law,
you name it, we had to track all of that, in addition to the normal military
measures, if you will. And we had, again, a very, very structured process.
Every single day we had the BUA. It started, I think it was at 7:30
in the morning to 8:30, our time, at the end of which we had a small
group meeting with a select group of the highest, most senior coalition
leaders, and then ultimately a smaller group with just US and UK, and
then perhaps the smallest of the small groups, which was just Lieutenant
General Odierno and me sitting there looking at each other asking when
each of us thought this thing was going to turn in the early, very, very
tough days. But then we would have a series of other events during the
week. I got an hour each week at minimum with the three star train and
equip commander, another hour minimum with the special operations
commanders, there was a special intelligence assessment that we did
every Sunday that was frankly very stimulating and enjoyable. We had
marked out two days a week minimum where right after the BUA I’d
get in either an up-armored Humvee or one of the other vehicles or a
helicopter and we’d drive or fly somewhere and then go on a patrol with
a unit, spend time with that unit, get an update from them, get a feel for
myself of what the situation was on the ground. There were certain Iraqi
events every single week. There was a National Security Council meeting
of the Iraqis that was conducted every single week, as an example.
And then we had the video teleconference with the president of the
United States, Washington time, 7:30 to 8:30 on Monday morning. I had
the video teleconference with Secretary Gates and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs every Tuesday at Washington time 7:30, and so forth. Then
there were events that took place biweekly; there were monthly events,
and there were even quarterly events, all the way to the so-called strategic campaign plan assessment Ambassador Crocker and I conducted
with all of the leaders of the US and coalition diplomatic communities
and embassy teams with the development and intelligence leaders there
as well, and all of the senior coalition military leaders present also. We
had quite detailed analytics we looked at for how were we coming in the
train-and-equip mission for the Iraqi security forces, the overall security
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situation, and so forth, all the way through the civilian lines of effort
as well.

Question: In either Iraq or Afghanistan, could you give us an
example of how an important “big idea” was revised?

Petraeus: I’ll give you an example of one that was created. In Iraq, I’d not
focused a great deal on detainee operations in my previous assignments
as the division commander or the commander of the Multi-National
Security Transition Command-Iraq, the train and equip mission. But
now, all of a sudden, I realized that we’ve got perhaps somewhere short
of 20,000 detainees and it went to twenty-seven or twenty-eight thousand during my time as commander of the Multi-National Force during
the surge. And I realized that we had to completely overhaul what we
were doing. We had a riot one night early on in my time in command
where there were some 10,000 detainees rioting. And there’s no fence in
the world that can stop 10,000 detainees if they all work together. And
we ended up mustering every single person at that particular camp, in
riot control gear, with the fire engines and everything else we could. We
used every non-lethal munition we had, and shot thousands of rubber
bullets that evening before finally getting it under control. And I realized something was seriously wrong.
The new detainee joint task force commander had just taken over,
and we underwent a very systematic assessment and we came up with a
number of big ideas for detainee operations. The first of which was we’re
not releasing any more detainees until we get it under control and we
have a rehabilitation process. But the second was we can’t do that until
we’ve identified who the true hardcore extremist leaders are and get them
out of these detainee facilities. So this was called “carrying out counterinsurgency inside the wire.” It’s very similar to what you do outside the
wire in the neighborhood. You’ve got to identify the bad guys, you’ve
got to figure out how to kill or capture or remove them from the general
population and put them somewhere safe, and we had to do that in the
detainee operations affairs as well. And again, it was not something I
thought would be a very significant part of my effort. I thought we’d be
focused on securing the people, reconciliation, going after the irreconcilables, but this was actually probably one of the top five. Ultimately
we had to figure out how to rehabilitate these individuals, release them,
but with a much reduced recidivism rate. And so we developed new big
ideas there, refined those over time, developed a review process and so
forth; and we developed the rehabilitation programs, began implementing them, and experimented with them and tweaked them, obviously,
again, as a learning organization should seek to do.
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The Utility of Nuclear Weapons Today: Two
Views
José de Arimatéia da Cruz

Books Reviewed:
No Use: Nuclear Weapons
and US National Security.
By Thomas M. Nichols
Atomic Assistance: How
“Atoms for Peace” Programs
Cause Nuclear Insecurity.
By Matthew Fuhrmann

M

y colleague Steven Metz recently wrote a very thought provoking piece, entitled “Thinking About Catastrophe: The
Army in a Nuclear Armed World.” Metz argues, “nothing is
more important to American security than nuclear weapons. Despite all
the fretting over terrorism, hybrid threats, and conventional aggression,
only nuclear weapons can threaten the existence of the United States and
destroy the global economy.”1 Indeed, despite the end of the Cold War
and nuclear hostilities between the United States and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the topic of nuclear weapons is vital today. Not a day
goes by without reference to nuclear weapons in national and international newspapers. For example, the New York Times, in its February 18,
2016 online edition, reported that Belgium police discovered ten hours
of video purportedly showing a Belgian nuclear official at the home of
the Paris attacker, Thierry Werts. Belgium officials argued the terrorist
organization network “involved in the coordinated attacks on November
13, 2015, that left 130 dead may also have intended to obtain radioactive
material for terrorist purposes.”2
Terrorist organizations attempting to acquire nuclear weapons
to carry out their nefarious activities, and renegade nation-states also
continue to challenge the international system and international law
by attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. The most recent example
occurred on February 7, 2016, when the “hermit kingdom” of North
Korea tested a nuclear bomb and launched a satellite, provoking sharp
condemnations from Russia and China as well as South Korea. Despite
the fact nuclear weapons could be considered obsolete since an attack
by one country could result in massive retaliation by another, the United
States maintains a huge nuclear arsenal on high alert and ready for war.
The two books considered in this review discuss the utility of nuclear
weapons in the post-Cold War era.
No Use: Nuclear Weapons and US National Security, by Thomas M.
Nichols, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War
College in Newport, examines the current state of US nuclear doctrine
1      Steven Metz, “Strategic Insights: Thinking About Catastrophe: The Army in a Nuclear Armed
World,” Strategic Studies Institute, December, 14, 2015, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.
mil/index.cfm/articles/Thinking-About-Catastrophe/2015/12/14.
2      Milan Schreuer and Alissa J. Rubin, “Police Find Video of Nuclear Official at Home of
Terrorism Suspect,” New York Times, February, 19, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/
world/europe/belgium-nuclear-official-video-paris-attacks.html?ref=world.
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and strategy, the effects of American thinking about nuclear weapons
on international security, and the various ways the United States might
reduce the overall threat of nuclear weapons.
(12) Why is it so difficult for the major
powers, and the United States in particular,
to break their nuclear addiction? What role
should nuclear weapons play in America’s
national security? These are the central questions guiding No Use. (5) While the United
States has reduced its nuclear stockpiles,
it still maintains a considerable number of
them.
Are nuclear weapons still relevant in
the post-Cold War world? Nichols has his
doubts. He argues Cold War-era precepts
about nuclear weapons have continued to
dominate security policy and nuclear strategies by default. (6) While they may still be
Thomas M. Nichols, No Use: Nuclear
Weapons and US National Security
considered a good deterrence mechanism,
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
other nations may see nuclear weapons as
Press, 2014) 217pgs. $39.95
aggressive tools in the military arsenal of its
opponents. For example, Russian officials, despite their displeasure with
North Korea for its most recent nuclear test and satellite launch, believe
the “North Korean regime is simply fighting for its own survival, using
the logic that when a pack of wolves attacks you, only a fool lowers his
gun.”3 Nichols succinctly argues, “deterrence will not be strengthened
by creating smaller or more accurate nuclear bombs or by drawing up
military senseless campaigns of desultory nuclear strikes.” (157)
Nichols believes a nuclear Armageddon, in the current international system, is unlikely to take place between nation-states. In fact, he
contends that without a real threat to the American civilization itself,
“nuclear weapons are now more an instrument of choice rather than
[of] necessity.” (11) Still, he does not take into consideration the possibility terrorist organizations or violent non-states actors may attempt
to acquire nuclear weapons to use against their enemies. Nichols proposes the United States re-evaluate what national security means in the
context of the post-Cold War international system. For Nichols, a key
component to reforming the traditional US notion of national security
is an examination of the utility of nuclear weapons. As Nichols argues,
“reforming US nuclear doctrine is the key not only to the reform of US
national security policy, but also to the reduction of nuclear arsenals and
the prevention of the wider spread of nuclear weaponry.” (8)
Obviously, what Nichols is calling for is the US Government to
reduce its nuclear stockpile in light of the insignificance of nuclear
weapons in the twenty-first century as a weapon of choice if a conflict
were to break-out. This proposition is not without its detractors. And,
Nichols recognizes that when he argues:
...removing nuclear weapons from their pride of place will require a fundamental change in the way Americans and others think about their security.
3      George Toloraya, “A Neighborly Concern: Russia’s Evolving Approach to Korean Problems,”
http://38north.org/2016/02/gtoloraya021816.
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Efforts to change the Cold War nuclear paradigm will encounter significant political, ideological, and bureaucratic obstacles, because reducing the
importance of nuclear weapons will involve remaking American security
strategy as a whole. (10)

However, without the US Government taking a leadership role as
opposed to “leading from behind,” there will not be a reduction in
nuclear weapons among the “nuclear club.”
Moreover, Nichols explains, “only the United States, with its
fortunate geopolitical advantages, its unique position of international
leadership, and its huge qualitative edge in nuclear matters can meaningfully lead any kind of change in global norms about the purpose and
meaning of nuclear arms.” (11)
While many countries and proponents of nuclear weapons propose
that nuclear weapons are not weapons of war, but weapons of deterrence, Nichols disagrees. Instead, he argues deterrence is by its nature
imprecise, “but every administration claims it is doing only what is
necessary to defend the country, and no more or less.” (70) Nichols
further argues US policy-makers and nuclear enthusiasts subscribe to
the idea of “calculated ambiguity.” (56) Calculated ambiguity was put
into practice in the 1990s to respond to the threats of nuclear attacks
if carried out by smaller nations. Calculated ambiguity was designed to
be vague, deliberately obscuring whether “Washington would resort to
nuclear retaliation as punishment for attacks against the United States,
its military forces, or its allies” if the attacks were carried out by smaller
states using chemical or biological weapons–otherwise known as “poor
man’s bombs.” (56)
If nuclear weapons have lost strategic deterrence value in the postCold War international system of the twenty-first century, the question
becomes: what should the United States new strategic nuclear policy
look like? Are nuclear weapons still relevant? Nichols quotes General
V. K. Singh, Chief of the Indian Army, who said in 2012 that “nuclear
weapons are not for warfighting. They have got a strategic significance
and that is where it should be.” (109) According to Nichols, the first
and most important step the President of the United States should do
is to declare a doctrine of minimum deterrence. (110) The doctrine of
minimum deterrence argues:
...the only use for American nuclear weapons would be to deter the use of
other nuclear weapons against the United States, and failing that, they would
be used purely for retaliation in the event of a nuclear attack that could
threaten the national existence of the United States. (110-11)

In the final analysis, Nichols argues, “an American doctrine of minimum
deterrence will not only bring US declaratory policy into line with political reality, it will represent the final abandoning of both the pretense,
and the burden, of adhering to Cold War nuclear maxims.” (177)
Matthew Fuhrmann’s Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs
Cause Nuclear Insecurity takes a different stance. Nuclear technology has
dual utility, that is to say, it can be used to produce nuclear energy or to
build nuclear weapons. “Nuclear technology, materials, and know-how
are dual use in nature, meaning they have both peaceful and military
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application.”(2) Furhmann argues politico-strategic factors drive nuclear
marketplace:
Countries provide atomic assistance to enhance their political influence by
strengthening recipient countries and improving their bilateral relationships
with those states. In particular, suppliers use aid [nuclear] to reinforce their
allies and alliances, to forge partnerships with enemies of enemies, and to
strengthen existing democracies (if the supplier is also a democracy). (239)

Furhmann goes on to claim “suppliers also barter nuclear technology
for oil when they are worried about their energy security.” (239) Despite
the recognition of nuclear technology’s dual nature, countries regularly
engage in “peaceful nuclear cooperation,” which Furhmann defines
as “state-authorized transfer of technology, materials, or know-how
intended to help the recipient country develop, successfully operate, or
expand a civil nuclear program.” (2)
His book discusses the use of economic statecraft to achieve foreign policy
objectives and the ways in which attempts
to influence the behavior of other states
can have unintended consequences for
international security. (239) Furhmann’s
work covers an important topic in the
twenty-first century, that is, it makes a
contribution toward our understanding of
the causes and effects of atomic peaceful
nuclear assistance. But, most importantly,
Furhmann’s main contribution to the
existing literature on nuclear proliferation
is the fact his book is the first of its kind
to “explore the supply side of the nuclear
proliferation.” (6) Furthermore, the book
emphasizes the proliferation potential of
Matthew Fuhrmann, Atomic Assistance:
peaceful nuclear assistance—as opposed
How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause
Nuclear Insecurity (Ithaca: Cornell
to indigenously acquired nuclear capabiliUniversity Press, 2012). 319pgs. $82.95
ties or deliberate proliferation assistance.
(6)
Furhmann’s Atomic Assistance is guided by the following research
questions: Why do nuclear suppliers provide peaceful nuclear assistance
to other countries? Does peaceful nuclear assistance raise the likelihood
of nuclear weapons proliferation? Have international institutions influenced the nuclear marketplace and effectively separated the peaceful and
military uses of the atom?
In reply, he argues peaceful nuclear cooperation warrants special
reflection for at least two reasons. First, policy-makers believe civilian
nuclear assistance can transform bilateral relationships. This transformation can be for better or worse depending on the country which is
receiving the peaceful nuclear cooperation. Furhmann contends that
countries receiving higher levels of peaceful nuclear cooperation are
more likely to pursue and acquire the bomb, especially if they experience
an international crisis after receiving aid.
Second, the proliferation potential of nuclear technology makes
atomic assistance a unique tool of economic statecraft. In other words,
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Furhmann argues nuclear peaceful cooperation “is simultaneously
helpful and potentially dangerous for international security.” (5) Since
nuclear peaceful proliferation could have a detrimental impact on world
stability, policymakers in the United States and elsewhere who are concerned about proliferation need to understand the connection between
civilian and military nuclear programs.
Furhmann draws on several cases of “Atoms for Peace” in the book.
Some of the cases include US civilian nuclear assistance to Iran from
1957 to 1979, prior to the Iranian Revolution which brought to power
the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mūsavi Khomeini; the Brazilian
nuclear exports to Iran from 1975 to 1981; Brazilian and German nuclear
agreements to build Angra III in 1975; and the controversial US nuclear
cooperation agreement with India from 2001 to 2008.
As former President George W. Bush put it, US-Indian nuclear cooperation would “deepen the ties of commerce and friendship between our
two nations.” (104-105) The nuclear peaceful agreement between the
United States and India also raised concerns for neighboring Pakistan
and China. For Pakistan, a nuclear India is unacceptable, but China is
seen by India as a constant irritant and a rising influence in Asia.
Brazil and Iraq signed a peaceful nuclear agreement in January
1980. This agreement required Brazil to provide technology for uranium
exploration and to train Iraqi scientists. Furthermore, the agreement
specified Brazil would supply unprocessed and enriched uranium and
offer assistance in the construction of nuclear reactors. (112) While
such an agreement had tremendous ramifications for Brazil’s role in the
international system, it was a zero-sum game for which Brazil could not
escape. At the time the nuclear agreement was signed, Brazil imported
roughly 80 percent of its oil and Iraq provided 40 percent. Therefore,
Furhmann argues, Brazil “aiding the Iraqi civilian nuclear program
could help Brazil secure a stable oil supply” and “Brazil’s thirst for oil
made it difficult to say no to Iraqi requests for nuclear assistance.” (114)
The Brazil-Germany agreement was heavily criticized by the United
States as “a reckless move that could set off a nuclear arms race in Latin
America, trigger the nuclear arming of a half-dozen nations elsewhere
and endanger the security of the United States and the world as a whole.”
(119)
Both Thomas M. Nichols’ No Use: Nuclear Weapons and US National
Security and Matthew Fuhrmann’s Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for
Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity are highly recommended. Given
present-day attempts by rogue nations to pursue their dreams of possessing nuclear weapons for deterrence or for legitimate purposes, as it is
often claimed, nuclear discussions once again are dominating the political debate by political experts and pundits alike. North Korea’s recent
launching of a satellite into orbit has been seen as “a cover for testing
a long-range missile, and the test of a nuclear device, the fourth such,
which took place on January 6th.”4 US Secretary of State John Kerry
condemned North Korea’s actions as “reckless and dangerous,” and
other nations at the UN Security Council called North Korea’s actions
4      “China, North Korea, and America: Between Punxsutawney and Pyongyang,” The Economist
(February 13-19, 2016): 33-34
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irresponsible. The international community has been unable to prevent
North Korea’s continual misbehavior.
Furhmann eloquently points out that, despite the establishment of
the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 and other nuclear safeguards, international institutions have had a limited effect in reducing the dangers
of atomic assistance for nuclear weapons proliferation. (207) Therefore,
it is no surprise that the nuclear debate continues into the twenty-first
century.

Commentary & Reply
On ”Expanding the Rebalance: Confronting
China in Latin America”
Jonathan Bissell
This commentary is in response to Daniel Morgan's article “Expanding the Rebalance:
Confronting China in Latin America” published in the Autumn 2015 issue of
Parameters (vol. 45, no. 3).

C

olonel Daniel Morgan sheds much-needed light on the Western
hemisphere and the challenges posed by deep Chinese engagement throughout it in his recent “Expanding the Rebalance:
Confronting China in Latin America” article. He lays out strong evidence
demonstrating China’s massive expansion of engagement in the hemisphere over the last 15 years using the four traditional pillars of national
power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic. His proposal for
the Pacific Command and the Southern Command to work together to
mitigate and confront contemporary issues, be more transparent, and
work multi-laterally with diverse partners offers innovative solutions
that should be seriously considered by senior leaders and United States
policy-makers.
His call for the inclusion of China in the annual PANAMAX exercise goes too far, however. China’s interests in the Western hemisphere
appear to be economically driven, predominantly by its demand for
extractable resources. As China’s growth wanes, the demand for these
commodities shrinks, adversely effecting the economic growth of several
Latin American countries whose populist leaders depend heavily upon
Chinese mineral consumption to satisfy their domestic social spending
promises. With the source of this revenue drying up, Latin American
leaders who exploited this commodity boom (while failing to diversify
their economies) are feeling political adversity during national elections. The recent change in the mood of the electorates in Argentina,
Guatemala, and Venezuela reflect voter frustrations with corruption
and poor economic choices. The complex, multi-lateral engagements of
many governments in the global south anchored around unsustainable
Chinese investments seem to be imploding.
The so-called South-South institutions (i.e. Bolivarian Alliance
for the Peoples of Our America, Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States, MERCOSUR, and Union of South American Nations)
have proven to be far less effective than the framework of intergovernmental institutions (IGOs) the United States set up following World
War II, such as the United Nations (UN) and the other regimes from
the Bretton Woods Accords. As China increases its power on the world
stage, it relies on these US-formed IGOs to build its global credibility. It does so by selectively participating in various regimes, such as
UN peacekeeping missions. China’s recent deployment of the Chinese
hospital ship, the Peace Ark, is reminiscent of the US’s effective use of
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its own USS Comfort and USS Mercy hospital ships as instruments of
smart-power. However, its use of the UN Convention of the Law of the
Sea Treaty to validate the expansion of its maritime boundaries in the
South China Sea, via an existing UN-sponsored, multi-lateral treaty is
legally questionable at best. China struggles to adhere to other international laws; its human rights and property rights enforcements remain
dubious. By permitting the Chinese to participate in PANAMAX, the
United States would be lending this autocratic regime tacit credence
to our hemispheric neighbors, clearly not part of the strategic vision
Washington endorses under its liberal world-order goals. China seems
to play by international rules and norms merely when it profits itself.
The ways and means to achieve China’s strategic ends primarily benefit
China, at varying costs to everyone else in the international system
The recent elections of the political opposition in Argentina,
Guatemala, and Venezuela demonstrate voter displeasure with endemic
corruption. Latin American leaders under increasing levels of public
scrutiny may be less prone to accept the “kick-backs” that go along
with large defense acquisitions, unscrupulous economic agreements,
and additional quid pro quo activities from other less-than-transparent
states such as China. This could potentially open these markets to
the United States once again, improving both hemispheric economic
collaboration and security cooperation efforts. Additionally, the transparency provided by the adaptation of the Trans Pacific Partnership,
the continued US engagement through forums such as the Financial
Action Task Force, and the cross-COCOM cooperation as suggested by
Colonel Morgan should be considered as key tools to addressing Chinese
influence in Latin America.

Author declined to reply.

Book Reviews
War & Strategy
The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge
By Paul Anthony Rahe
Reviewed by MAJ Jason W. Warren, PhD , Concepts and Doctrine Director,
Center for Strategic Leadership and Development, US Army War College.

I

n reviewing Paul Rahe’s The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta, I am faced
with a dilemma, just as the Spartans’ so-called “grand strategy” confronted from the 6th through 4th centuries B.C. Rahe’s volume, in his
projected trilogy dedicated to “diplomacy and war” of classical Sparta,
is richly detailed and elegantly written, yet the work fails to encompass
the title, losing its theme in the densely detailed text. (xv) The Spartans
could not easily project power given the inherently limited demographic
base of its slavocracy, which its complex oligarchy had established in the
southern Peloponnese. Yet Sparta risked irreplaceable Spartiate casualties
when giving battle to suppress, in succession, the neighboring Argives,
the invading Persians (and their Greek allies), the Athenians, and the
Thebans. Spartan “grand strategy,” as Rahe would have it, succeeded
over the better part of three centuries before collapsing under its flawed
demographic calculus, while it was a necessity to the “freedom” of the
Greek poleis. His tome is also requisite, but based on an apparatus of an
underdeveloped strategic theme.
Rahe begins by detailing the peculiar (and immoral) Spartan social
system, which was ultimately the basis for its grand strategy. The Grand
Strateg y of Classical Sparta serves as a critical reminder to those engaged
in crafting strategy at the national level that the ends, ways, and means
of strategy dedicated to projecting state power ultimately derive potency
from its particular political community. For this aspect alone, Rahe’s
book is important. He succeeds in tying the scant-in-numbers-purebirth Spartan male warrior class, which was cultivated at a young age
to endure incredible hardships in a violent barracks life away from the
nuclear family and resting on slave labor working the nearby fields, to
the city-state’s reticence to deploy military force. As Spartans could
not intermarry with the surrounding Helot or Messenian slave class or
outsiders, and were only allowed clandestine conjugal visits, while also
suffering increasing casualties from endemic conflict, this was a recipe
for demographic disaster. With skill, Rahe links this system to the necessity of fighting in a turbulent half-millennium that required the ultimate
committing of Spartiates to defend Spartan and Greek freedom, from
the Persian menace, as detailed in this volume.
Rahe is not the first scholar to make the claim for the “clash of
civilizations,” with the Persian threat, as he refers to it, but does not
incorporate this salient body of knowledge. (xiii) Victor Davis Hanson’s
The Western War of War and Carnage and Culture established this paradigm
in the literature decades ago, but there is neither reference in Rahe’s
first volume to these works, nor the scholarly debate, which ensued
(although he very briefly acknowledges A.R. Burns’ fifty-year old Persia
and the Greeks, 391). Perhaps he addresses this in the future volumes,
but as it stands here, this is an oversight. More of a detractor from this
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work given his focus on “grand strategy,” is Rahe’s failure to establish a
viable framework for what he means by this term. In today’s parlance,
“strategy” is very much a debated, fluid, idea (see Colin Gray, Antulio
Echevarria, Lawrence Freedman et al), and Rahe leaves it to the fifth
footnote of the Prologue to attempt any meaningful relation. Given the
fecundity of detail in this volume, an occasional reminder of the theme
of Spartan strategy interwoven in the elegant text would have served
as a signpost to the reader. Spartan strategy is infrequently mentioned
from the Prologue through the Ionian revolt, a third of the way through
the book.
The Grand Strateg y of Classical Sparta is suitable for a specialist audience. This passage serves as an example of this challenging read:
On the first occasion, ‘the men of the plain’ near Athens itself, led by a
shadowy figure named Lycurgus (almost certainly a member of the
Eteobutad clan), joined with ‘the men of the shore’ from the coastal areas
near Cape Sunium, led by Megacles, scion of the Alcmaeonid clan, to overwhelm Peisistratus’ supporters—‘the men from the hills’—and drive the
bodyguards he had been voted by the Athenian assembly from their perch
on the acropolis. (79)

The level of detail, while indispensable for the scholar, will pose a tough
slog for the non-specialist.
These criticisms aside, Rahe’s work serves as a repository, dealing
with a myriad of important topics, not the least of which is the innerworkings of the Persian regime that posed a critical threat to the freedom
of the Greek poleis. Sparta was the crucial component in the intra-citystate defense against the Persian Empire and its Greek allies, and its
viability, though ultimately secured on a quicksand demographic system,
served to protect Greek freedom from its establishment through the rise
of Macedon. Add this edition to your classical library.

Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in
the Post-Cold War Era
By Peter D. Haynes
Reviewed by Martin N. Murphy, political-strategic analyst and Senior Research
Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax
and Visiting Fellow at the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s
College, London.
Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2015
304 pages.
$33.00 .

I

t is asserted frequently, particularly in naval circles, that America is a
“maritime nation.” This is, at the very least, questionable. The reason
it falls short of being a maritime nation, and therefore a maritime power,
is the question this authoritative and meticulously written book seeks to
answer.
Haynes makes three main points: the US Navy’s ability to write
strategy is fundamentally flawed and, as a result, the strategies it has
pursued since the end of the Cold War have, with a single exception,
been as flawed as the process that made them.
Haynes’ research provides the reader with an extraordinary history
of the intellectual thinking, political pressure, bureaucratic infighting,
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personalities and budgetary constraints that have shaped strategy making
in the Department of the Navy over this time. Colin Gray is correct
when he writes in his endorsement that “it will make uncomfortable
reading to many, but read it they must.”
From Haynes’ analysis three particularly disturbing trends stand
out. First, naval strategy, as it is practiced by the US Navy, consists of
day-to-day policy and program choices. This may have delivered sufficient superiority during the long years of Soviet containment but, when
that ended, the Navy found itself bereft of the strategic skills to plot a
new course and justify it to its administrative and legislative masters.
Secondly, the pursuit of jointness and the restrictions this has placed
on the ability of all the individual service chiefs to influence strategy.
The consequences for the Navy, for which centralized command never
came naturally, have been particularly acute.
During the Cold War the US focused on military threats and the
very American use of technology to solve them. In that warfare-dominated environment, the persistent application of pressure with which
naval force has traditionally achieved effect was dismissed repeatedly
as too slow to play any worthwhile role in defeating Soviet power.
Consequently, the Navy retreated to a position where it was contingent
operationally, which it achieved by ensuring it was forward deployed and
offensively-minded.
The collapse of Soviet power did not usher in new strategic thinking
that measured up to the momentousness of the moment. The Navy’s
first post-Cold War strategic vision statement, “…From the Sea,” issued
in 1992, continued to explain the Navy’s existence as being “to provide
the regional CINCs with a breadth of capabilities, none more important
than striking targets ashore on exceptionally short notice.” (86) The
Navy effectively acquiesced to the prevailing patterns of US military
thought which, following the first Gulf War, were about jointness, warfighting, and “revolutionary” precision strike. This ordering of priorities
and the Navy’s willingness to accept them revealed the degree to which
the Navy had lost sight of the distinction between a naval and a maritime
strategy.
This is Haynes’ third point: not just to describe a flawed process
but a flawed outcome. Although the ideas of “national” and “systemic”
security are kept firmly separate in the minds of most naval officers
and defense officials, in reality they are so closely interwoven as to be
virtually indistinguishable in practice; and will continue to be unless
America decides to withdraw from its global role or its economy loses its
competitive edge and declines in global importance. A globalized world
is an American world.
If there are any heroes in Haynes’ history they are Admiral Mike
Mullen (Chief of Naval Operations, 2005 to 2007) and Mullen’s N3/5
head Vice-Admiral John Morgan. They recognized the importance of
globalization and the link between the security of the global economy,
naval power and US national interests, and fought to have this trinity
reflected in the US Navy’s 2007 strategic vision document, A Cooperative
Strateg y for 21st-Century (CS21).
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Although China was not mentioned directly, its analysts took a
clear message from what they read. The strategy advanced an argument
about the defense of the global system. They took this as meaning that
the United States would defend the system it had designed and led and
that the strategy was intended to help the United States retain its global
leadership position. It would do it, moreover, in cooperation with other
states with common interests in a secure and stable global maritime
order.
Securing and sustaining that re-balance, however, found a less sympathetic audience in the land of its birth. No force structure was put in
place to support CS21. The changes were, in other words, largely rhetorical. The 2015 re-write–A Cooperative Strateg y for 21st-Century Seapower:
Forward, Engaged, Ready–reflected this: as Haynes delicately puts it, “the
more traditional approach of the Navy’s post-Cold War strategic statements” was reinstated as the re-write pursued “a narrower and more
operationally focused and politically expedient route than the original.”
(248) The flaws in the Navy’s strategy process had reappeared.
Peter Haynes has written an essential book. It is one everyone interested in strategy and the future of American power in the world needs
to read and reflect upon. The US view of war, despite its limitations, has
proved enormously successful. Yet nothing lasts forever. No view of war
can persist unless its purpose is clear: why does the United States use and
threaten force? One of the most important ways must be to support and
defend the global political and economic system. It is, after all, primarily
an American system. As Haynes concludes, regardless of where “globalization may lead,” the US Navy is the “only institution on earth currently
capable of conceiving and executing a maritime strategy.” (252) Or it is
until a nation with a more compelling maritime narrative emerges to
replace it.
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Regional Issues
The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath
Edited by Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, Ph.D., Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

T

he Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath is an important consideration of
the recent, tragic past of this tortured country. The book is an edited
volume that assembles the work of a number of scholars and journalists with strong backgrounds in Libyan affairs. These contributions are
divided into two major sections, (1) “the revolution and its governance”
and (2) “sub-national identities and narratives.” Both of these sections
are important, but the second is noticeably strengthened by a significant amount of information about Libyan activities following the rebel
victory over the dictatorship of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. Some of the
chapters on Libyan minority groups, regional, and tribal groupings, and
Islamist organizations are especially valuable in underscoring the divisions within Libya and the byzantine political activity both within and
among Libyan sub-national groups.
The Libyan revolution began in February 2011, shortly after the
ouster of the presidents of neighboring Egypt and Tunisia. These revolutions appeared to the Libyan public as thrilling examples of the rapid
collapse of once seemingly invincible dictators, which correspondingly
inspired them to move against the Qadhafi regime. Initially, it was not
clear whether the revolutionaries were seeking to overthrow the regime
or force it to reform, but as events developed, the possibility of compromise quickly evaporated. Some Libyans maintained early hopes that
Qadhafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, might embrace the uprising as an opportunity for the political reform, which he had championed prior to the
mid-2000s. This hope ended after Saif’s vitriolic, hardline speech of
February 20, 2011. Moreover, as the revolution gained momentum and
casualties mounted, neither side seemed willing to accept anything less
than victory. The longevity of the fighting also made it difficult for any
major Libyan group to remain neutral. In many parts of Libya, community leaders were initially wary of entering into open rebellion, but
were forced to take an irrevocable stand against Qadhafi by their youth.
As the war progressed, it developed in a disorganized way along
four critical fronts. These were (1) the Benghazi/Brega area, (2) the
coastal city of Misrata and its surrounding areas, (3) the western Nafusa
Mountains, and most importantly, (4) Tripoli, Libya’s capital city and
home to almost one-fourth of the country’s population. These campaigns proceeded like four separate wars with no unified strategy and
only limited communications among the rebel groups involved in the
fighting. The overall leadership for the uprising was provided by the
National Transitional Council (NTC), but this organization was weak,
fragmented, and often unaware of key events on the battlefield until
after they had occurred. The NTC also avoided asserting strong leadership because it was unelected and did not want to establish parallels with
the Qadhafi regime. Adding to the confusion, many new and unknown
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groups continued to emerge with little interest in finding ways to fit into
any command hierarchy, except to gain supplies, weapons, and equipment. Most groups did not trust others, and one of the most important
NTC leaders, General Abdal Fattah Yunis was killed in July 2011,
probably by other rebels according to Peter Bartu’s chapter within this
volume. While the NTC fulfilled the key responsibility of the peaceful
and democratic transfer of power, it was unable to do much for Libyan
national unity.
The Libyan uprising was further complicated by the attention of a
number of foreign powers, including those with competing agendas for
the future of that country. Mindful of the problems in Iraq, Washington
did not want large numbers of Western combat forces on the ground,
but the United States struck hard from the air against Qadhafi’s forces in
Operation Odyssey Dawn in late March 2011. This effort was followed
by European and Gulf Arab airstrikes against the regime under the
umbrella of NATO’s Operation Unified Protector. Like the United States,
the NTC did not want significant numbers of Western combat troops in
Libya, but various countries including France and the United Kingdom
sent small groups of advisors and liaison officers. Qatar became active
early in the war providing trainers and significant amounts of weapons
to various preferred factions including some Islamists. The Qataris,
who had exceptionally bad relations with Qadhafi, were concerned that
the less militant members of the NTC could eventually seek a ceasefire
with the Libyan regime, and they correspondingly supported hardliners.
Additionally, Qatar and a number of other countries sought to shape
the post-revolutionary Libyan government by strengthening groups they
favored. Rivalry between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which
supported different local partners, was particularly fierce and may have
damaged the flow of relevant information to NATO planners and targeting officers. It is not clear how much influence any external powers
gained after the war since the Libyan revolutionaries were wary of a
post-conflict situation dominated by external actors due to the previous
example of Iraq.
Tripoli fell to the revolutionaries in August 2011, and Qadhafi was
captured and killed on October 20, 2011. The victorious rebels were then
faced with an extremely difficult legacy. Previously, both the monarchy
and Qadhafi had adopted a divide and rule approach to governance and
discouraged a unified national identity. During Qadhafi’s over 40 years in
power, state institutions were deliberately neglected and even remained
a subject of suspicion after the regime’s ouster. Correspondingly, there
was little to build upon when the victorious revolutionaries sought to
set up institutions and bureaucracies to adjudicate differences in the
society or to provide services. After the defeat of the old regime, creating a functioning state out of such a fragmented society remained an
ongoing crisis. Balancing representation among the former Tripolitania,
Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, Libya’s three historic regions, was particularly
challenging and divisive. There were also numerous problems over how
diverse groups could cooperate and organize themselves during and after
the uprising with many regional and subnational loyalties competing for
the allegiance of Libyan citizens. Adding texture to the reader’s understanding of these differences, many of Libya’s most important ethnic,
political, and ideological groups are considered in depth throughout the

Book Reviews: Regional Issues

95

latter section of this book, including particularly good chapters on the
Amazigh (Berber), Tebu, and Tuareg minorities. The different histories,
priorities, and agendas of various factions within these groups is a strong
indicator of how difficult future government will be in Libya. Libya’s
incorporation of unruly militias into a bloated hybrid security sector
was another especially serious blow to the emergence of state authority.
In summary, this book provides a deep examination of some very
complex situations and problems that modern Libyans face. Much of
the information it presents is not readily available in English, and some
of the material on the behavior of different sub-national groups during
and after the revolution is an especially important contribution to the
relevant literature. The book is not always easy reading as it examines
the factions within factions throughout Libyan society and politics. It is
a particularly sobering discussion for anyone who might think solving
Libya’s problems will be simple or can occur by rigidly using other states
as models. The situation is not hopeless, however, and progress in building a more unified national political entity still seems at least distantly
possible since wealthy countries with small populations have a great deal
to offer a citizenship that is able to find ways to tolerate or even respect
its neighbors.

The Improbable War: China, the United States, and the Logic
of Great Power Conflict
By Christopher Coker
Reviewed by Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

T

his is an erudite but ultimately disappointing book. But a reader’s
initial reaction is likely to be confusion. A glance at the title could
easily lead to the mistaken conclusion that the thesis of the volume is that
war between China and the United States is highly improbable. In fact,
the author’s thesis is: “that war [between China and the United States] is
not inevitable, but nor is it as improbable as many experts suggest.” (181)
A reader, however, should not have to puzzle over the title or trudge
through five chapters and almost two hundred pages to learn this.
The book reads like a collection of thoughtful and well-researched
essays written by a political philosopher. Themed chapters explore such
topics as historical analogies and strategic narratives. Professor Coker
writes in flowing prose and cites an extensive array of literature. This
intellectual journey is always pleasant, frequently engaging, but lacks a
significant final destination. The author states he has “sought to craft
stories which the reader can explore,” but a scholar of international relations should aspire to do more than weave together tales in a volume
about the ominous and unnerving prospect of great power conflict
between Washington and Beijing. (170)
Is the author correct in assuming China and the United States
“continue to convince themselves that war is too ‘improbable’ to take
seriously?” (181) Certainly, US-China relations in recent years have been
filled with an array of contentious issues, including probing and finger
pointing over cyber security and tensions in the South China Sea, any
one of which alone could escalate into conflict. Yet the two governments
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do seem intent on averting conflict. Indeed the careful stage management of the September 2015 Washington summit between Xi Jinping
and Barack Obama was a clear signal that each leader strongly desires to
manage the bilateral tensions. At least in ordinary times of peace—what
the Pentagon refers to as “phase zero”—Professor Coker’s concern
about the real possibility of a war between China and the United States
may appear overly alarmist.
However, it is when tensions arise suddenly, and one side becomes
overly confident in its ability to manage the crisis and to control escalation that the prospect of the United States and China stumbling into war
becomes frighteningly plausible. So Professor Coker is right to highlight
the potential for the “improbable war” almost imperceptibly evolving
into a conceivable one.
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Leadership, Motivation, & Resilience
Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the US Military
By George E. Reed
Reviewed by COL (Ret) Charles D. Allen, Professor of Leadership and Cultural
Studies, US Army War College

Y

ogi Berra, the American baseball icon, is known for his paradoxical
quotes. For Dr. George Reed, “You don’t have to swing hard to hit
a home run. If you got the timing, it’ll go” is wholly appropriate. While
an Army colonel, Reed was in the inaugural cohort of the Professor
US Army War College program, earned a PhD in Public Policy Analysis
and Administration, and returned to Carlisle to serve as the Director of
Command and Leadership Studies. At the Army War College, he was
involved in a study directed by the Army Chief of Staff to explore the
phenomenon of toxic leadership. Needless to say, Reed and colleague,
Dr. Craig Bullis did not have to swing hard or dig deep to confirm that
toxic leadership does exist within the culture of the US Army and that
it has an adverse impact on the profession of arms. Thus, the timing of
the initial research effort and of subsequent investigations since have
resulted in a series of journal articles and this important work, Tarnished:
Toxic Leadership in the US Military.
Reed begins by addressing the familiar concepts of leadership and
avoiding the imbroglio of leadership theories. To do so, he adopts and
presents an elegant but simple definition crafted by Dr. Joseph C. Rost
where “Leadership is an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes.”
(viii) Reed also establishes his focus on toxic leaders who “engage in
numerous destructive behaviors and who exhibit certain dysfunctional personal
characteristics….[that] inflict some reasonably serious and enduring harm
on their followers and their organizations.” (11)
Reed walks the reader through the various manifestations of bad
behavior by leaders and the impact such behaviors have on their followers. He centers on two personality and psychological concepts that may
explain why leaders are toxic–psychopathy and narcissism. Psychopathic
leaders have a disorder that is hard to mitigate–not that the psychopath would have desire to change or even care about their effect on
others. Narcissists may fall along a continuum and may be amenable
to changing their behavior, given awareness of impact and prospects
for still achieving their ambitions. After providing an understanding of
potentially toxic personalities, Reed also suggests organizational culture
may contribute to toxic behaviors based on the attention on results and
near-term requirements. Given that the military has a bias for action and
is all about tactical and operational results, it is easy to imagine how toxic
leadership aligns with the stereotype of harsh military leaders.
While many military members have personal experience with bad
leaders, some may discount the phenomenon by contending that, like
beauty, toxic leadership is “in the eyes of the beholder.” Reed makes
a convincing case that such leadership adversely affects organizational
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outcomes. He also notes toxic leaders are sometimes paired with, or
enabled by, toxic followers. If indeed for every two good bosses, we
experience one bad boss and that becomes the primary reason for job
dissatisfaction and organizational turnover, then acceptance of toxic
leadership is imprudent. If leadership is an exchange relationship
between leaders and followers, then followers share responsibility for
the climate that exists around a focal leader.
Perhaps the most valuable contribution Reed makes is more than
listing the coping skills to survive narcissistic leaders as he presents in
chapter 6. Accordingly, he acknowledges “the safest course of action
when confronted with toxic leaders is to suffer in silence or seek an
expeditious exit.” (113) Such follower behavior perpetuates a negative
climate for subsequent organizational members to endure or allows the
toxic leader to carry that climate to the next assignment and organization. Reed is not Pollyannaish about the risks and consequences of
confronting a toxic leader. The most adverse impact may be the backlash
from the military culture that tacitly prides loyalty to commanders above
all else.
Tarnished is an important book for several reasons. First, it provides the vocabulary and the concepts to describe a phenomenon that
persists within US military culture. Such an initial conversation generated a research report by the Center for Army Leadership. Subsequent
initiatives have established processes to assess the perception of toxic
leadership and its impact through annual command climate surveys
across the services. Second, Reed has attempted to link toxic leadership to the highly dysfunctional occurrence of sexual misconduct.
Military cultures or leadership climates that allow such behavior inflicts
“reasonably serious and enduring harm on their followers and their
organizations” is inherently toxic and intolerable. Last, much has been
made of the trust and confidence placed in the US military as a profession of arms. Toxic leadership, where it exists, “represents a violation of
the unwritten contracts with the American people about how their sons
and daughters should be treated while in service to the nation.” (26)
To close with Yogi Berra, “You’ve got to be very careful if you don’t
know where you are going, because you might not get there.” Reed offers
an essential discourse on what many may see as an unpleasant, but necessary reality of military culture. It is imperative to military professionals
that they know where they going and that how they will get there is
aligned with the values and the principles they espouse. Understanding
and not tolerating toxic leadership is critical to stewarding the profession
of arms.

Beyond the Band of Brothers: The US Military and the Myth
that Women Can’t Fight
By Megan MacKenzie
Reviewed by Ellen L. Haring (Colonel, US Army Retired)
Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2015
200 pages.
$28.00

D

r. Megan MacKenzie’s newest book, Beyond the Band of Brothers,
argues the exclusion of women from combat positions is rooted
in ideas of male essentialism that are based on a myth. She convincingly
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debunks the notion “the precious and indefinable band of brothers effect
so essential to winning in close combat would be irreparably compromised within mixed-gender infantry squads.” According to MacKenzie,
when General Scales asserts that all of “our senior ground-force leaders,
as well as generations of former close combat veterans from all of our
previous wars, are virtually united on one point,” namely, that combat
units would be “irreparably compromised” by women, what he is admitting is they have all been duped by a myth of their own making.
MacKenzie begins with a historical analysis of the establishment of the “band of brothers” myth. Originally a literary creation of
Shakespeare subsequently perpetuated by Darwin and Freud (though
Freud admitted it was not intended to be taken seriously), it became a
commonly accepted, rarely questioned, “truth” about the nature of maleonly bonding. MacKenzie shows how this myth subsequently informed
and sustained laws and later military policies regarding servicewomen’s
suitability for combat positions.
Ultimately, women’s exclusion had nothing to do with women’s
actual ability to fight; rather, it had everything to do with men protecting their position as exceptional, essential, and elite. She begins by
chronicling the path to how we arrived at such a policy, and how it was
sustained, even as evidence mounted showing women could, and were
indeed successfully integrating in fighting units.
MacKenzie details the depth of the self-deception the US military
engaged in, most obviously after 9/11 as it prosecuted two wars with
a growing number of women in ever-expanding roles. What made the
exclusion policy increasingly untenable was the way military commanders themselves circumvented the policy to accomplish their missions.
For example, co-location restrictions were violated almost from the
outset, while the practice of “attaching,” (in order to avoid rules that
forbade “assigning”) women to direct ground combat units became
commonplace.
MacKenzie lays out the parallel and mutually supporting social phenomena that established and then sustained an emotion-based policy.
Perhaps the best chapter in the book is Chapter 3 where she examines
how beliefs and emotions shape policy, often to the detriment of good
decision making. MacKenzie groups the arguments against women into
“gut reactions, divine concerns, and threats to nature.” She then shows
how gut, God, and nature are “harnessed” to seemingly objective data.
By following MacKenzie’s analysis one sees how emotion, shaped by
cultural norms and beliefs, defied rational logic and sustained a policy
that at times compromised national security and ignored research on
women’s performance.
While MacKenzie’s explanation of why and how the exclusion
policies existed are sound, her explanation for why it was ultimately
eliminated in 2013 is less believable. MacKenzie argues the military
made a strategically calculated decision to lift the policy to distract
attention from a series of sexual assault, prisoner abuse, and soldier misbehavior scandals. However, how the military came up with this plan or
even an explanation for how this decision might reasonably be thought
to recover the military’s tarnished image is not clear; nor is it supported
by any evidence.
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The second problematic area appears in the conclusion when
MacKenzie claims “unraveling the band of brothers myth is essential to
demystifying and ending wars.” The entire book is focused on how the
exclusion of women is not really about women’s capabilities, but about
men perpetuating the notion that they and they alone are elite, exceptional, and essential to national security. Nowhere is there an analysis
of how debunking this one myth will ultimately lead to ending all wars.
Despite these shortcomings, the book is a fascinating analysis of
how policies that impact national security are established and sustained
through the construction of symbolic narratives that justify, legitimize,
and promote cultural norms.

Building Psychological Resilience in Military Personnel:
Theory and Practice
Edited by Robert R. Sinclair and Thomas W. Britt
Reviewed by Thomas J. Williams, Senior Scientist, Director, Behavioral Health
and Performance, Johnson Space Center, NASA.

Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association,
2013
268 pages.
$69.95

A

fter almost 14 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan and with the
threats arrayed around the world today, there is a great need to
understand how to sustain the strength of our military. One answer has
been to ensure we have a force that is more resilient. However, with over
104 different definitions of resiliency in the research literature, senior
leaders and policymakers really need to ensure they understand what
exactly we mean by resiliency and what it means for the readiness of the
force.
This edited volume focused on Building Psychological Resilience in
Military Personnel provides an excellent overview of the conceptual basis
for resilience. The two editors, Sinclair and Britt, both experts in their
own right, have brought together an impressive group of authors to
guide readers through resilience as a concept, the theory that underpins
it, and the practice of resiliency. To that end, the editors have effectively
achieved their stated goals: They have brought together researchers in
military personnel and families to highlight the different ways resiliency
is defined and to provide an overview of the applied interventions
that have been developed to purportedly increase resiliency in service
members and their families.
One of the fundamental issues highlighted in this volume is there
is no “universally accepted” or agreed upon definition of resiliency and
the editors honestly acknowledge the difficulties in doing so, given that
resilience is a “nebulous construct.” For their purpose, the editors define
resiliency as the “demonstration of positive adaptation after exposure
to significant adversity.” The editor’s note “most,” but not all of the
definitions offered by other authors within the chapters of this book
adopt their definition. Given the lack of consensus on what resiliency is,
the editors acknowledge they are seeking to build a consensus on what
contributes to positive adaptation as an integral component of resiliency.
To that end they offer: realistic optimism, flexible coping strategies, and
effective communication.
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The authors use the Soldier Adaptation Model as a framework to
posit a soldier’s resilience is determined by related processes of appraisal
and coping responses to potentially demanding events that influence
the outcomes experienced by soldiers. This offers a critical distinction
that places emphasis on the “appraisal processes” along with the nature
of the “stressful circumstances” rather than on a presumed personality
trait, disposition, or capacity that is possessed by the individual. The
various chapters help to highlight the importance of carefully considering this distinction since how one views the problem should determine
the type of practical training and intervention programs developed to
address the problem.
Building Psychological Resilience in Military Personnel is divided into
three sections. The first section focuses on understanding resilience
by reviewing research related to personality, morale and cohesion, the
role of adaptation, and how leadership influences and builds resilience.
These chapters provide compelling and thoughtful assessments for
better understanding why when we consider resiliency, we really need
to understand whether we are thinking of something we do (coping
resources), something we are (a disposition or personality trait), or something that we possess (skills, experiences or beliefs that can be trained or
developed by knowledgeable leaders).
The second section builds on the first by considering how we might
build resilience (i.e., by establishing intervention programs). These programs seek to foster resiliency across the deployment cycle by efforts
to help soldiers better modulate stress with a dual purpose of either
increasing resilience and/or addressing mental health concerns. An
important chapter in this section focuses on military families and the
unique demands they face with separations from their military member,
reintegration stresses, and relocation demands. The final chapter in this
section addresses the Army’s Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness
(CSF2) program, described as an “empirically driven mental healthrelated program.”
The authors note that there are varying degrees of empirical support
for these programs that have “far-reaching implications” for soldiers in
their post-military lives. What is not really addressed is that these programs all seem to assume that there is a certain “model” of resiliency and
that if everyone is brought up to that “model-level” with these compensatory programs, everyone is the better for it. However, given the lack
of consensus on what resiliency is and how to define it, it would seem
prudent to have greater clarity on whether our well-intended efforts may
have unintended consequences. For example, many of these programs are
focused on and designed to bring every soldier to a certain (unknown at
this time) level of resiliency to compensate for (presumably) something
heretofore missing. Do we really understand the potential inadvertent
consequences of taking someone with no discernible difficulties and
requiring them to engage in training that by definition is designed to
strengthen their mental health? Does that potentially instill uncertainty
in those individuals and thereby alter their positive appraisals leaving
them to now question their own ability to cope with the demands?
Human reason and the will to prevail in the uncertainty and demands
of war are not strengthened by efforts, however well intended, to force
every soldier to receive “mental health” focused training. Rather, we
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need to ensure that we become more adept at identifying what training
is needed by whom for what purpose to what end.
In light of the significant resources invested in resiliency programs,
senior leaders and policy makers may find it surprising to learn that
evaluations of the training programs cannot yet answer whether they
are effective. It goes without saying that if we intend to implement a
resiliency program with the stated purpose to “fundamentally transform
the military” it should have as its basis a clear understanding of what
“resiliency” is and ensure we understand whether we are strengthening
the force or intervening to address vulnerabilities. The former seems to
fall within the purview of military leaders while the latter is the focus of
our medical personnel. While they both strive to strengthen the force
as an end-state, their starting points are different: Leaders should not
provide “treatment” or interventions to address psychological vulnerabilities and medical personnel should not presume to instill the morale
and readiness reflected in a warrior ethos. This book makes an important contribution precisely because, in its totality, it takes the issue of
resiliency head on, not trying to oversell it but by acknowledging we
still don’t know if resiliency reflects character, a pattern of reactions to
adversity, or both…in over a 104 different ways.
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Outsourcing Security
The Markets for Force: Privatization of Security Across World
Regions
Edited by Molly Dunigan and Ulrich Petersohn
Reviewed by Birthe Anders, PhD, Department of War Studies, King’s College
London

F

or many years now research on private military and security companies has suffered from one crucial problem: a lack of new data. The
Markets for Force offers insights into several rarely studied private security
markets, including China, Russia, and several Latin American countries.
Editors Dunigan and Petersohn’s key argument is the market for force
does not exist. While it is usually treated as a single, homogenous, and
neoliberal market, different types of markets for types of force exist:
neoliberal, hybrid and racketeering markets (if a market exhibits characteristics of more than one type, it is categorized according to its most
dominant features).
Thus, the nine country chapters in the volume are tasked with
describing how and why a specific type of market developed, and crucially which consequences that market has for the state’s monopoly of
force and the provision of security as a public good. The goal of the
book is to outline how these consequences vary across different market
types. As the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada are frequently
studied, this review will focus on the six less-commonly studied cases.
Kristina Mani opens the case study section with Guatemala and
Argentina. Both countries face diminished state capacity to provide
security, meaning it is mostly available to those who can afford it
(although Mani points out that security has rarely been a public good in
the region). Instead, the region is characterized by “high levels of insecurity persisting in urban as well as rural areas under democratic regimes.”
(24, emphasis in the original). The Argentinian market is a national one.
In this relatively wealthy and developed country, informal collaborations between state security and private security companies dominate
the market. In Guatemala, a criminal force market can be observed with
features that are unique to the region. Mara gangs and transnational
criminal organizations have strong links and the latter contract gangs
for security.
In Maiah Jaskoski’s chapter on Peru and Ecuador, she outlines
the relationship between the “War on Drugs” and private security
companies (PSCs). Both countries exhibit military protection markets.
Causes of these markets are found in cuts in defense spending, but also
increased oversight of the army, combined with weak state capacity. This
means army-client relations are pushed to the local level. Much pressure
exists on local commanders to contribute to funding their bases. Some
do so through private security work. Unsurprisingly, this leads Jaskoski
to conclude that these military protection markets diminish the military
as an institution and security as a public good.
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Oldřich Bureš explains how domestic companies dominate the neoliberal market for force in the Czech Republic. Only non-lethal services
are allowed in the country. In 2011, a draft law regulating the industry
was presented and included licensing of companies by the Ministry of
Interior, but it has not yet been enacted. Interestingly, the country features a reverse revolving doors phenomenon, as it is not uncommon to
move from private security into politics.
In her chapter on Russia and the Ukraine, Olivia Allison writes that
in both countries buyers and sellers interact based on Soviet-era military
and intelligence connections, which is different from the Anglo-Saxon
model. The market is dominated by private businesses. Individuals and
small companies sell predominantly pilot and aircraft expert services
to foreign companies and foreign states. Allison finds that the state
monopoly on force is eroded by the informal nature of the market, but
that there is no evidence that lack of control over exports negatively
affects control over force domestically.
In his very detailed chapter on Afghanistan, Jake Sherman describes
the diversity of international, national, and subnational security providers in the country. He argues the main problem regarding contractors
is no alternative exists, as the Afghan National Army and Police lack
capacity to provide security on their own. However, even if national
forces were fully functional this would not eliminate the need for PSCs
completely, e.g. for static and convoy security for international forces.
The Chinese market for private security is large and characterized
by strict state control and ownership and limited access for foreign
firms. Jennifer Catallo explains that PSCs are mostly subsidiaries of
police forces, so-called Public Security Bureaus (PSBs). Private security companies are expected to make “social profits,” meaning they
should maintain social order and prevent crime. The market is not only
organized hierarchically but also vertically across municipalities–with
growing regional black markets not under government control.
Where then do these case studies leave us regarding the questions
laid out in the introduction, especially a market’s impact on a state’s
monopoly of force? The editors conclude that racketeer markets have
the most negative effects, while a neoliberal market is less harmful in
its consequences. For hybrid markets this varies, depending on how the
state exercises control and influences interaction with the market. Now
that is in line with what common sense would expect and might not
appear groundbreaking, but Dunigan and Petersohn’s project makes a
convincing case for paying closer attention to the market type when
analyzing consequences of private security.
As Deborah Avant notes in her foreword, the book is a step towards
describing and understanding market forms, even if some of the data
used in individual case studies seems not entirely reliable. It is also nice
to see an edited volume which identifies the methods used and follows
a clear structure in most, if not all chapters. One question that remains
is how the book’s findings relate to non-lethal services, which of course
make up a significant percentage of PSC services (with the exception
of the China and Czech Republic all chapters focus on lethal services).
Overall, the book makes a very interesting read for anyone studying
private security or civil-military relations.
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Terrorism, Inc. The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and
Irregular Warfare
By Colin P. Clarke
Reviewed by Alma Keshavarz, Department of Politics and Policy, PhD Student,
Claremont Graduate University.

T

errorism, Inc, written by Colin P. Clarke, an associate political scientist at
the RAND Corporation, uncovers how terror and insurgent groups
raise funds. The book’s subtitle, The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and
Irregular Warfare, is the subject of each chapter, which traces the financial
structure of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam, Hezbollah and Hamas, Afghan Taliban, and finally al-Qaeda
and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Clarke discourages fixating
on strict definitions of terms, arguing it defeats the purpose of solving
problems requiring immediate action. For instance, “Counterterrorism
(CT) is different than counterinsurgency (COIN) and ISIS is not
Al-Qaida, just as Hamas is different from Hezbollah.” (3) Instead, Clarke
recommends policies that target each group’s principles individually and
to follow a “targeted approach on a case by case basis.” (3) Ultimately,
Clarke’s research investigates the rise of non-state actors in a post-Cold
War era, specifically the diffusion of radical ideas in unstable states, and
porous borders that provide for terror and criminal safe havens.
As Clarke shows, the September 11, 2001 attacks changed the
nature of terror financing legislation and action. President Bush signed
Executive Order 13224, which effectively blocked finances “with
persons who commit, threat to commit, or support terrorism.” (25) The
UN Security Council additionally adopted Resolution 1373, which compelled all UN member states to outlaw any suspected terror finances,
freezing funds and assets among other provisions. Additionally, the USA
PATRIOT Act allowed law enforcement and the intelligence community to share information regarding terrorist finances and activities. The
realm of financial intelligence has significantly expanded to investigate
terror finances. Most notably, the Treasury Department established the
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) and the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, which jointly investigate terror financial activity with various branches of law enforcement. These have helped combat
the Afghan Taliban, which profits primarily from a dark economy.
Clarke asserts that cutting off the Taliban’s finances is the best method
to cripple the organization since the Obama administration’s increased
drone strikes have not been as effective as many thought they would be.
The post-9/11 era has focused predominately on al-Qaeda and most
recently, ISIS. Clarke examines the core of al-Qaeda and the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant, in which he references their social media
capabilities and reliance on the dark economy for funds. Al-Qaeda has
an extraordinary ability to adapt to their surroundings and ally themselves with other fundamentalist groups. The Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant, on the other hand, began “metastasizing following
the United States withdrawal of troops from Iraq in 2011.” (153) Their
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funds are generated mostly from black market oil trades, trafficking
women and antiquities, and are now “thought to be the most financially
well-endowed insurgent group ever.” (154) Above all, their social media
campaign is unlike any other the world has seen by a terror or insurgent
group.
Intelligence sharing and Treasury actions have worked in the past,
but need to be strengthened in this post-9/11 era with growing cyber
sophistication. That also means that financial institutions need be open
to allowing more restrictions that will in turn force terror and insurgent
groups to seek other avenues, which may make it easier for law enforcement to target group members. Overall, Clarke argues for a “follow
the money.” (26) strategy to pinpoint hotspots and monitor specific
individuals, and that may suggest providing additional resources to law
enforcement agencies to combat the gray and dark economies.
The framework of the book is easy to follow and makes it a quick
read. The policy recommendations are also rather practical. They focus
on increased Treasury responsibilities and intelligence sharing. Most
importantly, law enforcement agencies require additional resources to
keep up with growing terror advancements. Further, Clarke offers an
adequate introduction to the terror and insurgent groups with a brief
historical backdrop, followed by his analysis fitting neatly in each
thematic component. Ultimately, the book serves as a primer to the
organization and functionality of terror and insurgent groups and their
financial networks.

Violence after War: Explaining Instability in Post-Conflict
States
By Michael J. Boyle
Reviewed by James H. Lebovic, The George Washington University

M
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2014
448 pages.
$69.95

ichael J. Boyle’s new book offers a welcome look at post-conflict
violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Rwanda, East Timor,
and Iraq. Despite its title, the book sensitizes readers more generally to
the fallacy of assuming countries have graduated to post-conflict status
with the ostensible end of fighting. Conflict can persist when parties seek
to “renegotiate” the terms of a peace through violence, new parties arise
to stake their claim to power, or coalitions dissolve in disputes over the
division of the spoils.
The book focuses accordingly on “strategic violence” which is
“designed to transform the balance of power and resources in a state.”
(8) Such violence is most obvious when one or more of the contending
parties seeks to challenge the terms of a settlement having agreed to
them, perhaps, under duress or false pretenses. But strategic violence
sometimes has a more complex explanation with ambiguous evidentiary support. It can occur when groups fragment to pursue their own
(unclear) agendas; capitalize on ethnic, religious, or political conflict;
and engage in criminal activities and employ criminal gangs to mobilize
resources and target opponents for “strategic” purposes: “not only can
such violence be unconnected or only indirectly related to the cause
of the war itself, but it can also provide a space for opportunists to
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pursue a variety of personal or criminal vendettas, some of which will
be detached from the fighting that preceded it.” In consequence, “the
violence of the post-conflict period will often appear as an inchoate mix
of personal attacks, criminal violence, and political-strategic violence
significantly different from violence in the war that preceded it.” (5) In
Boyle’s terminology, strategic violence mixes with “expressive violence,”
an emotional response to loss or suffering, and “instrumental violence,”
undertaken for criminal or personal gain. The analytical challenge is
met, as Boyle recognizes, by ascertaining the collective (not individual)
motives behind the violence, as discerned from tell-tale, aggregate
patterns. For that effort, Boyle marshals revealing qualitative and quantitative evidence to portray trends over time in the various conflicts.
According to Boyle, the key to understanding the role of strategic violence in post-conflict countries is appreciating the distinction
between the “direct pathway” to violence in which the parties, targets,
and issues in contestation remain relatively constant (from the conflict
through the post-conflict periods) and the “indirect pathway” in which
groups splinter and violence is a function of “multiple and overlapping
bargaining games between new and emergent claimants for power and
resources.” (12) In discussing these pathways, Boyle’s central argument
reduces to four hypotheses that derive from a “2-by-2” table, structured around two binary (independent) variables. These variables are:
a) whether the original parties have accepted (yes or no) a settlement
and b) how much control (high or low) these parties exercise over their
membership. Simply put, strategic violence emerges through the direct
pathway when a party refuses to accept a settlement and through the
indirect pathway when the level of control is low. Consequently, strategic
violence can occur simultaneously through direct and indirect pathways
when a party refuses a settlement and when the level of control is low.
In positing these hypotheses and testing them against the case evidence, Boyle moves beyond the largely descriptive focus of the early
theoretical chapters to explain the occurrence of strategic violence. In its
illuminating detail, the case-study analysis provides support for Boyle’s
provocative arguments. Yet it also serves to highlight the book’s limitations, which are as follows.
First, the utility of Boyle’s approach rests on the viability of a “2-by-2”
table that assumes implicitly that the loss of control and nonacceptance
of a settlement by any side produces the same outcome. Second, the
variables in Boyle’s analysis are defined so generally and inclusively that
the underlying logic is arguably circular. Third, Boyle could have done
more to disclose the processes through which conflicts change. He duly
notes that conflicts are complex and fluid but provides little guidance for
predicting whether and when one pathway might give way to the other,
strategic violence might give rise to instrumental violence, or expressive
violence might build to the point that it becomes a strategic force, when
channeled effectively by newly emergent group leaders. Thus, Boyle’s use
of the phrase “as predicted” is somewhat misleading when he discusses
the fit between the book’s arguments and case evidence.
Notwithstanding these deficiencies, Boyle’s book offers valuable
insights on an understudied phenomenon of great importance to academic researchers and policymakers.
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